M-018: Cisco - Multiple Vulnerabilities in ACL Implementations
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
M-018: Cisco - Multiple Vulnerabilities in ACL Implementations
[Cisco Security Advisory: Revision 1.1]
November 20, 2001 15:00 GMT
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PROBLEM: |
Six vulnerabilities involving Access Control List (ACL) has been discovered in
multiple releases of Cisco IOSŪ Software Release for Cisco 12000 Series Internet Routers.
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PLATFORM: |
Cisco 12000 Series Internet Routers with line cards based on Engine 2
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DAMAGE: |
Exploiting these vulnerabilities could result in Denial of Service attacks or allow some undesired traffic to pass into the protected network thus violating security policy.
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SOLUTION: |
Apply available patches or workarounds listed below.
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VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT: |
The risk is MEDIUM. Because of the range of vulnerabilities listed in this advisory it is advisable to apply the patches as soon as possible.
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[***** Start Cisco Security Advisory: Revision 1.1 *****]
Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Access Control List
Implementation for Cisco 12000 Series Internet Router
Revision 1.1
For Public Release 2001 November 14 08:00 (UTC -0800)
Last Update 2001 November 15 12:00 (UTC -0800)
Summary
Six vulnerabilities involving Access Control List (ACL) has been discovered in
multiple releases of Cisco IOSŪ Software Release for Cisco 12000 Series Internet
Routers. Not all vulnerabilities are present in all IOS releases and only line
cards based on the Engine 2 are affected by them.
No other Cisco product is vulnerable.
The workarounds are described in the Workarounds section.
This advisory is available at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/GSR-ACL-pub.shtml
Affected Products
Only Cisco 12000 Series Internet Routers with line cards based on Engine 2 are
affected with these vulnerabilities. Not all line cards of a Cisco 12000 Series are
affected by all vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are present in the underlying
technology an individual line card is based upon. That technology is called
"Engine". Currently Cisco is shipping line cards based on the following Engines: 0,
1, 2, 3 and 4.
To determine what Engine your card is based on, you need to log on the Cisco 12000
router and issue "sh diag" command while in enable mode. The engine type will be
displayed as "L3 Engine: x" where x will be the corresponding number.
The following example shows the output for an Engine 2 based line card.
c12000#sh diag
SLOT 1 (RP/LC 1 ): 1 Port Packet Over SONET OC-48c/STM-16 Single Mode/SR SC-SC
connector
MAIN: type 41, 800-5271-01 rev A0 dev 0
HW config: 0x04 SW key: 00-00-00
PCA: 73-3295-05 rev A0 ver 5
HW version 1.1 S/N SDK034004AY
MBUS: Embedded Agent
Test hist: 0x00 RMA#: 00-00-00 RMA hist: 0x00
DIAG: Test count: 0x00000000 Test results: 0x00000000
L3 Engine: 2 - Backbone OC48 (2.5 Gbps)
^^^^^^^^^^^ <- Note the engine type
[further output truncated]
These vulnerabilities are affecting line cards based on Engine 2.
Details
Six vulnerabilities were found in IOS releases that are supporting Cisco 12000
platforms. Only line cards based on Engine 2 are affected.
CSCdm44976
ACL will not block non initial fragments of a packet. This Cisco bug ID is adding a
support for "fragment" keyword in the ACL. The White Paper Access Control Lists and
IP Fragments describes how keyword fragment modifies behavior of ACL.
CSCdu57417
The keyword "fragment" in the compiled ACL (Turbo ACL) is ignored if a packet is
destined to the router itself.
CSCdu03323
The implicit "deny ip any any" rule at the end of an ACL is ignored if an ACL of
exactly 448 entries is applied on an interface as an outgoing ACL. An ACL with any
other number of rules, greater or less than 448, is unaffected by this
vulnerability.
CSCdu35175
A support for "fragment" keyword in an outgoing ACL is added. Previously, only
incoming ACL supported this keyword and outgoing ACL was ignoring it.
