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China, CALEA, and FBI Internet wiretapping demands
China, CALEA, and FBI Internet wiretapping demands
China, CALEA, and FBI Internet wiretapping demands
Previous Politech messages:
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Fwd: [chineseinternetresearch] giving them ideas, state
subsidies, and having them manufacture the equipment ...
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2005 16:20:24 +0100
From: Greg Walton
To: Declan McCullagh
Below is thread from the Chinese Internet Research group that you may
find relevant to your message, [Politech] Making universities pay for
FBI surveillance, thank you very much FCC [priv].
All the best,
Begin forwarded message:
> From: Greg Walton
> Date: 23 October 2005 08:11:36 BDT
> To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> Subject: Re: [chineseinternetresearch] giving them ideas, state
> subsidies, and having them manufacture the equipment ...
> Reply-To: email@example.com
> ... and that's the tip of the iceberg.
> Thank you, Anne. I think the article is perhaps more on topic that
> you suggest. CALEA originates in 1988, so your criticism is of the
> Bush administrations (plural, all 3 - er...so far). In China the PSB
> and the MSS is responsible for wiretapping, rather than the MII.
> With regards to the internationalization of CALEA as it relates to
> China in particular I would like to quote a summary of the respected
> privacy expert and Sun Microsystems employee Susan Landau, speaking
> at the 8th USENIX Security Symposium, August 23-26, 1999 in
> Washington, D.C.,
> . . . Landau is often asked for her opinion of what the future holds
> here. She feels there is a race going on. This race involves what the
> NSA and/or the FBI are trying to get away with, and what happens in
> Europe. If enough European competition starts taking away US
> business, then Congress may pass a certain set of laws. She also
> feels the FBI has a much more polarized view than the NSA; the NSA
> knows the game is lost as far as crypto goes, and it has a vested
> interest in the security of the US industry. A weak US computer
> industry makes the job of the NSA that much more difficult. Export
> controls that hamper the US computer industry are problematic
> precisely for that reason. She also feels that the currently admired
> practice of open source may change or influence the policy. If source
> code becomes public information, it will be harder to enforce export
> control, since the reason to do so will become less relevant.
> She ended her talk with a poignant story that took place shortly
> after CALEA passed. The FBI invited law enforcement from around the
> world to learn how to install and use similar wiretapping
> capabilities of digital switching technology. One of the police
> forces invited belonged to Hong Kong, which is now under Chinese
> jurisdiction; every year the State Department lists human-rights
> abuses from around the globe, and China is consistently at the top of
> this list. She ended with twin questions, "What are the technologies
> we're exporting, and what are the values we're exporting?"
> There is nothing new in the following, its all in fact extracted from
> China's Golden Shield:
> As you are probably aware,
> "there is increasing concern that much of this surveillance
> technology is being exported, without any end-use criteria, to
> countries that flagrantly abuse the fundamental human rights of their
> citizens. Governments of countries with poorly developed
> infrastructures rely on industrialized countries to supply them with
> surveillance equipment. The transfer of surveillance technology from
> the developed to the developing world is now an important component
> of the post-Cold War arms industry. (8) With scant attention given to
> differing levels of human rights compliance, standardization across
> national borders is leading many to argue that a global architecture
> of electronic surveillance is emerging, with its origins in the US
> law enforcement community."
> As early as 1988, in a program known internally to the US Federal
> Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as "Operation Root Canal," US law
> enforcement officials demanded that telephone companies alter their
> equipment to facilitate the interception of messages. All but one of
> the major global telecom companies refused to contemplate altering
> their equipment. The exception was a Canadian company, Nortel
> Networks, which agreed to work closely with the FBI. More than 75% of
> North American Internet backbone traffic travels across Nortel
> Networks systems, and the company derives a significant proportion of
> its sales revenue from the US telecom market.
> Given Nortel=92s early involvement in the development of standards in
> support of the CALEA legislation, it is natural that the first
> digital switch to reach market, and give service providers and
> vendors the ability to meet basic CALEA compliance, should be
> manufactured by Nortel.
> The sophisticated DMS Supernode switching technology is manufactured
> in China through a joint venture with the Chinese government known as
> GDNT (Guangdong Nortel). At the time, Nortel said of this technology
> transfer that it "will contribute immeasurably to the development of
> the Chinese telecommunications industry."
> In terms of funding, Nortel invested an extra US$37 million in GDNT
> (on top of funds agreed in a 1993 Memorandum of Understanding [MOU]
> with the state planning commission) =96 an investment that followed hot-
> on-the-heels of the announcement that the US government would pay
> equipment manufacturers compensation for the implementation of CALEA
> Of course, not mentioned in Golden Shield was that the establishment
> of GDNT was skillfully facilitated by the *alleged* double/triple
> agent Ms.Katrina Leung acting as a consultant for Nortel - while
> *allegedly* spying for China, while acting as a spy for the FBI.
