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__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
RSI BSDI rlogind Vulnerability
June 19, 1998 20:00 GMT Number I-063
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A vulnerability exists using rlogind in all current versions of
Berkeley Software Design Inc. (BSDI).
PLATFORM: Any server running BSDI with rlogind enabled.
DAMAGE: Can create a buffer overflow which may allow an attacker to
gain root access.
SOLUTION: Disable rlogind until patches are available.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Disable rlogind on affected systems as soon as possible. Apply
ASSESSMENT: the patches as soon as they are made available.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start Repent Security Inc. Advisory ]
RSI.0004a.06-17-98.BSDI.RLOGIND
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Repent Security Incorporated, RSI
[ http://www.repsec.com ]
*** RSI ALERT ADVISORY ***
- --- [CREDIT] --------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Zielinski: Research and development, author of advisory.
- --- [SUMMARY] -------------------------------------------------------------
Announced: June 17, 1998
Report code: RSI.0004a.06-17-98.BSDI.RLOGIND
Report title: BSDI rlogind
Vulnerability: A buffer overflow exists in rlogind that could allow remote
root access on servers running BSDI 2.1 or earlier
Vendor status: Has been contacted on 6-17-98
Patch status: No vendor patch currently available
Platforms: BSDI 2.0, 2.1
Not affected: BSDI 3.0, 3.1
FreeBSD-Current (2.2.6)
NetBSD-Current (1.3)
OpenBSD 2.1, 2.2, 2.3
Reference: http://www.repsec.com/advisories.html
Impact: If exploited, an attacker could potentially compromise
root access on your server
- --- [DETAILS] -------------------------------------------------------------
Problem: A vulnerability exists in BSDI rlogind that has the
potential to allow an attacker to gain remote root
access on any server running BSDI 2.1 or earlier with
rlogind enabled.
This vulnerability occurs as a result of inverse
resolution of IP addresses to hostnames. An attacker
in control of a DNS server can configure the records for
a specific IP address to resolve with a name larger than
rlogind can handle.
Due to insufficient bounds checking, a buffer
overflow can result when rlogind attempts to copy the
connecting hostname into a buffer with a predefined size.
While overwriting the buffer, the attacker can manipulate
the stack and execute their own commands, possibly gaining
root access on the server.
For more information on this type of attack, point your
web browsers to: http://www.repsec.com/bofs.html.
- --- [FIX] -----------------------------------------------------------------
Solution: Disable rlogind until Berkeley Software Design Inc.
can provide a patch.
To disable rlogind:
1. su to the root account
2. kill -9 `ps -aux | grep rlogind | awk '{print $2}'`
3. edit /etc/inetd.conf with your favorite editor
4. place a # in front of any lines beginning with "login"
- --- [PATCH] ---------------------------------------------------------------
Solution: Wait for Berkeley Software Design Inc. to release an
official patch or upgrade to 3.0 or higher.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repent Security Incorporated (RSI)
13610 N. Scottsdale Rd.
Suite #10-326
Scottsdale, AZ 85254
E-mail: advise@repsec.com
WWW: http://www.repsec.com
FTP: ftp://ftp.repsec.com
[ End Repent Security Inc. Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Repent Security Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
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I-063: RSI BSDI rlogind Vulnerability
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