CSCdt96370
An outbound Access Control List (ACL) may not block all intended traffic on a
router when an input ACL is configured on some, but not all, interfaces of a multi
port Engine 2 line card. The prerequisite is that, the traffic in question, was not
filtered by an inbound ACL on the ingress port. An ACL applied at the ingress point
will work as expected and block desired traffic.
CSCdt69741
Packet fragments are not filtered by the ACL despite using "fragment" keyword. The
White Paper Access Control Lists and IP Fragments describes how keyword fragment
modifies behavior of ACL.
Impact
CSCdm44976
The router will not block all traffic. By sending an offending traffic in packet
fragments it is possible to circumvent the protection offered by ACL and cause
Denial-of-Service for the protected IP address.
CSCdu57417
It is possible to cause the Denial-of-Service on the router itself if sufficient
amount of traffic is sent to the router. This offending traffic should be send as
packet fragments.
CSCdu03323
If an outgoing ACL contains exactly 448 entries and if explicit rule "deny ip any
any" is not present as the last statement, the ACL will fail to drop packets. Our
tests shows that only 50% of packets are dropped. This may allow some undesired
traffic to pass into the protected network thus violating security policy.
CSCdu35175
Fragmented packets may be allowed into the protected network if the keyword
"fragment" was applied to an outgoing ACL.
CSCdt96370
This vulnerability can cause unwanted traffic to be allowed in and out of the
protected network. The security based on an ACL will be breached completely.
CSCdt69741
This vulnerability can be exploited to attack systems that are supposed to be
protected by the ACL on the router.
Software Versions and Fixes
Each row of the table describes a release train and the platforms or products for
which it is intended. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest
possible releases that contain the fix and the anticipated date of availability for
each are listed in the "Rebuild", "Interim", and "Maintenance" columns. A device
running any release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a
specific column (less than the earliest fixed release) is known to be vulnerable,
and it should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version
(greater than the earliest fixed release label).
When selecting a release, keep in mind the following definitions:
Maintenance
Most heavily tested and highly recommended release of any label in a given row of
the table.
Rebuild
Constructed from the previous maintenance or major release in the same train, it
contains the fix for a specific defect. Although it receives less testing, it
contains only the minimal changes necessary to effect the repair.
Interim
Built at regular intervals between maintenance releases and receives less testing.
Interim releases should be selected only if there is no other suitable release that
addresses the vulnerability, and interim images should be upgraded to the next
available maintenance release as soon as possible. Interim releases are not
available via manufacturing, and usually they are not available for customer
download from CCO without prior arrangement with the Cisco TAC.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be
upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software
configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the
information is not clear, contact the Cisco TAC for assistance as shown in the
following section.
More information on Cisco IOS software release names and abbreviations is available
at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
Train Description of Image or Platform Availability of Fixed Releases*
Vulnerability CSCdm4476 Rebuild Interim** Maintenance
12.0S Core/ISP support: GSR, RSP, c7200 12.0(10.1)S 12.0(11)S
Vulnerability CSCdu57417 Rebuild Interim** Maintenance
12.0S Core/ISP support: GSR, RSP, c7200 12.0(19.3)S 12.0(19)S
12.0ST Early deployment (ED) release for the Cisco 7200, 7500/7000RSP and 12000
series routers for Service Providers (ISPs). 12.0(18.6)ST1 12.0(19.3)ST 12.0(19)ST
Vulnerability CSCdu03323 Rebuild Interim** Maintenance
12.0S Core/ISP support: GSR, RSP, c7200 12.0(16)S2 12.0(17.5)S 12.0(17)S
12.0ST Early deployment (ED) release for the Cisco 7200, 7500/7000RSP and 12000
series routers for Service Providers (ISPs). 12.0(16.6)ST1 12.0(17.5)ST 12.0(17)ST
Vulnerability CSCdu35175 Rebuild Interim** Maintenance
12.0S Core/ISP support: GSR, RSP, c7200 12.0(19.6)S
12.0ST Early deployment (ED) release for the Cisco 7200, 7500/7000RSP and 12000
series routers for Service Providers (ISPs). 12.0(19.6)ST
Vulnerability CSCdt96370 Rebuild Interim** Maintenance
12.0S Core/ISP support: GSR, RSP, c7200 12.0(16)S1 12.0(17.1)S 12.0(17)S
12.0ST Cisco IOS software Release 12.OST is an early deployment (ED) release for
the Cisco 7200, 7500/7000RSP and 12000 (GSR) series routers for Service Providers
(ISPs). 12.0(15.6)ST3 12.0(17.1)ST 12.0(16)ST
Vulnerability CSCdt69741 Rebuild Interim** Maintenance
12.0S Core/ISP support: GSR, RSP, c7200 12.0(16.6)S2 12.0(17.3)S 12.0(17)S
12.0ST Cisco IOS software Release 12.OST is an early deployment (ED) release for
the Cisco 7200, 7500/7000RSP and 12000 (GSR) series routers for Service Providers
(ISPs). 12.0(17.3)ST 12.0(18)ST
Notes
* All dates are estimates and subject to change.
