-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
Vulnerabilities in Sendmail
December 5,1997 20:00 GMT Number G-43a
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: There are two vulnerabilities in sendmail. The first
vulnerability is a resource starvation problem and the second
is a buffer overflow problem.
PLATFORM: Systems running any version of sendmail up to and including
sendmail 8.7.5.
DAMAGE: By exploiting these vulnerabilities, a local user can obtain
root access.
SOLUTION: Apply the patches and/or workarounds provided in the bulletin
below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY These vulnerabilities are widely known.
ASSESSMENT:
______________________________________________________________________________
[Appended to G-43 on December 5,1997 with additional patch information from
Sun Microsystems, Inc.]
[Begin CERT Bulletin]
=============================================================================
CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.20
Original issue date: September 18, 1996
Last revised: --
Topic: Sendmail Vulnerabilities
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*** This advisory supersedes CA-95:05 ***
The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of two security problems in
sendmail that affect all versions up to and including 8.7.5. By exploiting
the first of these vulnerabilities, users who have local accounts can gain
access to the default user, which is often daemon. By exploiting the second
vulnerability, any local user can gain root access.
The CERT/CC team recommends installing vendor patches or upgrading to the
current version of sendmail (8.7.6). Until you can do so, we urge you to
apply the workaround provided in Sec. III.C. In all cases, be sure to take
the extra precautions listed in Sec. III.D.
For beta testers of sendmail 8.8: The vulnerabilities described in this
advisory have been fixed in the beta version.
We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please
check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site. In
addition, you can check ftp://info.cert.org/pub/latest_sw_versions/sendmail
to identify the most current version of sendmail.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Description
There are two vulnerabilities in all versions of sendmail up to and
including sendmail 8.7.5. The first vulnerability is a resource
starvation and the second is a buffer overflow problem.
Resource Starvation
-------------------
When email is forwarded to a program using a .forward file or an
:include: statement within a .forward or alias file, that program is
executed as the owner of the .forward file or the file referenced by the
:include: statement. Similarly, if email is forwarded to a file, that
file is opened as the owner of the .forward file or the file referenced
by the :include: statement. The file owner is called the "controlling
user."
If the message cannot be delivered immediately, the name of the
controlling user is written into the queue file along with the other
delivery information so that the appropriate permissions can be acquired
when the mail queue is processed.
Only the name of the controlling user is written in the queue file. This
name is derived by calling the system routine getpwuid(3) on the user id
of the file owner. If getpwuid fails, the sendmail default user (defined
by the DefaultUser option in 8.7 and by the "u" and "g" options in older
releases) is assumed.
In some cases, the system can be forced into resource starvation, thus
forcing getpwuid(3) to fail even though an entry exists in /etc/passwd
corresponding to that uid. Since getpwuid has no way of portably
returning an error meaning "resource failure" as distinct from "user id
not found," sendmail has no way of distinguishing between these cases; it
assumes that the uid is unknown and falls back to the default user.
By starving sendmail of specific resources, sendmail will create files
owned by the default user. Once created, these files can be used to
access other files owned by the default user. In addition, these files
owned by the default user can be used to leverage access to other
privileged users on the system.
Buffer Overflows
----------------
There are several buffer overflows present in sendmail version 8.7.5 and
earlier. Some of the buffer overflows could result in local users gaining
unauthorized root access.
Significant work has been done on sendmail version 8.8 (now in beta
test) to eliminate the problem, and the code changes originally planned
for 8.8 have been backported to 8.7.6 to address these vulnerabilities.
II. Impact
Resource Starvation
-------------------
Anyone with access to an account on the system can run programs or write
files as the default user. The danger of compromising the default user
depends primarily on the other files in your system owned by that user.
For example, on many systems the line printer spool directory (e.g.,
/var/spool/lpd) is owned by daemon; because the line printer subsystem
runs setuid root, it may be possible to gain additional privileges.
However, some other systems have no files owned by user daemon on the
default system, and the only files owned by group daemon are not
writable by that group; hence, the danger is minimal.
Buffer Overflows
----------------
Anyone with access to an account on the system can gain root access.
III. Solution
Install a patch from your vendor if one is available (Sec. A) or upgrade
to the current version of sendmail (Sec. B). Until you can take one of
those actions, we recommend applying the workaround described in Sec. C.
This workaround addresses the resource starvation problem but not buffer
overflows.
In all cases, you should take the precautions listed in Sec. D.
