TUCoPS :: BSD :: ciaci051.txt

FreeBSD TTCP Vulnerability

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             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                          FreeBSD T/TCP Vulnerability

May 19, 1998 21:00 GMT                                            Number I-051
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       FreeBSD had identified a vulnerability in the T/TCP, extension
               for transactions to TCP
PLATFORM:      FreeBSD 2.1.* FreeBSD 2.2.*, FreeBSD-2.2-stable before
               1998/05/14 and FreeBSD-3.0-current before 1998/05/05.Any other
               system incorporating TTCP extentions may be affected.
DAMAGE:        If exploited, the hole may be used to obtain unauthorized
               access to the system by spoofing connections to the
               r*-services.
SOLUTION:      Apply patch or workaround
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  CIAC recommends that action to correct this problem be takes as
ASSESSMENT:    soon as possible if your systems is vulnerable.
______________________________________________________________________________

[  Start FreeBSD Advisory  ]

WARNING: The patch given in the original advisory had an error. You should
apply the patch in this advisory. In order to do so, you should have the
original file. If you do no longer have the original, look at
        ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-98:03/ttcp.orig
It contains the original patch. You should then apply it first using patch
with the -R option.
We're sorry for any inconvenience this may cause.

This advisory also contains a valid patch for FreeBSD 2.1.* versions.

=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-98:03                                            Security Advisory
                                                                FreeBSD, Inc.

Topic:          Problems with TTCP

Category:       core
Module:         kernel
Announced:      1998-05-14, revised at 1998-05-18
Affects:        FreeBSD 2.1.*
                FreeBSD 2.2.*,
                FreeBSD-2.2-stable before 1998/05/14 and
                FreeBSD-3.0-current before 1998/05/05 suffer from this problem.
Corrected:      FreeBSD-3.0-current as of 1998/05/14
                FreeBSD-2.2-stable as of 1998/05/05
                FreeBSD-2.1-stable as of 1998/05/18
FreeBSD only:   No. Any other system incorporating TTCP extentions may be
                affected.

Patches:        ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-98:03/

I.   Background   


     RFC 1644 provides an extension to TCP called TCP Extensions for
     Transactions, or shortly T/TCP. It provides a way of bypassing
     the standard three-way handshake found in TCP, thus speeding up
     transactions.
     T/TCP has been incorporated in FreeBSD since FreeBSD 2.0.5.

II.  Problem Description

     An accelerated open is initiated by a client by sending a new
     TCP option, called CC, to the server.  The kernel keeps a
     special cache for each host it communicated with, among others
     containing the value of the last CC option used by the client.
     A new accelerated open is allowed when the CC sent is larger
     than the one in the per-host cache. Thus one can spoof complete
     connections.
    
III. Impact
    
     The hole can be used to obtain unauthorized acces to the system
     by spoofing connections to the r*-services. This can only be
     done in the case where an .rhost file and/or a host.equiv file
     is used as the sole method of authentication.

IV.  Workaround

     Disable all r-* services. Note that setting the kernel variable
     net.inet.tcp.rfc1644 to 0 does not solve the problem. This
     variable controls whether the system will initiate rfc1644
     based connections and does not affect the ability to receive
     such connections.

V.   Solution


     Apply the following patch, rebuild your kernel, install it
     and reboot your system. The patch is valid for 2.1.* systems,
     for 2.1-stable, for 2.2.* systems, for 2.2-stable and for 3.0-current.

     The patch below can be found on
        ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-98:03/

  
  Index: tcp_input.c
  ===================================================================
  RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c,v
  retrieving revision 1.74
  retrieving revision 1.77
  diff -u -r1.74 -r1.77
  --- tcp_input.c       1998/04/24 10:08:57     1.74
  +++ tcp_input.c       1998/05/18 17:11:24     1.77
  @@ -680,7 +680,9 @@
                 * - otherwise do a normal 3-way handshake.
                 */
                if ((to.to_flag & TOF_CC) != 0) {
  -                 if (taop->tao_cc != 0 && CC_GT(to.to_cc, taop->tao_cc)) {
  +                 if (((tp->t_flags & TF_NOPUSH) != 0) &&
  +                     taop->tao_cc != 0 && CC_GT(to.to_cc, taop->tao_cc)) {
  +
                        taop->tao_cc = to.to_cc;
                        tp->t_state = TCPS_ESTABLISHED;
  
   
   
=============================================================================
FreeBSD, Inc.

Web Site:                       http://www.freebsd.org/
Confidential contacts:          security-officer@freebsd.org
Security notifications:         security-notifications@freebsd.org
Security public discussion:     freebsd-security@freebsd.org
PGP Key:                ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/public_key.asc

Notice: Any patches in this document may not apply cleanly due to
        modifications caused by digital signature or mailer software.
        Please reference the URL listed at the top of this document
        for original copies of all patches if necessary.
=========================================================================


[  End FreeBSD Advisory  ]
______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of FreeBSD, Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________


CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
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