__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
Sendmail 8.12.9 Prescan Bug
September 17, 2003 17:00 GMT Number N-149
[REVISED 22 Sept 2003]
[REVISED 23 Sept 2003]
[REVISED 26 Sept 2003]
[REVISED 30 Sept 2003]
[REVISED 1 Oct 2003]
[REVISED 27 Oct 2003]
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A buffer overflow has been discovered in Sendmail version
8.12.9 that could be remotely exploited to give an intruder
remote access to a system.
PLATFORM: Sendmail 8.12.9 and earlier
Hewlett Packard HP-UX B.11.00, B.11.04 (VVOS), B.11.11, B.11.22
Mac OS X versions prior to 10.2.8
IRIX 6.5.22 or patches 5325 and 5326
SPARC Solaris 7, 8, 9
x86 Solaris 7, 8, 9
Red Hat Linux products
DAMAGE: An intruder could get remote access to a system.
SOLUTION: Install Sendmail 8.12.10 available from www.sendmail.org.
Download and install appropriate files from Hewlett Packard and
Apple.
Download and install appropriate files from Sun Microsystems.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. We have not seen an exploit for this
ASSESSMENT: vulnerability. This vulnerability could be exploited to give an
intruder root access to a system.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-149.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.sendmail.org/8.12.10.html
ADDITIONAL LINK: Visit HEWLETT PACKARD Subscription Service for:
HPSBUX0309-281 (SSRT3631)
CERT Advisory CA-2003-25
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-25.html
Apple Security Advisory - Mac OS X 10.2.8 (APPLE-SA-2003-09-22)
http://net-security.org/advisory.php?id=2546
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=61798
RedHat Advisory RHSA2003:283-09
https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2003-283.html
RedHat Advisory RHSA2003:284-05
https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2003-284.html
SGI Security 20030903-01-P
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/
Sun Microsystems Alert ID: 56860
http://www.sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%
2F56860&zone_32=category%3Asecurity
______________________________________________________________________________
REVISION HISTORY:
9/22/03 - Updated PLATFORM Section; updated SOLUTION section; and added links
for Hewlett Packard HPSBUX0309-281 (SSRT3631) and CERT Advisory CA-2003-25.
9/23/03 - Updated PLATFORM section; updated SOLUTION section; and added link for
Apple Security Advisory - Mac OS X 10.2.8 (APPLE-SA-2003-09-22).
9/26/03 - Updated Additional Links section: added link for RedHat Advisory
RHSA-2003:283-09.
9/30/03 - Updated Additional Links section: added link for SGI Security Advisory
20030903-01-P.
10/1/03 - Updated PLATFORM Section; added link for Sun Microsystems Sun Alert
ID: 56860.
10/27/03 - Added link to Red Hat Advisory RHSA2003-284 for information on patches
for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux products.
[***** Start Sendmail 8.12.10 *****]
Sendmail 8.12.10
Sendmail, Inc., and the Sendmail Consortium announce the availability of
sendmail 8.12.10. It contains a fix for a security problem discovered by Michal
Zalewski whom we thank for bringing this problem to our attention. We also want
to thank Todd C. Miller for providing a patch. sendmail 8.12.10 also includes
fixes for other potential problems, see the release notes below for more details.
Sendmail urges all users to either upgrade to sendmail 8.12.10 or apply a patch.
Remember to check the PGP signatures of patches or releases obtained via FTP or
HTTP (to check the correctness of the patch in this announcement please verify
the PGP signature of it). For those not running the open source version, check
with your vendor for a patch.
For a complete list of changes see the release notes down below.
Please send bug reports to sendmail-bugs@sendmail.org as usual. Please send
security reports to sendmail-security@sendmail.org using PGP encryption.
Note: We have changed the way we digitally sign the source code distributions
to simplify verification: in contrast to earlier versions two .sig files are
provided, one each for the gzip'ed version and the compressed version. That is,
instead of signing the tar file, we sign the compressed/gzip'ed files, so you
do not need to uncompress the file before checking the signature.
This version can be found at
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.10.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.10.tar.gz.sig
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.10.tar.Z
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.10.tar.Z.sig
and the usual mirror sites.
MD5 signatures:
393f5d09d462f522c8288363870b2b42 sendmail.8.12.10.tar.gz
345042839dec70f0a0b5aaeafcf3a0e3 sendmail.8.12.10.tar.gz.sig
36b2b74577a96f79c242ff036321c2ff sendmail.8.12.10.tar.Z
1b9cd61e1342207148d950feafab0f07 sendmail.8.12.10.tar.Z.sig
You either need the first two files or the third and fourth, i.e., the gzip'ed
version or the compressed version and the corresponding .sig file. The PGP
signature was created using the Sendmail Signing Key/2003, available on the web
site or on the public key servers.
