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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- =========================================================================== A U S C E R T A L E R T AL-2001.15 -- AUSCERT ALERT W32/Nimda.A@mm worm 19 September 2001 =========================================================================== PROBLEM: AusCERT has been made aware of the existence of a new mass mailing worm "Nimda" that spreads itself in attachments named "readme.exe". The execution of this file causes the infected host computer to begin scanning for vulnerable implementations of Internet Information Server (IIS). The worm does this by either scanning for a backdoor created by Sadmind and CodeRed II worms, or the IIS unicode vulnerability. We have received significant numbers of reports of infection by this virus from Australian and New Zealand sites, indicating that it is propagating rapidly. The propagation Nimda performs via email appears to involve sending copies of itself to all addresses listed in the infected machine's Outlook address book. All messages sent appear to contain the following string in the mime-encoding of the attachment: Content-ID: <EA4DMGBP9p> The worm appears to: - contain the string "Concept Virus(CV) V.5, Copyright(C)2001 R.P.China" - contain a base64 encoding of a file name 'readme.exe' - rename or edit of wininit.ini - share the C drive - create a guest account and add that account to the Administrators and Guests group - perform the root.exe (Sadmind / CodeRed II) and unicode exploits - mails a copy of itself as readme.exe Due to a vulnerability described in ESB-2001.134 (CERT Advisory CA-2001-06 - Automatic Execution of Embedded MIME Types), any mail software running on an x86 platform that uses Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.5 SP1 or earlier (except IE 5.01 SP2) to render the HTML mail automatically runs the enclosed attachment and, as result, infects the machine with the worm. Thus, in vulnerable configurations, the worm payload will automatically be triggered by simply opening (or previewing) this mail message. As an executable binary, the payload can also be triggered by simply running the attachment. Organisations running web servers and IDS systems will see a large increase in web-vulnerability scanning. This virus is scanning for backdoors left in IIS web servers, possibly by the Code Red II worm. Details of the Sadmind and CodeRed worms and the IIS unicode vulnerability can be found at: Sadmind - ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-2001.08 CodeRed II - ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-2001.14 IIS unicode vulnerability - ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-2001.02 ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/ESB/ESB-2000.360 PLATFORM: For the Unicode Bug, unpatched IIS 4.0 and 5.0 servers are vulnerable to attacks from Nimda infected machines. IIS 4.0 and 5.0 servers that have been previously compromised, and are still compromised, by Sadmind or CodeRedII are also vulnerable to attacks. Nimda is also a Win32 executable and poses a threat to Microsoft Windows operating systems that run Win32 (32-bit) applications. These systems include, but are not limited to Windows 95, 98, ME, Windows NT4 and Windows 2000. Nimda specifically propagates via any mail software running on an x86 platform that uses Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.5 SP1 or earlier (except IE 5.01 SP2) to render the HTML mail automatically. IMPACT: Nimda has the ability to degrade network and system performance and possibly cause a denial of service. Systems infected with Nimda are also susceptable to intruders executing arbitrary code in a Local System context. RECOMMENDATIONS: A. Detection To check if you have the Nimda virus, either use your virus scanner with a recent update (check with your vendor to ensure the scanner can detect Nimda), follow any instructions supplied by virus scanner vendors (see the links below). Organisations should consider blocking or quarantining .exe files at the email gateway. This should prevent the Nimda virus infecting computers not running vulnerable versions of IIS (eg workstations), however it is recommended that all organisations contact their anti-virus vendors for an updated virus signature file that will detect this virus. B. Recovery If you detect Nimda on one machine, it is vital to check for the presence of the virus on *all* potentially affected systems, including systems connected via network shares to the infected machine. This may be accomplished using a current version of an anti-virus program that is certified by the vendor to detect them, or following the recovery steps listed at the following sites: http://vil.mcafee.com/dispVirus.asp?virus_k=99209 http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.nimda.a@mm.html http://www.antivirus.com/vinfo/virusencyclo/default5.asp?VName=TROJ_NIMDA.A http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/w32nimdaa.html http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/nimda.shtml C. User Education System Administrators are urged to inform their users about proper precautions with regards to handling email attachments. AusCERT recommends that sites should update and check their virus defences and either delete or quarantine any email messages or attachments that resemble those described above or in the following links. D. Update Anti-Virus Packages System administrators and users are urged to ensure that the latest Anti-Virus software is installed and that it is using the most current up-to-date virus databases. More information can be found at: