AOH :: P15-08.TXT

PWN III: The Affidavit



                       #### PHRACK PRESENTS ISSUE 15 ####

                    ^*^*^*^Phrack World News, Part 1^*^*^*^

                             **** File 8 of 10 ****



SEARCH WARRANT ON WRITTEN AFFIDAVIT

DATE: 7/17/87

TO: Special Agent Lewis F. Jackson II, U.S. Secret Service or any agent d use of ac-
cess devices, and Title 18 USC 1030 - Computer related fraud.

WHEN: On or before (10 days) at any time day or night

------------

AFFIDAVIT

   "I, Lewis F. Jackson II, first being duly sworn, do depose and state:..."

[Here he goes on and on about his position in the San Jose Secret Service, 
classes he has taken (none of them having to do with computers)]

   "Other individuals involved in the investigation:

     Detective  J. McMullen  -  Stanford Public Safety/Specialist in computers
     Steve Daugherty           -  Pacific Bell Telephone (sic)/ Specialist in fraud
     Stephen Hansen            -  Stanford Electrical Eng./ Director
     Brian Bales		  -  Sprint Telecom./ Security Investigator
     M. Locker                      -  ITT Communications/ Security Investigator
     Jerry Slaughter             -   MCI Communications/Security Investigator

4.  On 11/14/86, I met with Detective Sgt. John McMullen, who related the                                       
following:

      a.  Beginning on or about 9/1/86, an unknown suspect or group of sus-
pects using the code name Pink Floyd repeatedly accessed the Unix and Por-
tia computer systems at Stanford University without authorization.  

      b.  The suspects initially managed to decode the password of a computer 
user called "Laurent" and used the account without the permission or knowl-
edge of the account holder.  The true account holder was given a new ac-
count and a program was set up to print out all activity on the "Laurent" ac-
count.

       c & d.  Mentions the systems that were accessed illegally, the most
'dangerous' being Arpanet (geeeee)

       e.  Damage was estimated at $10,000 by Director of Stanford Computers.

       g.  On 1/13/87, the suspect(s) resumed regular break-ins to the 
"Laurent" account, however traps and traces were initially unsuccessful in 
identifying the suspect(s) because the suspect(s) dialed into the Stanford 
Computer System via Sprint or MCI lines, which did not have immediate trap 
and trace capabilities.  

6.  On 2/19/87 I forwarded the details of my investigation and a request for 
collateral investigation to the New York Field Office of The U.S. Secret Ser-
vice.  (The USSS [I could say something dumb about USSR here]).  SA Walter 
Burns was assigned the investigation.

7.  SA Burns reported telphonicaly that comparison of the times at which 
Stanford suffered break ins [aahhh, poor Stanford] with that of DNR's on sus-
pects in New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland and California 
showed a correlation.

8.  [Some stuff about Oryan QUEST engineering Cosmos numbers].  
  
9.  On 4/2/87, I was telephoned again by Mr. Daugherty who  reported that 
on 4/1/87, while checking a trouble signal on the above DNR's [on Oryan's 
lines], he overheard a call between the central figure in the New York 
investigation and [Oryan Quest's real name.]  Mr.  Daughtery was able to 
identify and distinguish between the three suspects because they addressed 
each other by there first name.  During the conversation,  [Oryan Quest] 
acknowledged being a member of L.O.D. (Legion Of Doom), a very private and 
exclusive group of computer hackers.  [Oryan QUEST never was a member.]  

10.  [Mr. Daughtery continued to listen while QUEST tried to engineer some 
stuff.  Gee what a coincidence that a security investigator was investigating a 
technical problem at the same time a conversation with 2 of the suspects 
was happening, and perhaps he just COULDN'T disconnect and so had to lis-
ten in for 20 minutes or so.  What luck.]

11.  SA Burns reported that the suspects in New York regularly called the 
suspects in California.

14.  From 4/30/87 to 6/15/87 DNR's were on both California suspects and 
were monitored by me.  

[The data from the DNR's was 'analyzed' and sent to Sprint, MCI, and ITT to 
check on codes.  Damages claimed by the various LDX's were:

SPRINT:  Oryan QUEST : 3 codes for losses totaling $4,694.72
              Mark Of CA    : 2 codes for losses totaling $1,912.57 
      
ITT      :  Mark Of CA    : 4 codes for losses totaling $639 

MCI      :  Mark Of Ca    : 1 code for losses totaling $1,813.62

And the winner is....Oryan QUEST at $4,694.72 against Mark with $4,365.19.]

20.  Through my training and investigation I have learned that people who 
break into computers ("hackers") and people who fraudulently obtain 
telecommunications services ("freakers") are a highly sophisticated and close 
knit group.  They routinely communicate with each other directly or through 
electronic bulletin boards.

     [Note: When a phrack reporter called Lewis Jackson and asked why after 
his no doubt extensive training he didn't spell "freakers" correctly with a 'ph' 
he reacted rather rudely.]

21. 
22. [Jackson's in depth analysis of what hackers have ("Blue Boxes are 
23.  normally made from pocket calculators...") and their behavior]
24.

26.  Through my training and investigations, I have learned that evidence 
stored in computers, floppy disks, and speed dialers is very fragile and can 
be destroyed in a matter of seconds by several methods including but not 
limited to: striking one or more keys on the computer keyboard to trigger a 
preset computer program to delete information stored within, passing a 
strong magnetic source in close proximity to a computer, throwing a light 
switch designed to either trigger a preset program or cut power in order to 
delete information stored in a computer or speed dialer or computer; or sim-
ply delivering a sharp blow to the computer.  [Blunt blows don't cut it.]

27.  Because of the ease with which evidence stored in computers can be de-
stroyed or transferred, it is essential that search warrants be executed at a 
time when the suspect is least likely to be physically operating the target 
computer system and least likely to have access to methods of destroying or 
transferring evidence stored within the system.  Because of the rapidity of 
modern communications and the ability to destroy or transfer evidence re-
motely by one computer to another, it is also essential that in cases involving 
multiple suspects, all search warrants must be executed simultaneously.


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