29th Jul 2002 [SBWID-5564]
COMMAND
IE w/ Outlook Express fooled into file execution (again)
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
Internet Explorer 6.00.
Outlook Express 6.00
PROBLEM
http-equiv [http-equiv@excite.com] [http://www.malware.com] found :
Trivial lead-up to yet another silent delivery and installation of an
executable on the target computer using Outlook Express 6. This can be
achieved combining several past possibilities, specifically the
following:
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1033
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2456
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/4387
And:
XML. In order to achieve the required results as outlined in the above,
we must determine the location of the Temporary Internet File [TIF]
folders. This can only be achieved if we can physically open up our
file from within and read its location. Technically that can only be
achieved if we have a security dialogue prompt asking us for
permission. For security reasons all embedded and attached files are
transferred to the TIF upon opening the mail message. If we elect to
open the file through acceptance of the security warning dialogue, it
is opened from within the TIF by whatever program is associated with
that file.
Okay:
Okay. XML. XML files are associated with Internet Explorer. It utilises
an XML parser to parse the file for display in Internet Explorer. These
files are peculiar little files that require an additional file called
a style sheet [*.xsl] in order to process scripting and html. To do
that, the file must be 'linked' to the XML file like so:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="malware.xsl" ?>
where malware.xsl can contain our scripting and html.
And:
Well, for security purposes linking to a remote *.xsl fle is denied:
"permission denied", so instead we force our scripting and html into
the XML file and into the XML parser directly:
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/css"
href="http://www.malware.com/malware.css" ?>
<malware>
<h4 style="position: absolute;top:39;left:expression(alert
(document.location));font-family:arial;font-size:12pt;BACKGROUND-
IMAGE:url('http://www.malware.com/youlickit.gif');background-
repeat:no-repeat;background-position: 100 30;z-index:-
100;height:200pt;width:400pt;font-family:Verdana;color:red">sure it
can, malware says so</h4>
</malware>
What this does is generate an error in the XML parser along with our
html and scripting, and as a consequence, having the file opened up
from within the TIF by Internet Explorer, we are once again able to
determine our TIF location. Couple that with the aforementioned past
possibilities and we are once again in business.
Working Example:
http://www.malware.com/cannotindeed.zip
Screen shot:
http://www.malware.com/x-ma.png
Important Notes:
1.On several test machines, recollection is foggy as to default status
of *.xml in mail. Possibility is that 'confirm open after download' is
not default.
2. On several test occasions, scripting was fired in mail and remotely
on the web site despite 'active scripting off' both, however not
reproducible consistentantly and may be related to processor speed and
xml parser delay in parsing combination.
3. Test series of win98 machines, Internet Explorer 6.0.2600 and
Outlook Express 6.0.2600 bandages and all
4. None.
SOLUTION
?
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