CERT Advisory CA-2001-09 Statistical Weaknesses in TCP/IP Initial Sequence
Numbers
Original release date: May 01, 2001
Last revised: May 10, 2001
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
* Systems using TCP stacks which have not incorporated RFC1948 or
equivalent improvements
* Systems not using cryptographically-secure network protocols like
IPSec
Overview
Attacks against TCP initial sequence number (ISN) generation have been
discussed for some time now. The reality of such attacks led to the
widespread use of pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to introduce
some randomness when producing ISNs used in TCP connections. Previous
implementation defects in PRNGs led to predictable ISNs despite some
efforts to obscure them. The defects were fixed and thought sufficient
to limit a remote attacker's ability to attempt ISN guessing. It has
long been recognized that the ability to know or predict ISNs can lead
to manipulation or spoofing of TCP connections. What was not
previously illustrated was just how predictable one commonly used
method of partially randomizing new connection ISNs is in some modern
TCP/IP implementations.
A new vulnerability has been identified (CERT VU#498440, CVE
CAN-2001-0328) which is present when using random increments to
constantly increase TCP ISN values over time. Because of the
implications of the Central Limit Theorem, adding a series of numbers
together provides insufficient variance in the range of likely ISN
values allowing an attacker to disrupt or hijack existing TCP
connections or spoof future connections against vulnerable TCP/IP
stack implementations. Systems relying on random increments to make
ISN numbers harder to guess are still vulnerable to statistical
attack.
I. Description
Some History
In 1985, Bob Morris first identified potential security concerns
[ref_morris] with the TCP protocol. One of his observations was that
if a TCP sequence number could be predicted, an attacker could
"complete" a TCP handshake with a victim server without ever receiving
any responses from the server. One result of the creation of such a
"phantom" connection would be to spoof a trusted host on a local
network.
In 1989, Steve Bellovin [ref_bellovin] observed that the "Morris"
attack could be adapted to attack client connections by simulating
unavailable servers and proposed solutions for strengthening TCP ISN
generators. In 1995, the CERT Coordination Center issued CA-1995-01,
which first reported the widespread use of such attacks on the
Internet at large.
Later in 1995, as part of RFC1948, Bellovin noted:
The initial sequence numbers are intended to be more or less
random. More precisely, RFC 793 specifies that the 32-bit
counter be incremented by 1 in the low-order position about
every 4 microseconds. Instead, Berkeley-derived kernels
increment it by a constant every second, and by another
constant for each new connection. Thus, if you open a
connection to a machine, you know to a very high degree of
confidence what sequence number it will use for its next
connection. And therein lies the attack.
Also in 1995, work by Laurent Joncheray [ref_joncheray] further
describes how an attacker could actively hijack a TCP connection. If
the current sequence number is known exactly and an attacker's TCP
packet sniffer and generator is located on the network path followed
by the connection, victim TCP connections could be redirected.
In his recently published paper on this issue, [ref_newsham] Tim
Newsham of Guardent, Inc. summarizes the more generalized attack as
follows:
As a result, if a sequence number within the receive window is
known, an attacker can inject data into the session stream or
terminate the connection. If the ISN value is known and the
number of bytes sent already sent is known, an attacker can
send a simple packet to inject data or kill the session. If
these values are not known exactly, but an attacker can guess a
suitable range of values, he can send out a number of packets
with different sequence numbers in the range until one is
accepted. The attacker need not send a packet for every
sequence number, but can send packets with sequence numbers a
window-size apart. If the appropriate range of sequence numbers
is covered, one of these packets will be accepted. The total
number of packets that needs to be sent is then given by the
range to be covered divided by the fraction of the window size
that is used as an increment.
Many TCP/IP implementers turned to incrementing the global tcp_iss
[TCP Initial Send Sequence number, a.k.a., an ISN] variable using
pseudo-random variables instead of constants. Unfortunately, the
randomness of the pseudo-random-number generators (PRNGs) used to
generate the "random" increments was sometimes lacking (see
CVE-1999-0077, CVE-2000-0328, CAN-2000-0916, CAN-2001-0288, among
others). As noted in RFC1750:
It is important to keep in mind that the requirement is for
data that an adversary has a very low probability of guessing
or determining. This will fail if pseudo-random data is used
which only meets traditional statistical tests for randomness
or which is based on limited range sources, such as clocks.