http://vil.mcafee.com/dispVirus.asp?virus_k=99209 http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.nimda.a@mm.html http://www.antivirus.com/vinfo/virusencyclo/default5.asp?VName=TROJ_NIMDA.A http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/w32nimdaa.html http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/nimda.shtml E. Patch Vulnerable Versions of Windows Workstations If you are running a vulnerable version of Internet Explorer (IE), the CERT/CC recommends applying patch for the "Automatic Execution of Embedded MIME Types" vulnerability available from Microsoft per AusCERT Bulletin: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/ESB/ESB-2001.131 E. Patch Vulnerable Versions of IIS Microsoft System Administrators are urged to check their systems for insecure versions of IIS services as per AusCERT Alerts and Bulletins available from: Sadmind - ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-2001.08 CodeRed II - ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-2001.14 IIS unicode vulnerability - ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-2001.02 ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/ESB/ESB-2000.360 This alert is to also remind you about the recent release of a software tool available from Microsoft to detect the presence or absence of security patches on some Microsoft based operating systems and applications. Microsoft has released the following description: "The Hfnetchk tool is a command-line tool that you can use to assess a computer or selected group of computers for the presence or absence of security patches. You can use Hfnetchk to assess patch status for the Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 operating systems, as well as hotfixes for IIS 4.0, IIS 5.0, SQL Server 7.0, and SQL Server 2000 (including MSDE), and Internet Explorer 5.01 or later. The Hfnetchk tool uses an Extensible Markup Language (XML) file that contains information about which hotfixes are available for which products. The XML file contains security bulletin name and title, and detailed data about product-specific security hotfixes, including: files in each hotfix package and their file versions and checksums, registry keys that were applied by the hotfix installation package, information about which patches supersede which other patches, related Microsoft Knowledge Base article numbers, and much more." Additional information and download instructions are available from: http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q303/2/15.asp Frequently Asked Questions about the Microsoft Network Security Hotfix Checker Tool is available from: http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q305/3/85.ASP AusCERT is releasing this information to its members for their information only. AusCERT does not endorse or recommend any program or tool listed in this message. Members are encouraged to review and verify all information before using any tool. F. Check For Signs of Compromise If you suspect that your site may have been compromised, we encourage you to read: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/cert/tech_tips/intruder_detection_checklist If your site has been compromised, we encourage you to read: http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/Auscert_info/Papers/win-UNIX-system_compromise.html AusCERT is currently monitoring this problem, if you detect your systems have been compromised please contact AusCERT. On a possibly related note, AusCERT has received reports indicating an increase in unauthorised network scans across a range of TCP and UDP ports. Members are encouraged to stay alert for any signs of network traffic which may indicate the use of scanning tools in an attempt to find already compromised servers. These attacks are currently widespread and AusCERT is releasing this information to alert system administrators to this activity. Member sites may wish to check their systems for evidence of attacker activity of malformed URL requests directed at IIS servers. AusCERT will continue to monitor the situation and we would appreciate any reports regarding this activity. If you have any information, comments or questions about this threat, please contact us. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The AusCERT team has made every effort to ensure that the information contained in this document is accurate at the time of publication. However, the decision to use the information described is the responsibility of each user or organisation. The appropriateness of this document for an organisation or individual system should be considered before application in conjunction with local policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for the consequences of applying the contents of this document. If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AusCERT or your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams). AusCERT maintains an anonymous FTP service which is found on: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/. This archive contains past SERT and AusCERT Advisories, and other computer security information. AusCERT maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on: http://www.auscert.org.au/. Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for emergencies. Postal: Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 AUSTRALIA =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/AUSCERT_PGP.key iQCVAwUBO6ig9yh9+71yA2DNAQHvCwP/XF6upGTfHlNVFqB3Rg3iOVwsCuNoqN5h sKEcpy1nOGS5FGHo7nxC3TgwF85sM/SF0P6c9K4K7hSkLTmNPVLQzfWvcG7/+Rhk UZPJXvQHbRno8ipwb6BbOjBM2fWkWaFHR2eesKAkEeE8j/46m8HlQepeaDLc3RwI WUg8JU7tjHc= =xHE/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----