TUCoPS :: Unix :: General :: n-030.txt

Sendmail Restricted Shell smrsh and check_relay vulnerabilities (CIAC N-030)

             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                   Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

              Sendmail Restricted Shell (smrsh) and Check_Relay Vulnerabilities
              
December 19, 2002 21:00 GMT                                       Number N-030
[REVISED 20 December 2002]
[REVISED 10 January 2003]
[REVISED 1 October 2003]
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:   1) Sendmail Restricted Shell (smrsh) may let local users bypass
           restrictions to execute code, or possibly gain root access.
           2) A remote user with the ability to control a DNS server or 
           spoof the DNS may be able to bypass a target server's sendmail
           access controls and send mail to or via that server.
PLATFORM:  Multiple vendor products might be affected when used in
	       conjunction with Sendmail, such as Linux and UNIX.
           HP-UX B.11.00, B.11.11, B.11.22 running sendmail version 8.11.1 only
DAMAGE:    1) The potential vulnerability may allow authorized users to
           execute unauthorized programs.
	       2) A remote user with ability to spoof the DNS can bypass 
           sendmail access controls and send mail to or through the server.
SOLUTION:  Check with your vendor for platform-specific solutions.
	       Sendmail.org has released 8.12.7, which corrects these
	       vulnerabilities.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  The risk is MEDIUM.  1) The vulnerability is only exploitable 
ASSESSMENT:    by local users and only allows execution of unauthorized programs.
               2) Only a remote user who already has the ability to control a 
               DNS server or spoof a DNS could exploit this vulnerability.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
 CIAC BULLETIN:      http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-030.shtml
 VENDOR BULLETINS:   Sendmail.org:
		             http://www.sendmail.org/8.12.7.html
	                 Hewlett-Packard: 
                     ftp://smrsh:smrsh1@hprc.external.hp.com/ 
					 or
                     ftp://smrsh:smrsh1@192.170.19.51/
                     http://www.software.hp.com/cgi-bin/swdepot_parser.cgi/
                     cgi/displayProductInfo.pl?productNumber=SMAIL811
		             SGI:
		             ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/
                            advisories/20030101-01-P				 
______________________________________________________________________________
REVISION HISTORY:  10/1/03 - Added Hewlett Packard's link and updated the 
                             Hewlett Packard's Security Bulletin HPSBUX0212-234
                             SSRT2432 smrsh restrictions bypass (rev 2.)

[******  START HEWLET PACKARD SECURITY BULLETIN  ******]

**REVISED 02**
 Source: HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
 SECURITY BULLETIN: HPSBUX0212-234
 Originally issued: 19 December 2002
 Last revision: 30 September 2003
 SSRT2432  smrsh restrictions bypass (rev.2)
 -----------------------------------------------------------------


NOTICE: There are no restrictions for distribution of this
Bulletin provided that it remains complete and intact.


The information in the following Security Bulletin should be
acted upon as soon as possible.  Hewlett-Packard Company will
not be liable for any consequences to any customer resulting
from customer's failure to fully implement instructions in this
Security Bulletin as soon as possible.


 -----------------------------------------------------------------
PROBLEM:  Sendmail Restricted Shell (smrsh) may let local users
          bypass restrictions to execute code.


IMPACT: The potential vulnerability may allow authorized users
        to execute unauthorized programs.


PLATFORM: HP-UX B.11.00, B.11.11, B.11.22 running sendmail
          version 8.11.1 ONLY.


SOLUTION: B.11.22 - PHNE_28409 or subsequent
          B.11.11 - Web upgrade
          B.11.00 - Web upgrade


MANUAL ACTIONS: Yes - Update
                Update B.11.00 and B.11.11.
                A patch is available for B.11.22.
                No manual action is required for B.11.22.


AVAILABILITY:  The patch and web upgrades are available now.


CHANGE SUMMARY: Rev.01 - Only sendmail version 8.11.1
                         is vulnerable.
                Rev.02 - Patch and web upgrades are available.
                         Added AFFECTED VERSIONS section.
 -----------------------------------------------------------------
 A. Background
    Sendmail Restricted Shell (smrsh) may let local users
    bypass restrictions to execute code.  The only vulnerable
    version delivered on HP-UX is sendmail 8.11.1.  This version
    is available as a web upgrade for HP-UX B.11.00 and B.11.11.
    Sendmail version 8.11.1 is delivered with HP-UX B.11.22.


**REVISED 02**
 --> AFFECTED VERSIONS


     The following is a list by HP-UX revision of
     affected filesets and the fileset revision or
     patch containing the fix.  To determine if a
     system has an affected version, search the
     output of "swlist -a revision -l fileset"
     for an affected fileset, then determine if
     a fixed revision or the applicable patch is
     installed.


     HP-UX B.11.22
     =============
     InternetSrvcs.INETSVCS2-RUN
     InternetSrvcs.INETSVCS-RUN
     fix: PHNE_28409 or subsequent


     HP-UX B.11.11
     =============
     SMAIL-811.INETSVCS-SMAIL
     fix: revision B.11.11.01.005 or subsequent
         (web upgrade to Sendmail 8.11.1 Version 5
          or subsequent)


     HP-UX B.11.00
     =============
     SMAIL-811.INETSVCS-SMAIL
     fix: revision B.11.00.01.004 or subsequent
         (web upgrade to Sendmail 8.11.1 Version 4
          or subsequent)


 --> END AFFECTED VERSIONS



    HP Tru64 UNIX is not vulnerable to this reported problem.


 B. Recommended solution


**REVISED 02**
 -->HP-UX B.11.22 sendmail 8.11.1
        PHNE_28409 is now available.


 -->HP-UX B.11.00 and B.11.11 sendmail 8.11.1
        A web upgrade is available from software.hp.com:
        <http://www.software.hp.com/cgi-bin/swdepot_parser.cgi/
        cgi/displayProductInfo.pl?productNumber=SMAIL811>


 C. To subscribe to automatically receive future NEW HP Security
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    Use your browser to get to the HP IT Resource Center page
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    In the left most frame select "Maintenance and Support".


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    To -subscribe- to future HP Security Bulletins or other
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    NOTE: Using your itrc account security bulletins can be
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    To -gain access- to the Security Patch Matrix, select
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    For information on the Security Patch Check tool, see:
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    displayProductInfo.pl?productNumber=B6834AA


    The security patch matrix is also available via anonymous
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    ftp://ftp.itrc.hp.com/export/patches/hp-ux_patch_matrix/


    On the "Support Information Digest Main" page:
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    The PGP key used to sign this bulletin is available from
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       2D2A7D59
       HP Security Response Team (Security Bulletin signing only)
       <security-alert@hp.com>
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 D. To report new security vulnerabilities, send email to


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    Please encrypt any exploit information using the
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 -----------------------------------------------------------------


(c)Copyright 2003 Hewlett-Packard Company
Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or
editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information
in this document is subject to change without notice.
Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of HP products referenced
herein are trademarks and/or service marks of Hewlett-Packard
Company.  Other product and company names mentioned herein may be
trademarks and/or service marks of their respective owners.
 ________________________________________________________________

[******  END HEWLET PACKARD SECURITY BULLETIN  ******]

______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sendmail.org, Hewlett-Packard 
Company, Silicon Graphics, Inc., and SecurityTracker.com for the information 
contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
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