Frequently such random quantities are determinable by an
adversary searching through an embarrassingly small space of
possibilities.
Eastlake, Crocker, and Schiller were focused on randomness in
cryptographic systems, but their observation was equally applicable in
any system which relies on random number generation for security. It
has been noted in the past that using such poor PRNGs can lead to
smaller search spaces and make TCP ISN generators susceptible to
practical brute-force attacks.
However, new research demonstrates that the algorithm implemented to
generate ISN values in many TCP/IP stacks is statistically weak and
susceptible to attack even when the PRNG is adequately randomizing its
increments. The problem lies in the use of increments themselves,
random or otherwise, to advance an ISN counter, making statistical
guessing practical.
Some Fresh Analysis: Guardent
Tim Newsham of Guardent, Inc. has written a paper titled "The Problem
with Random Increments" [ref_newsham] concerning an observed
statistical weakness in initial sequence number generation for TCP
connections. Newsham explains how incrementing the ISN by a series of
pseudo-random amounts is insufficient to protect some TCP
implementations from a practical ISN guessing attack in some
real-world situations. Such attacks would not rely on data sniffed
from a victim site but only on one or two ISN samples collected by
previous connections made to a victim site. Newsham's statistical
analyses provide a theoretical backdrop for practical attacks, drawing
attention once again to the protocol analysis documented by Steve
Bellovin (building on work pioneered by Robert Morris) in RFC1948.
Newsham points out that the current popular use of random increments
to obscure an ISN series still contains enough statistical information
to be useful to an attacker, making ISN guessing practical enough to
lead to TCP connection disruption or manipulation. This attack is
possible because an attacker can still predict within "a suitable
range of values" what the next (or a previous) ISN for a given TCP
connection may be. This range can be derived when looking at the
normal distribution that naturally arises when adding a large number
of values together (random or otherwise) due to expected values
governed by the Central Limit Theorem [ref_clt]:
Roughly, the central limit theorem states that the distribution
of the sum of a large number of independent, identically
distributed variables will be approximately normal, regardless
of the underlying distribution.
In addition to statistical analysis of this weakness, Newsham's paper
demonstrates the weakness inherent in one specific TCP/IP
implementation. In other recently-published research, Michal Zalewski
of BindView surveys over 20 different ISN generators included in many
of the most widely available operating systems on the Internet today.
Their work shows in graphic detail how observable this statistical
weakness is.
Some Fresh Empirical Evidence: BindView
Analysts at BindView have produced interesting research that analyzes
the patterns many of the most popular TCP/IP stacks produce when
producing ISNs. In a paper titled "Strange Attractors and TCP/IP
Sequence Number Analysis," [ref_zalewski] author Michal Zalewski uses
phase analysis to show patterns of correlation within sets of 32-bit
numbers generated by many popular operating systems' TCP ISN
generators. As Zalewski explains:
Our approach is built upon this widely accepted observation
about attractors:
If a sequence exhibits strong attractor behavior, then future
values in the sequence will be close to the values used to
construct previous points in the attractor.
Our goal is to construct a spoofing set, and, later, to
calculate its relative quality by empirically calculating the
probability of making the correct ISN prediction against our
test data. For the purpose of ISN generators comparison , we
established a limit of guess set size at the level of 5,000
elements, which is considered a limit for trivial attacks that
does not require excessive network bandwidth or processing
power and can be conducted within few seconds.
(A "spoofing set" is defined as "a set of guessed values for ISNs that
are used to construct a packet flood that is intended to corrupt some
established TCP connections." Please see [ref_zalewski] for more
information about phase space analysis and attractor reconstruction).
In effect, using this technique for data visualization, they are able
to highlight emergent patterns of correlation. Such correlation, when
present in TCP ISN generators, can dramatically shrink the set of
numbers that need to be guessed in order to attack a TCP session.