Note to beta testers of sendmail 8.8: The vulnerabilities described in
this advisory have been fixed in the beta version of 8.8.
A. Install a vendor patch.
Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information about
sendmail. Details are in Appendix A of this advisory; we will update
the appendix as we receive more information. If your vendor's name
is not on this list, please contact the vendor directly.
Digital Equipment Corporation
Hewlett-Packard Company
IBM Corporation
Linux
Open Software Foundation
The Santa Cruz Operation
Silicon Graphics Inc.
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
B. Upgrade to the current version of sendmail.
Install sendmail 8.7.6. This version is a "drop in" replacement for
8.7.x. There is no patch for 8.6.x. If you are using version 8.6 or
earlier, you need to upgrade to the current version and rebuild your
sendmail.cf files. Upgrading to version 8.7.6 addresses both
vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
Sendmail 8.7.6 is available from
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/ucb/src/sendmail/sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail/sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail/sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz
MD5 (sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz) = 4a1f2179c53c9106bc8d7738f4d55667
Also in that directory are .Z and .sig files. The .Z file contains the
same bits as the .gz file, but is compressed using UNIX compress
instead of gzip. The .sig is Eric Allman's PGP signature for the
uncompressed tar file. The key fingerprint is
Type bits/keyID Date User ID
pub 1024/BF7BA421 1995/02/23 Eric P. Allman <eric@CS.Berkeley.EDU>
Key fingerprint = C0 28 E6 7B 13 5B 29 02 6F 7E 43 3A 48 4F 45 29
Eric P. Allman <eric@Reference.COM>
Eric P. Allman <eric@Usenix.ORG>
Eric P. Allman <eric@Sendmail.ORG>
Eric P. Allman <eric@CS.Berkeley.EDU>
We strongly recommend that when you change to a new version of
Sendmail you also change to the configuration files that are provided
with that version.
Significant work has been done to make this task easier. It is now
possible to build a sendmail configuration file (sendmail.cf) using
the configuration files provided with the sendmail release. Consult
the cf/README file for a more complete explanation. Creating your
configuration files using this method makes it easier to incorporate
future changes to sendmail into your configuration files.
Finally, for Sun users, a paper is available to help you convert your
sendmail configuration files from the Sun version of sendmail to one
that works with sendmail version 8.7.x. The paper is entitled
"Converting Standard Sun Config Files to Sendmail Version 8" and was
written by Rick McCarty of Texas Instruments Inc. It is included in
the distribution and is located in contrib/converting.sun.configs.
C. Apply a workaround.
Resource Starvation
-------------------
Eric Allman, the author of sendmail, has provided the following
workaround to the resource starvation vulnerability.
Using smrsh as "prog" mailer limits the programs that can be run as
the default user. Smrsh does not limit the files that can be written,
but less damage can be done by writing files directly.
The damage can be almost entirely constrained by ensuring that the
default user is an innocuous one. Sendmail defaults to 1:1 (daemon)
only because that is reasonably portable. A special "mailnull"
account that is used only for this purpose would be better. This user
should own no files and should have neither a real home directory nor
a real shell. A sample password entry might be:
mailnull:*:32765:32765:Sendmail Default User:/no/such/dir:/dev/null
A corresponding entry should be made in /etc/group:
mailnull:*:32765:
These assume that there are no other users or groups with id = 32765
on your system; if there are, pick some other unique value. After
creating this user, change the line in /etc/sendmail.cf reading
O DefaultUser=1:1
to read
O DefaultUser=mailnull
If you are running 8.6.*, you will have to change the lines reading
Ou1
Og1
to read
Ou32765
Og32765
Finally, if you are using the m4(1)-based sendmail configuration scheme
provided with sendmail 8.7.*, you should add the following line to the
m4 input file, usually named sendmail.mc:
define(`confDEF_USER_ID', 32765:32765)
The actual values should, of course, match those in the passwd file.
Buffer Overflows
----------------
There is no workaround for the buffer overflow problem. To address this
problem, you must apply your vendor's patches or upgrade to the current
version of sendmail (version 8.7.6).
D. Take additional precautions.
Regardless of which solution you apply, you should take these extra
precautions to protect your systems.
* Use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh)
With *all* versions of sendmail, use the sendmail restricted shell
program (smrsh). You should do this whether you use vendor-supplied
sendmail or install sendmail yourself. Using smrsh gives you improved
administrative control over the programs sendmail executes on behalf of
users.
