TUCoPS :: BSD :: 43.txt

BSD 4.2 and 4.3 Software Problem Resolution

DDN MGT Bulletin 43              DCA DDN Defense Communications System   
3 Nov 88                         Published by: DDN Network Info Center
                                    (NIC@SRI-NIC.ARPA)  (800) 235-3155

                        DEFENSE  DATA  NETWORK

                         MANAGEMENT  BULLETIN

The DDN MANAGEMENT BULLETIN is distributed online by the DDN Network
Information Center under DCA contract as a means of communicating
official policy, procedures and other information of concern to
management personnel at DDN facilities.  Back issues may be read
through the TACNEWS server ("@n" command at the TAC) or may be
obtained by FTP (or Kermit) from the SRI-NIC host [ or] using login="anonymous" and password="guest".  The pathname
for bulletins is DDN-NEWS:DDN-MGT-BULLETIN-nn.TXT (where "nn" is the
bulletin number).


A virus is currently affecting a number of network hosts and may affect
yours.  It is spread via the electronic mail system (SMTP and
Sendmail) and attacks machines running 4.3 and 4.2 UNIX BSD and
possibly SUN 3.X machines.  The following are three messages which
provide some background information about the virus, and supply a fix.
The fix will prevent reinfection by the virus, but it will not fix any
damage the virus has done.

If you have any further questions about this bulletin, please contact
the Network Information Center at (800) 235-3155 or (415) 859-3695.
This fix is also available for FTP from SRI-NIC.ARPA as


 2-Nov-88 23:45:39-PST,1520;000000000000
Received: from ames.arc.nasa.gov by SRI-NIC.ARPA with TCP; Wed, 2 Nov 88 23:26:54 PST
Received: Wed, 2 Nov 88 23:28:00 PST by ames.arc.nasa.gov (5.59/1.2)
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 88 23:28:00 PST
From: Peter E. Yee <yee@ames.arc.nasa.gov>
Message-Id: <8811030728.AA18199@ames.arc.nasa.gov>
To: mkl@sri-nic.arpa
Subject: Internet VIRUS alert
Cc: postmaster@sri-nic.arpa, tcp-ip@sri-nic.arpa
X-Lines: 19

We are currently under attack from an Internet VIRUS.  It has hit UC Berkeley,
UC San Diego, Lawrence Livermore, Stanford, and NASA Ames.  The virus comes in
via SMTP, and then is able to attack all 4.3BSD and SUN (3.X?) machines.  It
sends a RCPT TO that requests that its data be piped through a shell.  It copies
in a program, compiles and executes it.  This program copies in VAX and SUN 
binaries that try to replicate the virus via connections to TELNETD, FTPD, 
FINGERD, RSHD, and SMTP.  The programs also appear to have DES tables in them.
They appear in /usr/tmp as files that start with the letter x.  Removing them
is not enough as they will come back in the next wave of attacks.  For now
turning off the above services seems to be the only help.  The virus is able
to take advantage of .rhosts files and hosts.equiv.  We are not certain what the
final result of the binaries is, hence the warning.

I can be contacted at (415) 642-7447.  Phil Lapsley and Kurt Pires at this
number are also conversant with the virus.  

							-Peter Yee


 3-Nov-88 04:06:58-PST,4162;000000000001
Received: from okeeffe.Berkeley.EDU by SRI-NIC.ARPA with TCP; Thu, 3 Nov 88 03:37:45 PST
Received: by okeeffe.Berkeley.EDU (5.61/1.29)
	id AA22168; Thu, 3 Nov 88 02:56:25 PST
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 88 02:56:25 PST
From: bostic%okeeffe.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Keith Bostic)
Message-Id: <8811031056.AA22168@okeeffe.Berkeley.EDU>
To: tcp-ip@sri-nic.arpa
Subject: Virus fixes

Subject: Fixes for the virus
Index: usr.lib/sendmail/src/srvrsmtp.c 4BSD

	There's a virus running around; the salient facts.  A bug in
	sendmail has been used to introduce a virus into a lot of
	Internet UNIX systems.  It has not been observed to damage the
	host system, however, it's incredibly virulent, attempting to
	introduce itself to every system it can find.  It appears to
	use rsh, broken passwords, and sendmail to introduce itself
	into the target systems.  It affects only VAXen and Suns, as
	far as we know.  

	There are three changes that we believe will immunize your
	system.  They are attached.