> According to allegations, Ms. Leung had affairs with two FBI agents
> over a 20-year period while she was being paid $1.7-million (U.S.) by
> the FBI to spy on China. However, court documents allege that she was
> also spying for China and stole documents from the agents. During
> that period, Ms. Leung, whose code name was Parlor Maid, also ran a
> consulting business and her clients included Nortel, which paid her
> $1.2-million to help open markets in China. She was also active in
> the Republican Party and attended U.S. President George W. Bush's
> "Mrs. Leung has never been an employee of Nortel Networks. Mrs.
> Leung was the president of a firm engaged by Nortel Networks in the
> early 1990s as a representative to assist us in the creation of a
> Chinese joint venture," said Tina Warren, a Nortel spokeswoman. "The
> firm was paid for its services and our business relationship with it
> terminated in 1996. Documents filed in court show that Nortel hired
> Ms. Leung's company, Merry Glory Ltd., in October, 1990, to help
> establish a joint venture in China: GDNT. Nortel was subpoenaed in
> January and handed over all documents relating to Ms. Leung.
> Ms.Leung's defense argued that the alleged double agent is loyal U.S.
> "It's not even the tip of the iceberg here," Levine said. "What we
> have here is a woman who pledged her allegiance to this country ...
> for many years she worked at the direction and the control of the
> FBI. "She was used by them to do what they wanted her to do. She
> acted as they told her to act." Levine said the FBI's handling of her
> client now looks like "absolute abuse." She mentioned that Smith, her
> handler, and another FBI agent had been sleeping with her.
> On 23 Oct 2005, at 07:21, Anne Stevenson-Yang wrote:
>> Not on topic, but I can't resist noting that here goes the Bush
>> Admin again,
>> one-upping China in invasiveness and disregard for individual
>> Imagine if MII tried to do this. I'm curious: who is planning to
>> such a "network operations center," and what would its daily
>> activities be?
>> The core of the plan:
>> "But the federal law would apply a high-tech approach, enabling law
>> enforcement to monitor communications at campuses from remote
>> locations at
>> the turn of a switch.
>> It would require universities to re-engineer their networks so that
>> Net access point would send all communications not directly onto the
>> Internet, but first to a network operations center where the data
>> could be stitched together into a single package for delivery to law
>> enforcement, university officials said."
>> Colleges Protest Call to Upgrade Online Systems
>> - E-Mail This
>> - Printer-Friendly2005/10/23/technology/23college.html?
>> - Single-Page2005/10/23/technology/23college.html?
>> - Reprints <#>
>> - Save Article <#>
>> By SAM DILLON
>> Published: October 23, 2005
>> The federal government, vastly extending the reach of an 11-year-
>> old law, is
>> requiring hundreds of universities, online communications companies
>> cities to overhaul their Internet computer networks to make it
>> easier for
>> law enforcement authorities to monitor e-mail and other online
>> Skip to next paragraph <#secondParagraph> Phil Sears for The New
>> York Times
>> Larry D. Conrad of Florida State University calls the order to
>> Internet systems "overkill."
>> [image: Related] Related Site: Communications Assistance for Law
>> Act (fcc.gov )
>> The action, which the government says is intended to help catch
>> and other criminals, has unleashed protests and the threat of
>> lawsuits from
>> universities, which argue that it will cost them at least $7
>> billion while
>> doing little to apprehend lawbreakers. Because the government would
>> have to
>> win court orders before undertaking surveillance, the universities
>> are not
>> raising civil liberties issues.
>> The order, issued by the Federal Communications Commission in
>> August and
>> first published in the Federal Register last week, extends the
>> provisions of
>> a 1994 wiretap law not only to universities, but also to libraries,
>> providing wireless service and commercial Internet access providers.
>> It also applies to municipalities that provide Internet access to
>> be they rural towns or cities like Philadelphia and San Francisco,
>> have plans to build their own Net access networks.
>> So far, however, universities have been most vocal in their
>> The 1994 law, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,
>> requires telephone carriers to engineer their switching systems at
>> their own
>> cost so that federal agents can obtain easy surveillance access.
>> Recognizing the growth of Internet-based telephone and other
>> the order requires that organizations like universities providing
>> access also comply with the law by spring 2007.
>> The Justice Department requested the order last year, saying that new
>> technologies like telephone service over the Internet were
>> endangering law
>> enforcement's ability to conduct wiretaps "in their fight against
>> terrorists and spies."
>> Justice Department officials, who declined to comment for this
>> article, said
>> in their written comments filed with the Federal Communications
>> that the new requirements were necessary to keep the 1994 law
>> "viable in the
>> face of the monumental shift of the telecommunications industry"
>> and to
>> enable law enforcement to "accomplish its mission in the face of
>> advancing technology."
>> The F.C.C. says it is considering whether to exempt educational
>> from some of the law's provisions, but it has not granted an
>> extension for
>> Lawyers for the American Council on Education, the nation's largest
>> association of universities and colleges, are preparing to appeal
>> the order
>> before the United
>> of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Terry W. Hartle, a
>> senior vice president of the council, said Friday.
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