Vulnerability
OpenSSL
Affected
OpenSSL up to 0.9.6a
Description
Following is based on a OpenSSL Security Advisory. The
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) in SSLeay/OpenSSL versions
up to 0.9.6a is weakened by a design error. Knowing the output
of specific PRNG requests (including a number of consecutive very
short PRNG requests) would allow an attacker to determine the
PRNG's internal state and thus to predict future PRNG output.
Typical applications (including applications using OpenSSL's
SSL/TLS library) are not vulnerable to this attack because PRNG
requests usually happen in larger chunks. It is strongly
recommended upgrading to OpenSSL 0.9.6b, which includes a fixed
PRNG. If upgrading to 0.9.6b is not immediately possible, the
source code patch contained at the end of this advisory should be
applied.
Recently a cryptographic flaw in OpenSSL's built-in pseudo-random
number generator (PRNG) was pointed out to us by Markku-Juhani
O. Saarinen, who showed how an attacker could reconstruct the
PRNG's internal state from the output of a couple of hundred
1-byte PRNG requests. This problem dates back to SSLeay, which
OpenSSL is based on, and was found in other SSLeay-based toolkits
as well. While a number of enhancements have been done to the
original PRNG during the development of OpenSSL, this design
error was overlooked so far.
The PRNG (implemented in source code file crypto/md_rand.c) uses a
hash function, by default SHA-1, to update its internal secret
state and to generate output. The secret state consists of two
components: A chaining variable 'md', sized according to the
hash function's output (160 bits for SHA-1), and a large buffer
'state'. 'md' is always replaced by a hash function output
during the PRNG's operation. 'state' is accessed circularly and
is used for storing additional entropy.
When generating output bytes, OpenSSL versions up to 0.9.6a set
'md' to the hash of one half of its previous value and some other
data, including bytes from 'state'. The design error was that
the half of 'md' input to the hash function was the same half
that was also used as PRNG output, meaning that it in general
cannot be considered secret. Also the number of bytes used from
'state' depended on the number of bytes requested as PRNG output
and could be as small as one, allowing for easy brute-force
analysis of all possible cases. The combination of these effects
made it possible to reconstruct the complete internal PRNG state
from the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain
knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG
requests to traverse all of 'state'.
It is unlikely for applications to request PRNG bytes in a pattern
allowing for the attack against the OpenSSL PRNG. Typically,
applications will request PRNG bytes in larger chunks. No
applications is known to us which is actually vulnerable.
However, the PRNG design flaw is a significant weakness: The PRNG
does not provide the intended strength under all circumstances.
Solution
OpenSSL 0.9.6b has been corrected and does not require this patch.
The source code of OpenSSL 0.9.6b is available as file
openssl-0.9.6b.tar.gz from
ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source
If you were previously using the "engine" release of OpenSSL 0.9.6
or 0.9.6a, obtain file openssl-engine-0.9.6b.tar.gz instead.
OpenSSL 0.9.6b changes the PRNG implementation as follows to give
the PRNG its intended strength:
1. When updating 'md' during PRNG output generation, all of the
previous 'md' value is hashed, including the secret half.
2. Also, the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash
is now independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested.
The first measure alone would be sufficient to solve the problem.
The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state'
is never mixed in in small portions; this heuristically further
strengthens the PRNG.
If upgrading to OpenSSL 0.9.6b is not immediately possible, the
following patch should be applied to file crypto/rand/md_rand.c
in the OpenSSL source code tree. (The patch is compatible with
OpenSSL versions 0.9.5 up to 0.9.6a.) This changes the PRNG in
two ways, as discussed above.
