Vulnerability
Mantrap
Affected
Mantrap prior to and including 1.6.1
Description
Following is based on Fate Advisory. ManTrap's intent is to set
up a honeypot as a 'cage' which can be filled with fake
information running on a system where the intruder can be lured
and studied, and which is also supposed to prevent erasing of
logs etc.
A great idea - but the implementation is poor. Instead of running
as a VMware like virtual machine or such, it just runs as a chroot
like environment with some kernel patches, and thus it can easily
be identified and subverted. In case an intruder breaks in and
finds out that it's a cage, he/she will most likely just trash it
and move on instead of fulfilling the purpose of staying long
enough to be studied/identified/traced.
Problem 1:
==========
ManTrap hides processes from the caged intruder (or atleast tries
to), by hiding them from the /proc in the cage (resembles what
many LKM trojans do), which sounds fine.
BUT, the cage still runs the SAME kernel as the real box, and also
has access to all kernel memory etc. So what we can do is to use
a syscall, in this case kill(), which gets its information from
the kernel instead of /proc, and compare it's results with the
information in /proc. What we do is to simply send a signal
(SIGCONT in this case) which hopefully shouldn't affect anything,
to PID 1 to 65535 as a nonroot user, and compare the results with
/proc.
- kill() gives EPERM and /proc/<PID> exists -> Fine
- kill() gives EPERM and /proc/<PID> does not exist -> Not fine!
This can also possibly be used to detect LKM trojanss and the
like. It might give a false alarm though, as some kernel patches
designed to hide other user's processes might give the same
result. But together with the other tell-tale signs of ManTrap
it gives a very good fingerprint.
Problem 2&3:
============
This looks like a result from the /proc filtering/emulation
mentioned above. /proc/.. doesn't show up in any syscalls wanting
to get the directory listing! (such as getdents()). Also, (cd
/proc/self; cd cwd; pwd) gives an error. Another interesting note
is that the whole box can be made to lock up and disconnect all
users for a couple of minutes by doing:
# cd /proc && cd self && cd cwd
# pwd <causes error response>
# cd ../../../../../
# cd proc
# cd self <should receive error response>
# ls, pwd, etc, <BOOM!>
Problem 4:
==========
ManTrap accidentally seems to hide the first 4 processes always
running on a Solaris box (sched, init, fsflush, pageout).
Problem 5:
==========
Since / isn't the real root of the filesystem, but
/usr/rti/cage/root, the inode number is very off, usually in the
100000-200000 range instead of the normal 2. This can be checked
by simply doing `ls -id /`.
Problem 6:
==========
If the intruder got root in the cage, it's very possible to
read/write directly to/from /dev/mem, the raw disk device[s], etc.
The crash(1M) utility can be used to examine /dev/mem and get the
real process listing etc, which includes all ManTrap's processes.
(Yes, they can be killed...)
More serious damage can be caused using the raw disk device[s],
such as /dev/rdsk/c0t0d0s0. ANY data on the system can be
read/modified by the intruder, which can be used to wipe logs and
such. An utility such as fsdb(1M) can be used to view the
directory listings etc.
Fate Research Labs written a small program to demonstrate problems
1-3. It's capable of identifying ManTrap using these methods, and
also list all 'hidden' processes. It's available from
http://www.f8labs.com
This basically shows that you can't rely upon anything but a
total instruction-level emulation to make a real-looking and
yet secure cage. We look forward to such a product as it would be
a great tool in intrusion detection. As VMware shows, this can be
done atleast on x86 CPUs and it would surprise me if it wouldn't
be possible on other platforms (such as Sparc).
One key thing to take in mind when deploying a honeypot is to take
special care in the architecture of the deployment. Place
particular attention on where in the network it is deployed. It
is reccomended that if an organization does deploy any honeypots,
the systems are firewalled off in a secured, second DMZ.