Since the sequence number for TCP sessions is stored in packet headers
using 32-bits of data, it was generally assumed that an attacker would
have a very small chance of correctly guessing a sequence number to
attack established (or to-be established) connections. BindView's
research shows attackers actually have much smaller bit-spaces to
guess within due to dependencies on system clocks and other
implementation defects.
Zalewski further notes in his paper [ref_zalewski]:
What comes to our attention is that most every implementation
described above, except maybe current OpenBSD and Linux, has
more or less serious flaws that make short-time TCP sequence
number prediction attacks possible. Solaris 7 and 8 with
tcp_strong_iss set to 2 results are a clear sign there are a
lot of things to do for system vendors. We applied relatively
loose measures, classifying attacks as "feasible" if they can
be accomplished using relatively low bandwidth and a reasonable
amount of time. But, as network speeds are constantly growing,
it would be not a problem for an attacker having access to
powerful enough uplink to search the entire 32-bit ISN space in
several hours, assuming a local LAN connection to the victim
host and assuming the network doesn't crash, although an attack
could be throttled to compensate.
The work done by Guardent and BindView illustrates that not all
current TCP/IP ISN generators have implemented the suggestions made by
Steve Bellovin in RFC1948 to address prediction-based ISN attacks, or
provided a equivalent fixes. In particular, TCP/IP stacks based on
operating system software which has not previously incorporated
RFC1948 or equivalent fixes will be susceptible to classic TCP
hijacking in the absence of other cryptographically secure hardening
(i.e., when not using IPSec or an equivalent secure networking
technology). Much work remains to be done to ensure the systems
deployed using TCP today and tomorrow have strengthened their ISN
generators using RFC1948 recommendations or equivalent fixes.
II. Impact
If the ISN of an existing or future TCP connection can be determined
within some practical range, a malicious agent may be able to close or
hijack the TCP connections. If the ISNs of future connections of a
system are guessed exactly, an agent may be able to "complete" a TCP
three-way handshake, establish a phantom connection, and spoof TCP
packets delivered to a victim.
The ability to spoof TCP packets may lead to other types of system
compromise, depending on the use of IP-based authentication protocols.
Examples of such attacks have been previously described in CA-1995-01
and CA-1996-21.
III. Solution
The design of TCP specified by Jon Postel in RFC793 specifically
addressed the possibility of old packets from prior instantiations of
a connection being accepted as valid during new instantiations of the
same connection, i.e., with the same 4-tuple of <local host, local
port, remote host, remote port>:
To avoid confusion we must prevent segments from one
incarnation of a connection from being used while the same
sequence numbers may still be present in the network from an
earlier incarnation. We want to assure this, even if a TCP
crashes and loses all knowledge of the sequence numbers it has
been using. When new connections are created, an initial
sequence number (ISN) generator is employed which selects a new
32-bit ISN. The generator is bound to a (possibly fictitious)
32-bit clock whose low order bit is incremented roughly every 4
microseconds. Thus, the ISN cycles approximately every 4.55
hours. Since we assume that segments will stay in the network
no more than the Maximum Segment Lifetime (MSL) and that the
MSL is less than 4.55 hours we can reasonably assume that ISN's
will be unique.
Several criteria need to be kept in mind when evaluating each of the
following solutions to this problem:
1. Does the soulution address the security concerns identified in
this advisory?
2. How well does the solution conform for TCP reliability and
interoperability requirements?
3. How easily can the solution be implemented?
4. How much of a performance cost is associated with the solution?
5. How well will the solution stand the test of time?
In the discussions following the initial report of this statistical
weakness, several approaches to solving this issue were identified.
All have various strengths and weaknesses themselves. Many have been
implemented independently by various vendors in response to other
reported weaknesses in specific ISN generators.
Deploy and Use Cryptographically Secure Protocols
TCP initial sequence numbers were not designed to provide proof
against TCP connection attacks. The lack of cryptographically-strong
security options for the TCP header itself is a deficiency that
technologies like IPSec try to address. It must be noted that in the
final analysis, if an attacker has the ability to see unencrypted TCP
traffic generated from a site, that site is vulnerable to various TCP
attacks - not just those mentioned here. The only definitive proof
against all forms of TCP attack is end-to-end cryptographic solutions
like those outlined in various IPSec documents.
