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Inside the Twisted Mind of the Security Professional




Inside the Twisted Mind of the Security Professional
Inside the Twisted Mind of the Security Professional



http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/03/securitymatters_0320 

By Bruce Schneier   
Security Matters
03.20.08

Uncle Milton Industries has been selling ant farms to children since 
1956. Some years ago, I remember opening one up with a friend. There 
were no actual ants included in the box. Instead, there was a card that 
you filled in with your address, and the company would mail you some 
ants. My friend expressed surprise that you could get ants sent to you 
in the mail.

I replied: "What's really interesting is that these people will send a 
tube of live ants to anyone you tell them to."

Security requires a particular mindset. Security professionals -- at 
least the good ones -- see the world differently. They can't walk into a 
store without noticing how they might shoplift. They can't use a 
computer without wondering about the security vulnerabilities. They 
can't vote without trying to figure out how to vote twice. They just 
can't help it.

SmartWater is a liquid with a unique identifier linked to a particular 
owner. "The idea is for me to paint this stuff on my valuables as proof 
of ownership," I wrote when I first learned about the idea. "I think a 
better idea would be for me to paint it on your valuables, and then call 
the police."

Really, we can't help it.

This kind of thinking is not natural for most people. It's not natural 
for engineers. Good engineering involves thinking about how things can 
be made to work; the security mindset involves thinking about how things 
can be made to fail. It involves thinking like an attacker, an adversary 
or a criminal. You don't have to exploit the vulnerabilities you find, 
but if you don't see the world that way, you'll never notice most 
security problems.

I've often speculated about how much of this is innate, and how much is 
teachable. In general, I think it's a particular way of looking at the 
world, and that it's far easier to teach someone domain expertise -- 
cryptography or software security or safecracking or document forgery -- 
than it is to teach someone a security mindset.

Which is why CSE 484, an undergraduate computer-security course taught 
this quarter at the University of Washington, is so interesting to 
watch. Professor Tadayoshi Kohno is trying to teach a security mindset.

You can see the results in the blog the students are keeping. They're 
encouraged to post security reviews about random things: smart pill 
boxes, Quiet Care Elder Care monitors, Apple's Time Capsule, GM's 
OnStar, traffic lights, safe deposit boxes and dorm-room security.

The most recent one is about an automobile dealership. The poster 
described how she was able to retrieve her car after service just by 
giving the attendant her last name. Now any normal car owner would be 
happy about how easy it was to get her car back, but someone with a 
security mindset immediately thinks: "Can I really get a car just by 
knowing the last name of someone whose car is being serviced?"

The rest of the blog post speculates on how someone could steal a car by 
exploiting this security vulnerability, and whether it makes sense for 
the dealership to have this lax security. You can quibble with the 
analysis -- I'm curious about the liability that the dealership has, and 
whether their insurance would cover any losses -- but that's all domain 
expertise. The important point is to notice, and then question, the 
security in the first place.

The lack of a security mindset explains a lot of bad security out there: 
voting machines, electronic payment cards, medical devices, ID cards, 
internet protocols. The designers are so busy making these systems work 
that they don't stop to notice how they might fail or be made to fail, 
and then how those failures might be exploited. Teaching designers a 
security mindset will go a long way toward making future technological 
systems more secure.

That part's obvious, but I think the security mindset is beneficial in 
many more ways. If people can learn how to think outside their narrow 
focus and see a bigger picture, whether in technology or politics or 
their everyday lives, they'll be more sophisticated consumers, more 
skeptical citizens, less gullible people.

If more people had a security mindset, services that compromise privacy 
wouldn't have such a sizable market share -- and Facebook would be 
totally different. Laptops wouldn't be lost with millions of unencrypted 
Social Security numbers on them, and we'd all learn a lot fewer security 
lessons the hard way. The power grid would be more secure. Identity 
theft would go way down. Medical records would be more private. If 
people had the security mindset, they wouldn't have tried to look at 
Britney Spears' medical records, since they would have realized that 
they would be caught.

There's nothing magical about this particular university class; anyone 
can exercise his security mindset simply by trying to look at the world 
from an attacker's perspective. If I wanted to evade this particular 
security device, how would I do it? Could I follow the letter of this 
law but get around the spirit? If the person who wrote this 
advertisement, essay, article or television documentary were 
unscrupulous, what could he have done? And then, how can I protect 
myself from these attacks?

The security mindset is a valuable skill that everyone can benefit from, 
regardless of career path.

-=-

Bruce Schneier is CTO of BT Counterpane and author of Beyond Fear: 
Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. You can read 
more of his writings on his website.


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