A number of sites have reported some confusion about the need to continue
using the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh) when they install a
vendor patch or upgrade to a new version of sendmail. You should always
use the smrsh program.
smrsh is included in the sendmail distribution in the subdirectory
smrsh. See the RELEASE_NOTES file for a description of how to integrate
smrsh into your sendmail configuration file.
smrsh is also distributed with some operating systems.
* Use mail.local
If you run /bin/mail based on BSD 4.3 UNIX, replace /bin/mail with
mail.local, which is included in the sendmail distribution. It is also
included with some other operating systems distributions, such as
FreeBSD.
Although the current version of mail.local is not a perfect solution, it
is important to use it because it addresses vulnerabilities that are
being exploited. For more details, see CERT advisory CA-95:02.
Note that as of Solaris 2.5 and beyond, mail.local is included with the
standard distribution. To use mail.local, replace all references to
/bin/mail with /usr/lib/mail.local. If you are using the M4(1)-based
configuration scheme provided with sendmail 8.X, add the following to
your configuration file:
define(`LOCAL_MAILER_PATH', /usr/lib/mail.local)
* WARNING: Check for executable copies of old versions of mail programs
If you leave executable copies of older versions of sendmail installed
in /usr/lib (on some systems, it may be installed elsewhere), the
vulnerabilities in those versions could be exploited if an intruder
gains access to your system. This applies to sendmail.mx as well as
other sendmail programs. Either delete these versions or change the
protections on them to be non-executable.
Similarly, if you replace /bin/mail with mail.local, remember to remove
old copies of /bin/mail or make them non-executable.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix A - Vendor Information
Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this
advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information.
If you do not see your vendor's name, please contact the vendor directly.
Digital Equipment Corporation
=============================
[About the resource starvation problem]
Source:
Software Security Response Team
Copyright (c) Digital Equipment Corporation 1996. All rights reserved.
08.SEP.1996
At the time of writing this document, patches (binary kits) for Digital's
UNIX related operating systems are being developed. Digital will provide
notice of availability for remedial kits through AES services (DIA, DSNlink
FLASH), placed in the public FTP patch service domain and also be
available from your normal Digital Support channel.
ftp://ftp.service.digital.com/public/{OS/{vn.n}
| |
| |--version
|--osf or ultrix
9/96 - DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
Hewlett-Packard Company
=======================
[About the resource starvation problem]
HP-UX is vulnerable, and a patch is in progress.
The HP SupportLine Mail Service provides notification of security patches
for HP-UX to its 'security_info' mailing list. For information on the
service, send mail to support@us.external.hp.com with 'help' in the body of
the message (without quotes).
To report new security defects in HP software, send mail to
security-alert@hp.com.
IBM Corporation
================
The following APARs are being developed and will be available shortly.
See the appropriate release below to determine your action.
AIX 3.2
-------
Apply the following fixes to your system:
APAR - IX61303 IX61307
AIX 4.1
-------
Apply the following fixes to your system:
APAR - IX61162 IX61306
To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following
command:
instfix -ik IX61162 IX61306
AIX 4.2
-------
Apply the following fixes to your system:
APAR - IX61304 IX61305
To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following
command:
instfix -ik IX61304 IX61305
To Order
--------
APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist)
or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist,
http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/
or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist".
IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines
Corporation.
Linux
=====
[For the resource starvation problem:]
Debian Linux: not vulnerable (uses smail)
Red Hat and derivatives:
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat-3.0.3/i386/updates/RPMS/sendmail*
Open Software Foundation
========================
OSF's OSF/1 R1.3.2 is not vulnerable to these types of attacks described in
the resource starvation sections of the advisory.
OSF's OSF/1 R1.3.2 is vulnerable to the buffer overflow problems.
We will address the problem in our next maintenance release.
The Santa Cruz Operation
========================
Any SCO operating system running a version of sendmail provided by SCO
is vulnerable to this problem. SCO is providing Support Level
Supplement (SLS) oss443a for the following releases to address this issue:
SCO Internet FastStart release 1.0.0
SCO OpenServer releases 5.0.0 and 5.0.2
This SLS provides a pre-release version of sendmail release 8.7.6
for these platforms. SCO hopes to have a final version of sendmail 8.7.6
available to address both issues mentioned in this advisory in the near
future.