The key idea with an end-to-end cryptographic solution is that there
is some secure verification that a given packet belongs in a
particular stream. However, the communications layer at which this
cryptography is implemented will determine its effectiveness in
repelling ISN based attacks. Solutions that operate above the
Transport Layer (OSI Layer 4), such as SSL/TLS and SSH1/SSH2, only
prevent arbitrary packets from being inserted into a session. They are
unable to prevent a connection reset (denial of service) since the
connection handling will be done by a lower level protocol (i.e.,
TCP). On the other hand, Network Layer (OSI Layer 3) cryptographic
solutions such as IPSec prevent both arbitrary packets entering a
transport-layer stream and connection resets because connection
management is directly integrated into the secure Network Layer
security model.
The solutions presented above have the desirable attribute of not
requiring any changes to the TCP protocol or implementations to be
made. Some sites may want to investigate hardening the TCP transport
layer itself though. RFC2385 ("Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP
MD5 Signature Option") and other technologies provide options for
adding cryptographic protection within the TCP header at the cost of
some potential denial of service, interoperability, and performance
issues.
The use of cryptographically secure protocols has several advantages
over other possible solutions to this problem. Protection against
hijacking and disruption are provided by the cryptography, while the
TCP layer is free to return to a simple increasing sequence number
mechanism, providing the greatest level of reliability. The
performance, durability, and practicality of implementation will vary
according to the protocol selected, but IPSec in particular appears to
have a number of positive attributes in this regard.
Use RFC1948 Implementations
In RFC1948, Bellovin observed that if the 32-bit ISN space could be
segmented across all the ports available to a system, collecting
sample ISNs from one connection could yield little or no information
about the ISNs being generated in other connections. Breaking the
reliance on a global ISN pool by using cryptographically hashed
secrets and [IP, port] 4-tuples effectivly eliminates TCP ISN attacks
by remote users (unless, of course, attackers able to sniff traffic on
a local network segment).
Newsham notes in his paper [ref_newsham]:
RFC 1948 [ref1] proposes a method of TCP ISN generation that is
not vulnerable to ISN guessing attacks. The solution proposed
partitions the sequence space by connection identifiers. Each
connection identifier, which is composed of the local address
and port and the remote address and port of a connection, is
assigned its own unique sequence space starting at an offset
that is a function of the connection identifier. The function
is chosen in such a way that it cannot be computed by an
attacker. The ISN is then [...] generated by increments to this
offset. ISN values generated in this way are not vulnerable to
ISN range prediction methods outlined in this paper since an
attacker cannot gain knowledge of the ISN space for any
connection identifiers he cannot directly observe.
Once the global ISN space becomes segmented among all the TCP ports
available on a system, attacking TCP ISNs remotely becomes
impractical. However, it should be noted that even when using RFC1948
implementations, some forms of ISN attack remain viable under very
specific conditions, as discussed in further detail below.
In addition, using a cryptographically strong hash function to perform
this segmentation may lead to longer TCP connection establishment
time. Some implementors (like those of the Linux kernel) have chosen
to use a reduced-round MD4 hash function to provide a "good enough"
solution from a security standpoint to keep performance degradation to
a minimum. One cost of weakening the hash algorithm is the need to
re-key the generator every few minutes. Each time a re-keying occurs,
security is strengthened, but other reliability issues identified in
RFC793 become a concern.
It had been understood (but not widely noted) that ISNs generated by a
"strictly-compliant" RFC1948 generator would still allow ISN guessing
attacks to be made against previously-owned IP addresses. If an
attacker could "own" an IP address used by a potential victim at some
point afterward, given enough sample ISNs collected within the shared
[IP, port] 4-tuple ISN space, an attacker could make reasonable
guesses about the ISNs of subsequent connections.