--- md_rand.c
+++ md_rand.c
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
+ int num_ceil;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
@@ -333,6 +334,12 @@
}
#endif
+ if (num <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+ num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
*
@@ -418,11 +425,11 @@
md_c[1] = md_count[1];
memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
- state_index+=num;
+ state_index+=num_ceil;
if (state_index > state_num)
state_index %= state_num;
- /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % st_num]
+ /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num]
* are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
md_count[0] += 1;
@@ -434,6 +441,7 @@
while (num > 0)
{
+ /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
num-=j;
MD_Init(&m);
@@ -444,27 +452,28 @@
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
- MD_Update(&m,&(local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+ MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
#ifndef PURIFY
MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
#endif
- k=(st_idx+j)-st_num;
+ k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
+ MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k);
MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
+ MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
MD_Final(local_md,&m);
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+ for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
{
state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */
- *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
if (st_idx >= st_num)
st_idx=0;
+ if (i < j)
+ *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
}
}
For Trustix Secure Linux:
http://www.trustix.net/pub/Trustix/updates/
ftp://ftp.trustix.net/pub/Trustix/updates/
ftp://ftp.trustix.net/pub/Trustix/software/swup/
./1.2/SRPMS/openssl-0.9.6-2tr.src.rpm
./1.2/RPMS/openssl-devel-0.9.6-2tr.i586.rpm
./1.2/RPMS/openssl-0.9.6-2tr.i586.rpm
./1.1/SRPMS/openssl-0.9.5a-2tr.src.rpm
./1.1/RPMS/openssl-devel-0.9.5a-2tr.i586.rpm
./1.1/RPMS/openssl-0.9.5a-2tr.i586.rpm
For EnGarde Secure Linux:
ftp://ftp.engardelinux.org/pub/engarde/stable/updates/
http://ftp.engardelinux.org/pub/engarde/stable/updates/
SRPMS/openssl-0.9.6-1.0.14.src.rpm
i386/openssl-0.9.6-1.0.14.i386.rpm
i386/openssl-devel-0.9.6-1.0.14.i386.rpm
i386/openssl-misc-0.9.6-1.0.14.i386.rpm
i686/openssl-0.9.6-1.0.14.i686.rpm
i686/openssl-devel-0.9.6-1.0.14.i686.rpm
i686/openssl-misc-0.9.6-1.0.14.i686.rpm
For Red Hat:
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/SRPMS/openssl-0.9.5a-7.6.x.src.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/alpha/openssl-0.9.5a-7.6.x.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/alpha/openssl-devel-0.9.5a-7.6.x.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/alpha/openssl-perl-0.9.5a-7.6.x.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/alpha/openssl-python-0.9.5a-7.6.x.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/i386/openssl-0.9.5a-7.6.x.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/i386/openssl-devel-0.9.5a-7.6.x.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/i386/openssl-perl-0.9.5a-7.6.x.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/i386/openssl-python-0.9.5a-7.6.x.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/sparc/openssl-0.9.5a-7.6.x.sparc.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/sparc/openssl-devel-0.9.5a-7.6.x.sparc.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/sparc/openssl-perl-0.9.5a-7.6.x.sparc.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/6.2/en/os/sparc/openssl-python-0.9.5a-7.6.x.sparc.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/SRPMS/openssl095a-0.9.5a-9.src.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/SRPMS/openssl-0.9.6-9.src.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/alpha/openssl095a-0.9.5a-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/alpha/openssl-0.9.6-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/alpha/openssl-devel-0.9.6-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/alpha/openssl-perl-0.9.6-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/alpha/openssl-python-0.9.6-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/i386/openssl095a-0.9.5a-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/i386/openssl-0.9.6-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/i386/openssl-devel-0.9.6-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/i386/openssl-perl-0.9.6-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/i386/openssl-python-0.9.6-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/SRPMS/openssl095a-0.9.5a-9.src.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/SRPMS/openssl-0.9.6-9.src.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/SRPMS/nss_ldap-149-4.src.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/alpha/openssl095a-0.9.5a-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/alpha/openssl-0.9.6-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/alpha/openssl-devel-0.9.6-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/alpha/openssl-perl-0.9.6-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/alpha/openssl-python-0.9.6-9.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/alpha/nss_ldap-149-4.alpha.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/i386/openssl095a-0.9.5a-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/i386/openssl-0.9.6-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/i386/openssl-devel-0.9.6-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/i386/openssl-perl-0.9.6-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/i386/openssl-python-0.9.6-9.i386.rpm
ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.1/en/os/i386/nss_ldap-149-4.i386.rpm
TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2024 AOH