	Thanks to the Experimental Computing Facility, Center for
	Disease Control for their assistance.  (It's pretty late,
	and they certainly deserved some thanks, somewhere!)

	First, either recompile or patch sendmail to disallow the `debug'
	option.  If you have source, recompile sendmail after first
	applying the following patch to the module svrsmtp.c:

		*** /tmp/d22039	Thu Nov  3 02:26:20 1988
		--- srvrsmtp.c	Thu Nov  3 01:21:04 1988
		*** 85,92 ****
		  	"onex",		CMDONEX,
		  # ifdef DEBUG
		  	"showq",	CMDDBGQSHOW,
		- 	"debug",	CMDDBGDEBUG,
		  # endif DEBUG
		  # ifdef WIZ
		  	"kill",		CMDDBGKILL,
		  # endif WIZ
		--- 85,94 ----
		  	"onex",		CMDONEX,
		  # ifdef DEBUG
		  	"showq",	CMDDBGQSHOW,
		  # endif DEBUG
		+ # ifdef notdef
		+ 	"debug",	CMDDBGDEBUG,
		+ # endif notdef
		  # ifdef WIZ
		  	"kill",		CMDDBGKILL,
		  # endif WIZ

	Then, reinstall sendmail, refreeze the configuration file,
	using the command "/usr/lib/sendmail -bz", kill any running
	sendmail's, using the ps(1) command and the kill(1) command,
	and restart your sendmail.  To find out how sendmail is 
	execed on your system, use grep(1) to find the sendmail start
	line in either the files /etc/rc or /etc/rc.local

	If you don't have source, apply the following patch to your
	UP!  This is mildly tricky -- note, some versions of strings(1),
	which we're going to use to find the offset of the string 
	"debug" in the binary print out the offsets in octal, not
	decimal.  Run the following shell line to decide how your
	version of strings(1) works:

		/bin/echo 'abcd' | /usr/ucb/strings -o 

	Note, make sure the eight control 'G's are preserved in this
	line.  If this command results in something like:

		0000008 abcd

	your strings(1) command prints out locations in decimal, else
	it's octal.

	The patch script for sendmail.  NOTE, YOUR OFFSETS MAY VARY!!
	This script assumes that your strings(1) command prints out
	the offsets in decimal.  

		Script started on Thu Nov  3 02:08:14 1988
		okeeffe:tmp {2} strings -o -a /usr/lib/sendmail | egrep debug
		0096972 debug
		okeeffe:tmp {3} adb -w /usr/lib/sendmail
		?m 0 0xffffffff 0
		radix=10 base ten
		96972:		debug
		96972?w 0
		96972:		25701	=	0
		okeeffe:tmp {4} ^D
		script done on Thu Nov  3 02:09:31 1988

	If your strings(1) command prints out the offsets in octal,
	change the line "0t10$d" to "0t8$d".

	After you've fixed sendmail, move both /bin/cc and /bin/ld to
	something else.  (The virus uses the cc and the ld commands
	to rebuild itself to run on your system.)

	Finally, kill any processes on your system that don't belong there.
	Suspicious ones have "(sh)" or "xNNNNNNN" where the N's are random
	digits, as the command name on the ps(1) output line.

	One more thing, if you find files in /tmp or /usr/tmp that 
	have names like "xNNNNNN,l1.c", or "xNNNNNN,sun3.o", or
	"xNNNNNNN,vax.o" where the N's are random digits, you've been

 3-Nov-88 09:09:57-PST,898;000000000000
Received: from okeeffe.Berkeley.EDU by SRI-NIC.ARPA with TCP; Thu, 3 Nov 88 08:14:43 PST
Received: by okeeffe.Berkeley.EDU (5.61/1.29)
	id AA22875; Thu, 3 Nov 88 08:13:50 PST
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 88 08:13:50 PST
From: bostic%okeeffe.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Keith Bostic)
Message-Id: <8811031613.AA22875@okeeffe.Berkeley.EDU>
To: tcp-ip@sri-nic.arpa
Subject: Virus posting #2

Subject: Virus posting #2
Index: usr.lib/sendmail/src/srvrsmtp.c 4BSD

	This is a followup message, to clear up two points.
	First off, a better value to use to PATCH your sendmail
	executable is 0xff; if you're using the patch script,
		96972?w 0
		96972?w 65535

	Secondly, note, if, when you run strings(1) on your sendmail
	executable, greping for ``debug'', you don't get any output,
	don't worry about the problem, your system is already (we
	think) safe.

TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2024 AOH