This is because strict RFC1948 suggests the following algorithm:
ISN = M + F(sip, sport, dip, dport, <some secret>)
where
ISN = 32-bit initial sequence number
M = monotonically increasing clock/counter
F = crypto hash (typically MD4 or MD5)
sip = source IP
sport = source port
dip = destination IP
dport = destination port
<some secret> = an optional fifth input into the hash function
to make remote IP attacks unfeasible.
For the ISN itself to monotonically (constantly) increase, F() needs
to remain fairly static. So the <some secret> envisioned by Bellovin
was a system-specific value (such as boot time, a passphrase, initial
random value, etc) which would infrequently change. Each time it
changes, the value of F() (a hash) changes and there is no guarantee
that subsequent ISNs will be sufficiently distanced from the previous
value assigned, raising the potential RFC793 reliability concern
again.
When viewed from the perspective of a particular [IP, port] 4-tuple,
the ISN sequence is predictable and therefore subject to practical
attacks. When looking at the Solaris tcp_strong_iss generator
(RFC1948) from the perspective of a remote IP attacker, for example,
the ISNs generated appear random. However, the Zalewski paper analyzes
data which looks at both the remote and same-IP address attack
vectors. Their data confirms the same-IP attack vector against Solaris
tcp_strong_iss=2 (RFC1948) is a practical attack.
The Linux TCP implementors avoided this issue by rekeying <some
secret> every five minutes. Unfortunately, this breaks the
monotonicity of the algorithm, weakening the iron-clad reliability
guarantee that Bellovin was hoping to preserve by segmenting the ISN
space among ports in the first place.
Some have proposed that the following algorithm may be a better answer
to this issue:
M = M + R(t)
ISN = M + F(sip, sport, dip, dport, <some secret> )
where
R(t) = some random value changing over time
This is essentially adding a random increment to the RFC1948 result.
This makes most attacks impractical, but still theoretically possible.
(It would still be "RFC1948-compliant" as well ... RFC1948 makes as
few assumptions about the F() incrementing function as possible,
requiring only that the connection [IP, port] 4-tuple be inputs to the
function and that it be practically irreversible.) However, the
"problem" of random increments was what brought this issue back into
the spotlight to begin with.
Use Some Other Non-RFC1948 Approaches
A more direct solution chosen by some TCP implementors is to simply
feed random numbers directly into the ISN generator itself. That is,
given a 32-bit space to choose from, assign:
ISN = R(t)
Solutions which essentially randomize the ISN seem to mitigate against
the practical guessing attack once and for all (assuming strong
pseudo-random number generation). However, a purely-random approach
allows for overlapping sequence numbers among subsequently-generated
TCP connnections sharing [IP, port] 4-tuples. For example, a random
generator can produce the same ISN value three times in a row. This
runs contrary to multiple RFC assumptions about monotonically
increasing ISNs (RFC 793, RFC 1185, RFC 1323, RFC1948, possibly others
as well). It is unclear what practical effect this will have on the
long-term reliability guarantees the TCP protocol makes or is assumed
to make.
Another novel approach introduced by Niels Provos of the OpenBSD group
tries to strike a balance between the fully-random and segmented
(RFC1948) approaches:
ISN = ((PRNG(t)) << 16) + R(t)
where
PRNG(t) = a pseudo-randomly ordered list of
sequentially-generated 16-bit numbers
R(t) = a 16-bit random number generator
with its msb always set to zero
(This formula is an approximation of the results the OpenBSD
implementation actually generates. Please see their actual code
at:
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.
c )
What the Provos implementation effectively does is generate a
psuedo-random sequence that will not generate duplicate ISN values
within a given time period. Additionally, each ISN value generated is
guaranteed to be at least 32K away from other ISN values. This avoids
the purely-random ISN collision problem, as well as makes a stronger
attempt to keep sequence number spaces of subsequent [IP, port]
4-tuple connections from overlapping. It also avoids the use of a
cryptographic hash which could degrade performance. However,
monotonicity is lost, potentially causing reliability problems, and
the generator may leak information about the system's global ISN
state.
Further discussion and analysis on the importance of such attributes
needs to occur in order to ascertain the characteristics present in
each ISN generator implemented. Empirical evidence provided by
BindView may indicate that from a predictability standpoint, the
solutions are roughly equivalent when viewed from a remote attackers
perspective. It is unclear at the time of this writing what the
security, performance, and reliability tradeoffs truly are.
