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TUCoPS :: Malware :: ca200111.txt

Sadmind/IIS Worm




CERT Advisory CA-2001-11 sadmind/IIS Worm

   Original release date: May 08, 2001
   Last revised: May 10, 2001
   Source: CERT/CC
   
   A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
   
Systems Affected

     * Systems running unpatched versions of Microsoft IIS
     * Systems running unpatched versions of Solaris up to, and
       including, Solaris 7
       
Overview

   The CERT/CC has received reports of a new piece of self-propagating
   malicious code (referred to here as the sadmind/IIS worm). The worm
   uses two well-known vulnerabilities to compromise systems and deface
   web pages.
   
I. Description

   Based on preliminary analysis, the sadmind/IIS worm exploits a
   vulnerability in Solaris systems and subsequently installs software to
   attack Microsoft IIS web servers. In addition, it includes a component
   to propagate itself automatically to other vulnerable Solaris systems.
   It will add "+ +" to the .rhosts file in the root user's home
   directory. Finally, it will modify the index.html on the host Solaris
   system after compromising 2,000 IIS systems.
   
   To compromise the Solaris systems, the worm takes advantage of a
   two-year-old buffer overflow vulnerability in the Solstice sadmind
   program. For more information on this vulnerability, see
   
          http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/28934
          http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html
          
   After successfully compromising the Solaris systems, it uses a
   seven-month-old vulnerability to compromise the IIS systems. For
   additional information about this vulnerability, see
   
          http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677
          
   Solaris systems that are successfully compromised via the worm exhibit
   the following characteristics:
   
     *
Sample syslog entry from compromised Solaris system

May  7 02:40:01 carrier.example.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Bus Error -
core dumped
May  7 02:40:01 carrier.example.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:40:03 carrier.example.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:40:06 carrier.example.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Segmentation
 Fault - core dumped
May  7 02:40:03 carrier.example.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:40:06 carrier.example.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Segmentation
 Fault - core dumped
May  7 02:40:08 carrier.example.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Hangup
May  7 02:40:08 carrier.example.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:44:14 carrier.example.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Killed
     * A rootshell listening on TCP port 600
     * Existence of the directories
       
     * /dev/cub contains logs of compromised machines
     * /dev/cuc contains tools that the worm uses to operate and
       propagate
       
     Running processes of the scripts associated with the worm, such as
   the following:
     * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/sadmin.sh
     * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 111
     * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 80
     * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/uniattack.sh
     * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/time.sh
     * /usr/sbin/inetd -s /tmp/.f
     * /bin/sleep 300
       
   Microsoft IIS servers that are successfully compromised exhibit the
   following characteristics:
   
     * Modified web pages that read as follows:
                            fuck USA Government
                               fuck PoizonBOx
                       contact:sysadmcn@yahoo.com.cn
     *
Sample Log from Attacked IIS Server

2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 GET /scripts/../../winnt/syste
m32/cmd.exe /c+dir 200 -
2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 GET /scripts/../../winnt/syste
m32/cmd.exe /c+dir+..\ 200 -
2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
           GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+copy+\winnt\system32\cm
d.exe+root.exe 502 -
2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
           GET /scripts/root.exe /c+echo+<HTML code inserted here>.././index
.asp 502 -
       
II. Impact

   Solaris systems compromised by this worm are being used to scan and
   compromise other Solaris and IIS systems. IIS systems compromised by
   this worm can suffer modified web content.
   
   Intruders can use the vulnerabilities exploited by this worm to
   execute arbitrary code with root privileges on vulnerable Solaris
   systems, and arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
   IUSR_machinename account on vulnerable Windows systems.
   
   We are receiving reports of other activity, including one report of
   files being destroyed on the compromised Windows machine, rendering
   them unbootable. It is unclear at this time if this activity is
   directly related to this worm.
   
III. Solutions

Apply a patch from your vendor

   A patch is available from Microsoft at
   
          http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-078.asp
          
          For IIS Version 4:
          http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/nts/downloads/critical/q26986
          2/default.asp
          
          For IIS Version 5:
          http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/downloads/critical/q269862
          /default.asp
          
   Additional advice on securing IIS web servers is available from
   
          http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/iis5chk.asp
          http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools.asp
          
   Apply a patch from Sun Microsystems as described in Sun Security
   Bulletin #00191:
   
          http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?
          doctype=coll&doc=secbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba
          
Appendix A. Vendor Information

Microsoft Corporation

   The following documents regarding this vulnerability are available
   from Microsoft:
   
          http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-078.asp
          
Sun Microsystems

   Sun has issued the following bulletin for this vulnerability:
   
          http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?
          doctype=coll&doc=secbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba
          
References

    1. Vulnerability Note VU#111677: Microsoft IIS 4.0 / 5.0 vulnerable
       to directory traversal via extended unicode in url (MS00-078)
       http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677
    2. CERT Advisory CA-1999-16 Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstice
       AdminSuite Daemon sadmind
       http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html
       
   Authors:  Chad Dougherty, Shawn Hernan, Jeff Havrilla, Jeff Carpenter,
   Art Manion, Ian Finlay, John Shaffer
   ______________________________________________________________________
   
   This document is available from:
   http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-11.html
   ______________________________________________________________________
   
CERT/CC Contact Information

   Email: cert@cert.org
          Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
          Fax: +1 412-268-6989
          Postal address:
          CERT Coordination Center
          Software Engineering Institute
          Carnegie Mellon University
          Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
          U.S.A.
          
   CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
   EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
   during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
   
    Using encryption
    
   We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
   Our public PGP key is available from
   
   http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
       
   If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
   information.
   
    Getting security information
    
   CERT publications and other security information are available from
   our web site
   
   http://www.cert.org/
       
   To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
   send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your
   message
   
   subscribe cert-advisory
   
   * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
   Patent and Trademark Office.
   ______________________________________________________________________
   
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   Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
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     _________________________________________________________________
   
   Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
   
   Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.
   
   Revision History
May 08, 2001: Initial Release
May 08, 2001: Formatting change to improve printing
May 08, 2001: Correct link in the vendor section to point to the correct Micros
oft Bulletin.
              Our apologies to Microsoft for the error.
May 10, 2001: Changed sanitized logs to example.com


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