Since sendmail 8.11 and later includes hooks to cryptography, the following
information from OpenSSL applies to sendmail as well.
PLEASE REMEMBER THAT EXPORT/IMPORT AND/OR USE OF STRONG CRYPTOGRAPHY SOFTWARE,
PROVIDING CRYPTOGRAPHY HOOKS OR EVEN JUST COMMUNICATING TECHNICAL DETAILS ABOUT
CRYPTOGRAPHY SOFTWARE IS ILLEGAL IN SOME PARTS OF THE WORLD. SO, WHEN YOU IMPORT
THIS PACKAGE TO YOUR COUNTRY, RE-DISTRIBUTE IT FROM THERE OR EVEN JUST EMAIL
TECHNICAL SUGGESTIONS OR EVEN SOURCE PATCHES TO THE AUTHOR OR OTHER PEOPLE YOU
ARE STRONGLY ADVISED TO PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO ANY EXPORT/IMPORT AND/OR USE LAWS
WHICH APPLY TO YOU. THE AUTHORS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR ANY VIOLATIONS YOU MAKE HERE.
SO BE CAREFUL, IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY.
SENDMAIL RELEASE NOTES
$Id: RELEASE_NOTES,v 8.1340.2.165 2003/09/16 20:50:42 ca Exp $
This listing shows the version of the sendmail binary, the version of the sendmail
configuration files, the date of release, and a summary of the changes in that
release.
8.12.10/8.12.10 2003/09/24
SECURITY: Fix a buffer overflow in address parsing. Problem
detected by Michal Zalewski, patch from Todd C. Miller
of Courtesan Consulting.
Fix a potential buffer overflow in ruleset parsing. This problem
is not exploitable in the default sendmail configuration;
only if non-standard rulesets recipient (2), final (4), or
mailer-specific envelope recipients rulesets are used then
a problem may occur. Problem noted by Timo Sirainen.
Accept 0 (and 0/0) as valid input for set MaxMimeHeaderLength.
Problem noted by Thomas Schulz.
Add several checks to avoid (theoretical) buffer over/underflows.
Properly count message size when performing 7->8 or 8->7 bit MIME
conversions. Problem noted by Werner Wiethege.
Properly compute message priority based on size of entire message,
not just header. Problem noted by Axel Holscher.
Reset SevenBitInput to its configured value between SMTP
transactions for broken clients which do not properly
announce 8 bit data. Problem noted by Stefan Roehrich.
Set {addr_type} during queue runs when processing recipients.
Based on patch from Arne Jansen.
Better error handling in case of (very unlikely) queue-id conflicts.
Perform better error recovery for address parsing, e.g., when
encountering a comment that is too long. Problem noted by
Tanel Kokk, Union Bank of Estonia.
Add ':' to the allowed character list for bogus HELO/EHLO
checking. It is used for IPv6 domain literals. Patch from
Iwaizako Takahiro of FreeBit Co., Ltd.
Reset SASL connection context after a failed authentication attempt.
Based on patch from Rob Siemborski of CMU.
Check Berkeley DB compile time version against run time version
to make sure they match.
Do not attempt AAAA (IPv6) DNS lookups if IPv6 is not enabled
in the kernel.
When a milter adds recipients and one of them causes an error,
do not ignore the other recipients. Problem noted by
Bart Duchesne.
CONFIG: Use specified SMTP error code in mailertable entries which
lack a DSN, i.e., "error:### Text". Problem noted by
Craig Hunt.
CONFIG: Call Local_trust_auth with the correct argument. Patch
from Jerome Borsboom.
CONTRIB: Better handling of temporary filenames for doublebounce.pl
and expn.pl to avoid file overwrites, etc. Patches from
Richard A. Nelson of Debian and Paul Szabo.
MAIL.LOCAL: Fix obscure race condition that could lead to an
improper mailbox truncation if close() fails after the
mailbox is fsync()'ed and a new message is delivered
after the close() and before the truncate().
MAIL.LOCAL: If mail delivery fails, do not leave behind a
stale lockfile (which is ignored after the lock timeout).
Patch from Oleg Bulyzhin of Cronyx Plus LLC.
Portability:
Port for AIX 5.2. Thanks to Steve Hubert of University
of Washington for providing access to a computer
with AIX 5.2.
setreuid(2) works on OpenBSD 3.3. Patch from
Todd C. Miller of Courtesan Consulting.
Allow for custom definition of SMRSH_CMDDIR and SMRSH_PATH
on all operating systems. Patch from Robert Harker
of Harker Systems.
Use strerror(3) on Linux. If this causes a problem on
your Linux distribution, compile with
-DHASSTRERROR=0 and tell sendmail.org about it.
Added Files:
devtools/OS/AIX.5.2
[***** End Sendmail 8.12.10 *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sendmail.org for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24)
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@ciac.org
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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