TUCoPS :: General Information :: primer.txt

Prevention Thru Recovery

      Coping with the Threat of Computer Security Incidents

            A Primer from Prevention through Recovery

                        Russell L. Brand ?

                           June 8, 1990


      As computer security becomes a more important issue in
     modern society, it begins to warrant a systematic
     approach.  The vast majority of the computer security
     problems and the costs associated with them can be
     prevented with simple inexpensive measures.  The most
     important and cost effective of these measures are
     available in the prevention and planning phases.  These
     methods are presented followed by a simplified guide to
     incident handling and recovery.

 ?Copyright ?c  Russell L.  Brand 1989,  1990  Permission to  copy
granteddprovidede eachscopyfincludes  attributionoand the pversion
information.  This  permission extends for one year minus  one day
from June  8, 1990; past  that point, the  reader should obtain  a
newer copy of the article as the information will  be out of date.



1 Overview                                                       4

2 Incident Avoidance                                             5

  2.Passwords :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: : 5

    2.1Joe's  :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: : 6

    2.1Same Passwords on Different Machines  :: :: :: :: :: :: : 6

    2.1Readable Password Files  :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: : 7

    2.1Many faces of a person : :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: : 9

    2.1Automated Checks for Dumb Passwords : :: :: :: :: :: :: : 9

    2.1Machine Generated Passwords :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :10

    2.1The Sorrows of Special Purpose Hardware  :: :: :: :: :: :12

    2.1Is Writing Passwords Down that Bad? : :: :: :: :: :: :: :13

    2.1The Truth about Password Aging ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :13

    2.1How do you change a password : ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :13

  2.Old Password Files :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :14

  2.Dormant Accounts : :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :14

    2.3VMS :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :14

  2.Default Accounts and Objects : :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :14

    2.4Unix : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :16

    2.4VMS :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :17

    2.4CMS :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :18

  2.File Protections : :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :18

  2.Well Known Security Holes : :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :19

  2.New Security Holes :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :20


    2.7CERT : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :20

    2.7ZARDOZ :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :21

    2.7CIAC : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :21

  2.Excess Services :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :21

  2.Search Paths :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :21

  2.Routing : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :21

  2.Humans :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :22

    2.1Managers  :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :22

    2.1Secretaries  :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :22

    2.1Trojan Horses : :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :22

    2.1Wizards : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :23

    2.1Funders : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :23

  2.Group Accounts  :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :23

  2..rhosts and proxy logins :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :24

  2.Debugging :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :24

  2.Getting People Mad at You : :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :24

3 Pre-Planning your Incident Handling                           25

  3.Goals: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :25

    3.1Maintaining and restoring data ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :25

    3.1Maintaining and restoring service  :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :26

    3.1Figuring how it happenned : :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :26

    3.1Avoiding the Future Incidents and Escalation : :: :: :: :26

    3.1Avoiding looking foolish :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :27

    3.1.Finding out who did it  :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :27


    3.1Punishing the attackers  :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :27

  3.Backups : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :27

    3.2Why We Need Back Ups  :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :28

    3.2How to form a Back Up Strategy that Works : :: :: :: :: :29

  3.Forming a Plan  :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :30

  3.Tools to have on hand :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :31

  3.Sample Scenarios to Work on in Groups :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :31

4 Incident Handling                                             33

  4.Basic Hints: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :33

    4.1Panic Level  :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :33

    4.1Call Logs and Time Lines :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :33

    4.1Accountability and Authority : ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :33

    4.1Audit Logs : :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :33

    4.1Timestamps : :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :34

  4.Basic Techniques : :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :34

    4.2Differencing :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :34

    4.2Finding : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :34

    4.2Snooping  :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :34

    4.2Tracking  :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :34

    4.2Psychology : :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :34

  4.Prosecution: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :35

  4.Exercise: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :35

5 Recovering From Disasters                                     36

A Micro Computers                                               36


B VMS Script                                                    39

C Highly Sensitive Environments                                 42

D Handling the Press                                            44

  D.Spin Control :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :44

  D.Time Control :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :44

  D.Hero Making: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :44

  D.Discouraging or Encouraging a Next Incident :: :: :: :: :: :45

  D.Prosecution: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :45

  D.No Comment : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :45

  D.Honesty : :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :45

E Object Code Protection                                        46

F The Joy of Broadcast                                          47

G Guest Accounts                                                48

  G.Attack Difficulty Ratios :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :48

  G.Individual Sponsors : :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :48

  G.The No Guest Policy : :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :48

H Orange Book                                                   49

I Acknowledgements                                              50


1 Overview

Since 1984, I have been periodically distracted from my
education, my research and from my personal life to help handle
computer emergencies.  After presenting dozens of papers,
tutorials talks on computer security, Roger Anderson and George
Michale arranged for me to lead a one day intensive seminar on
the practical aspects of computer security in an unclassified
networked environment for IEEE Compcon.  This primer was written
as a basic text for this type seminar and has been used for about
2 dozen of them in the past year , and is still in draft form.

The text is divided into four main sections with a number of
appendices.  The first two major sections of this document
contain the material for the morning lecture.  The two following
sections contain the afternoon lecture contain the afternoon's
material.  The remaining appendices include material that is of
interest to those people who have to deal with other computer
security issues.

Since this primer is a direct and simple ``how to guide'' for
cost-effective solutions to computer security problems, it does
not contain as many stories and examples as my other tutorials.
Those readers interested in these stories or who are having
difficulty convincing people in their organization of the need
for computer security are referred to Attack of the Tiger Team,
when it becomes available.  and those readers interested in
comprehensive list of computer security vulnerabilities should
contact the author regarding the Hackman project.