Appendix A. - Vendor Information
This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. When vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
comments.
Cisco Systems
Cisco systems now use a completely random ISN generator.
Please see the following for more details:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/ios-tcp-isn-random-pub.sht
ml
Compaq Computer Corporation
At the time this document was written, Compaq is investigating the
potential impact to Compaq's Tru64 UNIX and OPENVMS operating systems.
Compaq views the problem to be a concern of moderate severity. Compaq
implementations of TCP/IP sequence randomization for Tru64 UNIX for
Alpha and OpenVMS for Alpha follow current practices for
implementation of TCP/IP initial sequence numbers.
If and when further information becomes available Compaq will provide
notice of the completion/availability of any necessary patches or
tuning recommendations through AES services (DIA, DSNlink FLASH and
posted to the Services WEB page) and be available from your normal
Compaq Global Services Support channel. You may subscribe to several
operating system patch mailing lists to receive notices of new patches
at:
http://www.support.compaq.com/patches/mailing-list.shtml
FreeBSD, Inc.
FreeBSD has adopted the code and algorithm used by OpenBSD 2.8-current
in FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE and later, and this release is therefore
believed not to be vulnerable to the problems described in this
advisory (for patches and information relating to older releases see
FreeBSD Security Advisory 01:39). We intend to develop code in the
near future implementing RFC 1948 to provide a more complete solution.
Fujitsu
Fujitsu is currently working on the patches for the UXP/V operating
system to address the vulnerabilities reported in VU#498440.
The patches will be made available with the following ID numbers:
OS Version,PTF level patch ID
-------------------- --------
UXP/V V20L10 X01021 UX28164
UXP/V V20L10 X00091 UX28163
UXP/V V10L20 X01041 UX15529
Hewlett-Packard Company
HP has been tracking tcp randomization issues over the years, and has
to date implemented the following:
For 11.00 and 11.11 (11i):
_______________________________
For 11.00, if you want HP's solution for randomized ISN numbers then
apply TRANSPORT patch PHNE_22397. Once you apply PHNE_22397, there's
nothing more to do --- default is randomized ISNs.
(Note: PHNE_22397 has patch dependencies unrelated to ISN randomized
ISN number modification listed in the dependency section, but they
should still be also applied. One is a PHKL kernel patch dependency
and the other STREAMS/UX minimum level patch dependency.)
The LR release of 11.11 (11i) has the same random ISN implementation
as the patched 11.00.
For the the legacy 10.20 release:
__________________________________
HP created a tunable kernel parameter that can enable two levels of
randomization. This randomization feature requires a TRANSPORT patch
level of:
For S700 platform: PHNE_17096 or greater
For S800 platform: PHNE_17097 or greater
The tunable kernel parameter is set as follows using
the "nettune" program:
tcp_random_seq set to 0 (Standard TCP sequencing)
tcp_random_seq set to 1 (Random TCP sequencing)
tcp_random_seq set to 2 (Increased Random TCP sequencing)
and requires a reboot.
IBM Corporation
We have studied the document written by Guardent regarding
vulnerabilities caused by statistical analysis of random increments,
that may allow a malicious user to predict the next sequence of chosen
TCP connections.
IBM's AIX operating system should not be vulnerable as we have
implemented RFC 1948 in our source coding. According to Guardent, we
do not expect an exploit described in the document to affect our AIX
OS because we employ RFC 1948.
Linux
The Linux kernel has used a variant of RFC1948 by default since
1996. Please see:
http://lxr.linux.no/source/drivers/char/ChangeLog#L258
http://lxr.linux.no/source/drivers/char/random.c#L1855
OpenBSD
post-2.8 we no longer use random increments, but a much more
sophisticated way.
SGI
SGI implemented RFC 1948 with MD5 on IRIX 6.5.3 and above using the tcpiss_md5
tunable kernel parameter, but the default is disabled.
