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__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
IBM AIX "xdat" Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
October 21, 1997 21:00 GMT Number I-006
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A vulnerability exists in the IBM AIX "xdat" command which may
cause a buffer overflow.
PLATFORM: IBM AIX(r) 4.1, 4.2
DAMAGE: Local users may gain root access.
SOLUTION: Remove the setuid bit or apply one of the fixes below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The information on this vulnerability should be acted upon as
ASSESSMENT: soon as possible to avoid possible unauthorized access.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start IBM Advisory ]
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICE
SECURITY VULNERABILITY ALERT
21 October 1997 16:00 GMT Number: ERS-SVA-E01-
1997:004.1
==============================================================================
VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
VULNERABILITY: Buffer overflow in the IBM AIX "xdat" command
PLATFORMS: IBM AIX(r) 4.1, 4.2
SOLUTION: Remove the setuid bit or apply one of the fixes below
THREAT: Local users may become root
==============================================================================
DETAILED INFORMATION
I. Description
The "xdat" command shipped with AIX version 4 does not check the length of the
"TZ" environment variable. This command was not shipped with AIX 3.2.
II. Impact
Local users may become root.
III. Solutions
A. How to alleviate the problem
This problem can be alleviated by removing the set-user-id bit from the
"xdat" program. To do this, execute the following command as "root":
chmod 555 /usr/lpp/X11/bin/xdat
B. Official fix
IBM is currently working on the following APARs but they are not yet
available.
AIX 4.1: IX72020
AIX 4.2: IX72021
C. Temporary fixes
A temporary fix is available via anonymous ftp from:
ftp://testcase.software.ibm.com/aix/fromibm/security.xdat.tar.Z
Filename sum md5
=================================================================
xdat 44047 74 33bcec8bbc7d8eb2e4e2ae760d2b986e
Use the following steps (as root) to install the temporary fix:
1. Uncompress and extract the fix:
# uncompress < security.xdat.tar.Z | tar xf -
2. Use the "xdat_patch.sh" script or the following manual commands:
# pgp xdat/xdat.pgp xdat/xdat
# cp /usr/lpp/X11/bin/xdat /usr/lpp/X11/bin/xdat.orig
# chmod -s /usr/lpp/X11/bin/xdat.orig
# cp xdat/xdat /usr/lpp/X11/bin/xdat
# chmod 4555 /usr/lpp/X11/bin/xdat
This fix has not been fully regression tested but does prevent the TZ
environment variable exploit. If the new executable fails to load due
to missing symbols, the following APARs may help to resolve the
prerequisites:
AIX 4.1: IX69580
AIX 4.2: IX69180
IV. Obtaining Fixes
IBM AIX APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via the
FixDist
program), or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist,
and to obtain fixes via the Internet, please reference
http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/
or send electronic mail to "aixserv@austin.ibm.com" with the word "FixDist" in
the "Subject:" line.
V. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Bryan Self <bryan@scott.net> for bringing this problem to our
attention.
VI. AIX Security Contact Information
To request the PGP public key that can be used to encrypt new AIX security
vulnerabilities, send email to security-alert@austin.ibm.com with a subject
of "get key".
If you would like to subscribe to the AIX security newsletter, send a note
to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "subscribe Security". To cancel
your subscription, use a subject of "unsubscribe Security". To see a list of
other available subscriptions, use a subject of "help".
IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines
Corporation. All other trademarks are property of their respective holders.
==============================================================================
IBM's Internet Emergency Response Service (IBM-ERS) is a subscription-based
Internet security response service that includes computer security incident
response and management, regular electronic verification of your Internet
gateway(s), and security vulnerability alerts similar to this one that are
tailored to your specific computing environment. By acting as an extension
of your own internal security staff, IBM-ERS's team of Internet security
experts helps you quickly detect and respond to attacks and exposures across
your Internet connection(s).
As a part of IBM's Business Recovery Services organization, the IBM Internet
Emergency Response Service is a component of IBM's SecureWay(tm) line of
security products and services. From hardware to software to consulting,
SecureWay solutions can give you the assurance and expertise you need to
protect your valuable business resources. To find out more about the IBM
Internet Emergency Response Service, send an electronic mail message to
ers-sales@vnet.ibm.com, or call 1-800-742-2493 (Prompt 4).
IBM-ERS maintains a site on the World Wide Web at http://www.ers.ibm.com/.
Visit the site for information about the service, copies of security alerts,
team contact information, and other items.
IBM-ERS uses Pretty Good Privacy* (PGP*) as the digital signature mechanism
for
security vulnerability alerts and other distributed information. The IBM-ERS
PGP* public key is available from http://www.ers.ibm.com/team-
info/pgpkey.html.
"Pretty Good Privacy" and "PGP" are trademarks of Philip Zimmermann.
IBM-ERS is a Member Team of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
(FIRST), a global organization established to foster cooperation and response
coordination among computer security teams worldwide.
Copyright 1997 International Business Machines Corporation.
The information in this document is provided as a service to customers of
the IBM Emergency Response Service. Neither International Business Machines
Corporation, Integrated Systems Solutions Corporation, nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal
liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of
any information, apparatus, product, or process contained herein, or
represents that its use would not infringe any privately owned rights.
Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by
trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by IBM or
its subsidiaries. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not
necessarily state or reflect those of IBM or its subsidiaries, and may not be
used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
The material in this security alert may be reproduced and distributed,
without permission, in whole or in part, by other security incident response
teams (both commercial and non-commercial), provided the above copyright is
kept intact and due credit is given to IBM-ERS.
This security alert may be reproduced and distributed, without permission,
in its entirety only, by any person provided such reproduction and/or
distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes and with the intent of
increasing the awareness of the Internet community.
[ End IBM Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of IBM for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
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CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
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