Note that only SCO Internet FastStart uses sendmail as the default mail
system. All other SCO operating systems use other mail systems such as the
Multi-Channel Memorandum Distribution Facility (MMDF) or the "mailsurr"
mail system as the default, and as such are not vulnerable to this
problem unless otherwise configured to use sendmail.
SCO intends to provide a similar patch for SCO UnixWare release 2.1.0
in the near future.
When configured to use a version of sendmail provided by SCO, releases
prior to the ones mentioned here are also vulnerable, but no
plans have yet been made concerning patches for these earlier releases.
You can download SLS oss443a as shown below.
Anonymous ftp (World Wide Web URL)
-------------
ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SSE/oss443a (SLS image)
ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SSE/oss443a.ltr.sse (cover letter/install notes)
Compuserve
----------
SLS oss443a is also available in the SCO Forum on Compuserve.
SCO Online Support (SOS) BBS
----------------------------
SLS oss443a can also be downloaded interactively via X, Y, or Z MODEM or
Kermit, using the SCO Online Support System (SOS). Follow the menu
selections under "Toolchest" from the main SOS menu.
The phone numbers available for interactive transfer from SOS are:
1-408-426-9495 (USA)
+44 (0)1923 210 888 (United Kingdom)
Checksums
---------
sum -r
------
13804 630 oss443a
35304 14 oss443a.ltr.sse
MD5
---
MD5 (oss443a) = 549260a71ca76f4e98dd38bccb72748c
MD5 (oss443a.ltr.sse) = 7475d83f0db64a1af69eb66cd392a9d3
Be sure to keep track of the README file at ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SSE/README
for updates to this supplement.
If you have further questions, contact your support provider. If you
need to contact SCO, please send electronic mail to support@sco.COM, or
contact SCO as follows.
USA/Canada: 6am-5pm Pacific Daylight Time (PDT)
-----------
1-800-347-4381 (voice)
1-408-427-5443 (fax)
Pacific Rim, Asia, and Latin American customers: 6am-5pm Pacific
------------------------------------------------ Daylight Time
(PDT)
1-408-425-4726 (voice)
1-408-427-5443 (fax)
Europe, Middle East, Africa: 9am-5:30pm Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)
----------------------------
+44 (0)1923 816344 (voice)
+44 (0)1923 817781 (fax)
Silicon Graphics, Inc.
======================
We are analyzing the vulnerability, and will provide additional
information as it becomes available.
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
======================
Sun is working on a patch which will fix both problems, and we expect to
have it out by the end of the month. Also, we will send out a Sun bulletin
on this subject at about the same time.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- -
The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Eric Allman, the author of sendmail,
for his extensive assistance with this advisory, Wolfgang Ley of DFN-CERT for
his support in the development of the advisory, and D. J. Bernstein of the
University of Illinois at Chicago for reporting the resource starvation
vulnerability.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[End CERT Bulletin]
[Append Sun Microsystems, Inc. Bulletin]
______________________________________________________________________________
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin
Bulletin Number: #00159
Date: December 3, 1997
Cross-Ref:
Title: V8 Sendmail for SunOS(tm) 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1
______________________________________________________________________________
The information contained in this Security Bulletin is provided "AS IS."
Sun makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information
contained in this Security Bulletin. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS,
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE
HEREBY DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW.
IN NO EVENT WILL SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE,
PROFIT OR DATA, OR FOR DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL
OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY
ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN
THIS SECURITY BULLETIN, EVEN IF SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. HAS BEEN ADVISED OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
If any of the above provisions are held to be in violation of applicable law,
void, or unenforceable in any jurisdiction, then such provisions are waived
to the extent necessary for this disclaimer to be otherwise enforceable in
such jurisdiction.
______________________________________________________________________________
1. Bulletins Topics
Sun announces the release of patches for SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1
containing the same version of sendmail included with SunOS 5.x:
V8.6.9 plus extensions. SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 originally
included V5 sendmail.
Sun recommends that customers using sendmail on SunOS 4.1.4 and
4.1.3_U1 install the patches listed in section 4 below to take
advantage of security and other enhancements found in V8 sendmail.
2. Understanding What is Available
sendmail is a public domain utility based on SMTP, which provides
internetwork mail routing. SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 originally
included version 5 of the public domain sendmail with Sun
enhancements.
Various security related improvements were made to subsequent versions
of the public domain sendmail. These improvements were included in the
version of sendmail that Sun provides with SunOS 5.x, V8.6.9; in addition,
Sun's version includes enhancements to address subsequently identified
security vulnerabilities. The patches listed in section 4 below provide
this same version of Sun sendmail for SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 customers.