To enablee tcpiss_md5 kernel parameter, use the following command as root:
# /usr/sbin/systune -b tcpiss_md5 1
To verify RFC 1948 has been enabled in IRIX, use the following command as root:
# /usr/sbin/systune tcpiss_md5
This should return:
tcpiss_md5 = 1 (0x1)
The latest IRIX 6.5 Maintenance Releases can be obtained from the URL:
http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html
An SGI security advisory will be issued for this issue via the normal
SGI security information distribution methods including the wiretap
mailing list and http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ .
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Sun implemented RFC 1948 beginning with Solaris 2.6, but it isn't
turned on by default. On Solaris 2.6, 7 and 8, edit
/etc/default/inetinit to set TCP_STRONG_ISS to 2.
On a running system, use:
ndd -set /dev/tcp tcp_strong_iss 2
Appendix B. - References
1. Postel, J., "RFC 793: TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL: DARPA
INTERNET PROGRAM PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION," September 1981.
ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc793.txt
2. Eastlake, D., Crocker, S., Schiller, J., "RFC 1750: Randomness
Recommendations for Security," December 1994.
ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1750.txt
3. Bellovin, S., "RFC 1948: Defending Against Sequence Number
Attacks," May 1996.
ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1948.txt
4. Heffernan, A., "RFC 2385: Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP
MD5 Signature Option," August 1998.
ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2385.txt
5. Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N., Glenn, R., "RFC 2411: IP Security
Document Roadmap," November 1998.
ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2411.txt
6. CERTŪ Advisory CA-1995-01: IP Spoofing Attacks and Hijacked
Terminal Connections
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1995-01.html
7. CERTŪ Advisory CA-1996-21: TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing
Attacks
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1996-21.html
8. A Weakness in the 4.2BSD UNIX TCP/IP Software, Morris, R.,
ComputingScience Technical Report No 117, ATT Bell Laboratories,
Murray Hill,New Jersey, 1985.
ftp://research.att.com/dist/internet_security/117.ps.Z
9. Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite, Bellovin, S.,
Computer Communications Review, April 1989.
http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/ipext.ps
http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/ipext.pdf
10. Simple Active Attack Against TCP, Joncheray, L., Proceedings, 5th
USENIX UNIX Security Symposium, June 1995.
http://www.usenix.com/publications/library/proceedings/security95/
full_papers/joncheray.txt
11. Newsham, T., "Guardent White Paper: The Problem with Random
Increments," February 2001.
http://www.guardent.com/comp_news_tcp.html
12. Zalewski, M., "Razor Paper: Strange Attractors and TCP/IP Sequence
Number Analysis," April 2001.
http://razor.bindview.com/publish/papers/tcpseq.html
13. Virtual Laboratories in Probability and Statistics, Random Samples
Section 5: The Central Limit Theorem
14. CVE-1999-0077
15. CVE-2000-0328
16. CAN-2000-0916
17. CAN-2001-0288
18. CAN-2001-0328
19. Havrilla, J., "CERT Vulnerability Note VU#498440: Multiple TCP/IP
implementations may use statistically predictable initial sequence
numbers", March 2001.
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/498440
_________________________________________________________________
The CERT/CC thanks Guardent, Inc. and BindView for their invaluable
contributions to this advisory. We also thank all the vendors who
participated in the discussion about this vulnerability and proposed
solutions.
We also thank the following people for their individual contributions
to this advisory:
* Steve Bellovin, AT&T Labs
* Kris Kennaway, FreeBSD
* Mark Loveless, Bindview
* Tim Newsham, Guardent, Inc.
* Niels Provos, OpenBSD
* Damir Rajnovic, Cisco
* Theo de Raadt, OpenBSD
* Theodore Tso, MIT
_________________________________________________________________
Authors: Jeffrey S. Havrilla, Cory F. Cohen, Roman Danyliw, and Art
Manion.
______________________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-09.html
______________________________________________________________________
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
Our public PGP key is available from
http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
information.
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available from
our web site
http://www.cert.org/
To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your
message
subscribe cert-advisory
* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.
______________________________________________________________________
NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
_________________________________________________________________
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.
Revision History
May 01, 2001: Initial release
May 10, 2001: Updated vendor statement from HP
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