The code:
* ManTrap detection/testing program by wilson / f8labs - www.f8labs.org
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/signal.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <dirent.h>
void check_proc_vs_kill(int listpids)
{
struct stat st;
int i, counter;
char buf[520];
printf("proc-vs-kill() test: \n");
fflush(0);
if (geteuid() == 0)
{
printf(" Error: Running as root. NOT performing /proc-vs-kill() test.\n");
return;
}
if (listpids == 1)
{
printf("Listing mismatching PIDs:\n");
}
counter = 0;
for (i = 1; i < 65535; i ++)
{
if ((kill(i, SIGCONT) != 0) && (errno == EPERM)) /* send SIGCONT (which hopefully won't matter) to the process */
{
snprintf(buf, 511, "/proc/%d", i);
if (stat(buf, &st) != 0)
{
counter ++;
if (listpids == 1)
{
printf("%.5d ", i);
if (counter%8 == 0)
{
printf("\n");
}
}
}
}
}
if (listpids == 1)
{
printf("\n");
}
if (counter == 0)
{
printf(" Normal: No mismatches found.\n");
} else
{
printf(" ManTrap? %d mismatching PIDs found.\n", counter);
}
}
void check_proc_dotdot()
{
DIR *procDIR;
struct dirent *procdirent;
int found;
printf("dotdot test:\n");
procDIR = opendir("/proc");
if (procDIR == NULL)
{
printf(" Error: Couldn't open /proc while performing dotdot test.\n");
return;
}
found = 0;
procdirent = readdir(procDIR);
while (procdirent != NULL)
{
if (strcmp(procdirent->d_name, "..") == 0)
{
found = 1;
break;
}
procdirent = readdir(procDIR);
}
closedir(procDIR);
if (found == 0)
{
printf(" ManTrap? /proc/.. not found in directory listing!\n");
} else {
printf(" Normal: /proc/.. found in directory listing.\n");
}
}
void check_proc_cwdwalk()
{
char savedpwd[2048], newpwd[2048];
printf("cwdwalk test:\n");
if (getwd(savedpwd) == NULL)
{
printf(" Error: Couldn't get working directory while performing cwdwalk test.\n");
return;
}
if (chdir("/proc/self") != 0)
{
printf(" Error: Couldn't chdir to /proc/self while performing cwdwalk test.\n");
return;
}
if (chdir("cwd") != 0)
{
printf(" Error: Couldn't chdir to /proc/self/cwd while performing cwdwalk test.\n");
return;
}
if (getwd(newpwd) == NULL)
{
printf(" ManTrap? getwd() failed after chdir to /proc/self/cwd.\n");
} else {
printf(" Normal: getwd() succeeded after chdir to /proc/self/cwd.\n");
}
chdir(savedpwd);
return;
}
void usage(char *myname)
{
printf("Usage: %s <-a|-p|-l|-d|-c|-h>\n", myname);
printf(" -a performs ALL tests\n");
printf(" -p performs /proc-vs-kill() test\n");
printf(" -l performs /proc-vs-kill() test and lists mismatching PIDs\n");
printf(" -d performs /proc/.. test\n");
printf(" -c performs /proc/self/cwd test\n");
printf(" -h shows this help\n");
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
printf("ManTrap detection/testing program by wilson@f8labs.org - www.f8labs.org\n");
if (argc != 2)
{
usage(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
if (strlen(argv[1]) != 2)
{
usage(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
switch(argv[1][1])
{
case 'a':
check_proc_vs_kill(0);
check_proc_dotdot();
check_proc_cwdwalk();
break;
case 'p':
check_proc_vs_kill(0);
break;
case 'l':
check_proc_vs_kill(1);
break;
case 'd':
check_proc_dotdot();
break;
case 'c':
check_proc_cwdwalk();
break;
case 'h':
default:
usage(argv[0]);
exit(1);
break;
}
printf("Finished.\n");
}
Solution
Vendor has addressed all issues in their version 2.0 of the
Mantrap software release, which they released last week. It is
advised for all users of Mantrap to contact Recourse technologies
for an upgrade.
TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2024 AOH