3. Support for Sun's sendmail
The patches listed in section 4 below are covered by Sun's normal
support policy.
Sun's V5 sendmail is currently covered by Sun's normal support policy.
However, with this release of V8 sendmail for SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1.
Sun will cease to update V5 patches after May 31, 1998. Patches affected
are 102423-xx for SunOS 4.1.4 and 101665-xx for SunOS 4.1.3_U1.
4. List of Patches
Sun's most current version of sendmail is provided for SunOS 4.1.4
and 4.1.3_U1 via these patches:
OS version Patch ID
______________ _________
SunOS 4.1.4 105466-01
SunOS 4.1.3_U1 105465-01
______________________________________________________________________________
APPENDICES
A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers via
World Wide Web at:
<URL:http://sunsolve.sun.com/sunsolve/pubpatches/patches.html>
B. Checksums for the patches listed in this bulletin are available via
World Wide Web at:
<URL:http://sunsolve.sun.com/sunsolve/pubpatches/patches.html>
C. Sun security bulletins are available via World Wide Web at:
<URL:http://sunsolve.sun.com/sunsolve/secbulletins>
D. Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key is available via World Wide Web
at:
<URL:http://sunsolve.sun.com/sunsolve/secbulletins/SunSCkey.txt>
E. To report or inquire about a security problem with Sun software, contact
one or more of the following:
- Your local Sun answer centers
- Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT
- Sun Security Coordination Team. Send email to:
security-alert@sun.com
F. To receive information or subscribe to our CWS (Customer Warning System)
mailing list, send email to:
security-alert@sun.com
with a subject line (not body) containing one of the following commands:
Command Information Returned/Action Taken
_______ _________________________________
help An explanation of how to get information
key Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key
list A list of current security topics
query [topic] The email is treated as an inquiry and is forwarded to
the Security Coordination Team
report [topic] The email is treated as a security report and is
forwarded to the Security Coordinaton Team. Please
encrypt sensitive mail using Sun Security Coordination
Team's PGP key
send topic A short status summary or bulletin. For example, to
retrieve a Security Bulletin #00138, supply the
following in the subject line (not body):
send #138
subscribe Sender is added to our mailing list. To subscribe,
supply the following in the subject line (not body):
subscribe cws your-email-address
Note that your-email-address should be substituted
by your email address.
unsubscribe Sender is removed from the CWS mailing list.
______________________________________________________________________________
Copyright 1997 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. Sun,
Sun Microsystems, Solaris and SunOS are trademarks or registered trademarks
of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other countries. This
Security Bulletin may be reproduced and distributed, provided that this
Security Bulletin is not modified in any way and is attributed to
Sun Microsystems, Inc. and provided that such reproduction and distribution
is performed for non-commercial purposes.
[End Append Sun Microsystems, Inc. Bulletin]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Eric Allman, the author of
sendmail, Wolfgang Ley of DFN-CERT, D. J. Bernstein of the University of
Illinois at Chicago, and CERT for the information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 510-422-8193
FAX: +1 510-423-8002
STU-III: +1 510-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/
Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (198.128.39.53)
Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)
CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.
Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:
E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name
e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin
You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the
instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure
you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question.
If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)
G-33: rdist vulnerability
G-34: HP-UX Vulnerabilities (netttune, SAM remote admin)
G-35: SUN Microsystems Solaris vold Vulnerability
G-36: HP-UX Vulnerabilities in elm and rdist Programs
G-37: Vulnerability in Adobe FrameMaker (fm_fls)
G-38: Linux Vulnerabilities in mount and umount Programs
G-39: Vulnerability in expreserve
G-40: SGI admin and user Program Vulnerabilities
G-41: Vulnerability in BASH Program
G-42: Vulnerability in WorkMan Program
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.0 Business Edition
iQCVAwUBNIhvn7nzJzdsy3QZAQHgKAP8CsyIZtoU6Aawlj7H+rMxcK+XBWVpsJmI
sHcOW99P6UbS06muAvZBPpu6HDzydy/KMP0Lmq+Tpn8HfrluZUbr20hJXqZXfY3D
7vo9S6hoFONj1mbR72OZOL/76Cz0E3d1UxMfyPuzI5JUuV0GMTupw/zPTA2u2xg5
ZLAA/bzaVOA=
=f0kb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2024 AOH