** Interim releases are subjected to less rigorous testing than regular maintenance
releases, and may have serious bugs.
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco is offering free software upgrades to eliminate this vulnerability for all
affected customers.
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular
update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained
through the Software Center on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing
agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized
resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for
assistance with the upgrade, which should be free of charge.
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service
contract and customers who purchase through third party vendors but are
unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get
their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC
contacts are as follows:
+1 800 553 2447 (toll-free from within North America)
+1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as
evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract
customers must be requested through the TAC.
Please do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com" for
software upgrades.
Workarounds
CSCddm44976
There is no direct workaround for this vulnerability. If feasible, packet fragments
may be filtered before they reach the GSR.
CSCdu57417
There is no direct workaround for this vulnerability. If feasible, packet fragments
may be filtered before they reach the GSR.
CSCdu03323
The workaround is to either shorten the ACL to be less than 448 lines in length or
to explicitly add rule "deny ip any any" as the last statement.
CSCdu35175
The workaround is to transform an ACL to an incoming ACL instead of the outgoing
one.
CSCdt96370
Apply an ACL on all ports on the ingress line card. If a particular port is
supposed to not block any traffic, then apply the ACL of the form access-list xy
permit ip any any.
CSCdt69741
There is no direct workaround for this vulnerability. It is possible to block the
fragments on an intermediate router, if such exists, that should be placed between
the affected Cisco 12000 and the final target. The intermediate router must not be
another Cisco 12000 affected by the same vulnerability.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the
vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
Status of This Notice: FINAL
This is a final notice. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of all
statements in this notice, all of the facts have been checked to the best of our
ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions of this notice unless
there is some material change in the facts. Should there be a significant change in
the facts, Cisco may update this notice.
A standalone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack
important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This notice will be posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/GSR-ACL-pub.shtml. In addition to Worldwide
Web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP
key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients:
cust-security-announce@cisco.com
bugtraq@securityfocus.com
first-teams@first.org (includes CERT/CC)
cisco@spot.colorado.edu
comp.dcom.sys.cisco
firewalls@lists.gnac.com
Various internal Cisco mailing lists
Future updates of this notice, if any, will be placed on Cisco's Worldwide Web
server, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups.
Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the URL given above for
any updates.
Revision History
Revision 1.0 2001-November-14 08:00 UTC -0800 Initial public release
Revision 1.1 2001-November-15 12:00 UTC -08:00 Update table with fixed IOS releases
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products,
obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security
information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This includes
instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices.
All Cisco Security Advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This notice is Copyright 2001 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text, provided
that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and include all date and
version information.
[***** End Cisco Security Advisory: Revision 1.1 *****]
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Cisco for the
information contained in this bulletin.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE Contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7 x 24)
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
http://ciac.llnl.gov
(same machine -- either one will work)
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
ciac.llnl.gov
(same machine -- either one will work)
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agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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UCRL-MI-119788
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