Suggestions, questions and other comments are always welcome.
Please send comments to primer@cert.sei.cmu.edu.  I hope to
publish a this set of notes in a more complete form in the
future.  When sending comments or questions, please mention that
you were reading version CERT 0.6 of June 8, 1990.

                         Russell L. Brand
                    1862 Euclid Ave, Suite 136
                       Berkeley, CA  94709


2 Incident Avoidance

``An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.''  In computer
security this is an understatement by a greater factor than can
be easily be believed.  Very little has historically been done to
prevent computer break-ins and I have been told by a number of
the country's top computer scientists that ``Computer Security is
a waste of time.''  The belief that security measures or
preventive medicine is a waste has led to giant expenditures to
repair damage to both computers and people respectively.  Must of
my surprise, several system managers reviewing this document were
sure that even basic preventative measures would not be cost
effective as compared to repairing disasters after they occurred.

The vast majority of the security incidents are caused by one of
about a dozen well understood problems.  By not making these
mistakes, you can prevent most of the problems from happening to
your systems and avoid untold hassles and losses.  Almost every
site that I survey and almost every incident that did not involve
insiders was caused by one of these problems.  In the most of the
insider cases, no amount of computer security would have helped
and these are in many ways demonstrated problems with physical
security or personnel policy rather than with computer security
per se.

Most of the security incidents are caused by ``attackers'' of
limited ability and resources.  Because of this and because there
are so many easy targets, if you provide the most basic level of
protection, most of the attackers will break into some other site
instead of bothering yours.  There are of course exceptional
cases.  If you are believed to have highly sensitive information
or are on a ``hit list'' of one type or another, you may
encounter more dedicated attackers.  Readers interested in more
comprehensive defensive strategies should consult the appendices.

Over all, prevention of a problem is about four orders of
magnitude cheaper than having to handling it in the average case.
Proper planning can reduce the cost of incident handling and
recovery and is discussed in the section on planning.  In
addition to whatever other measures are taken, the greatest
incremental security improvement will be obtained be implementing
the simple measures described below.


2.1 Passwords

While ``good passwords'' is not a hot and sexy topic and will
never command the prestige of exploitable bugs in the operating
system itself, it is the single most important topic in incident
prevention.  Doing everything else entirely correctly is almost
of no value unless you get this right!

2.1.1 Joe's

A ``Joe'' is an account where the username is the same as the
password.  This makes the password both easy to remember and easy
to guess.  It is the single most common cause of password
problems in the modern world.

In 1986, there was popular conjecture that every machine had a
Joe.  There was fair amount of random testing done and in fact a
Joe was found on each and every machine tested.  These included
machines that had password systems designed to prevent usernames
from being used as passwords.

This summer, while I was testing a series of sensitive systems,
where hundred of thousands of dollars were spent to remove
security holes including re-writing a fair fraction of the
operating system, there were Joes.

It is worthwhile to include a process in your system batching
file (cron on unix) to check for Joes explicitly.  The most
common occurrences of Joes is the initial password that the
system administrators set for an account which has never been
changed.  Often this initial password is set by the administrator
with the expectation the user will change it promptly.  Often the
user doesn't know how to change it or in fact never logs in at
all.  In the latter case a dormant account lies on the system
accomplishing nothing except wasting system resources and
increasing vulnerabilities.

2.1.2 Same Passwords on Different Machines

Many years ago when a computing center had a single mainframe the
issue of a user having the same password on multiple machines was
moot.  As long the number of machines that a user accessed was
very small, it was reasonable to request that a person to use a
different password on each machine or set of machines.  With a


modern workstation environment, it is no longer practical to
expect this from a user and a user is unlikely to comply if
asked.  There are a number of simple compromise measures that can
and should be taken.

Among these measures is requesting that privileged users have
different passwords for their privileged accounts than for their
normal use account and for their accounts on machines at other
centers.  If the latter is not the case, then anyone who gains
control of one of these ``other'' machines which you have no
control over, has gained privileged access to yours as well.

The basic question of when passwords should be the same is
actually a simple one.  Passwords should be the same when the two
machines are (1) logically equivalent (as in a pool of
workstations), (2) ``trust each other'' to the extent that
compromising one would compromise the others in other ways, or
(3) are run by the same center with the same security measures.
Passwords should be different when the computers are (1) run by
different organizations, (2) have different levels of security or
(3) have different operating systems.

Lest this seems too strict, be assured that I have on several
occasions broken into machines by giving privileged users on the
target machines accounts on one of my own and exploiting their
use of the same password on both.  Further, machines with
different operating systems are inherently vulnerable to
different ``programming bugs'' and hence by having the same
passwords on the two machines, each machine is open to the all
the bugs that could exist on either system.

It is interesting (but of little practical value) to note that an
attacker can gain a cryptographic advantage by having two
different encrypted strings for the same password.  This would
happen when the user has the same password on two machines but it
has been encrypted with different salts.  In principle, this
makes hostile decryption much easier.  In practice, the attack
methods that are most often used do not exploit this.

The worst offenders of the ``shared password problem'' are
network maintenance people and teams.  Often they want an account
on every local area net that they service, each with the same
password.  That way they can examine network problems and such
without having to look up hundreds of passwords.

While the network maintainers are generally (but not always) good
about picking reasonable passwords and keeping them secret, if
any one machine that they are using has a readable password file


(discussed below) or is ever compromised, this password is itself
compromised and an attacker can gain unauthorized access to
hundreds or thousands of machines.

2.1.3 Readable Password Files

A readable password file is an accident waiting to happen.  With
access to the encrypted password an attacker can guess passwords
at his leisure without you being able to tell that he is doing
so.  Once he has a correct password, he can then access your
machine as that user.  In the case of certain operating systems,
including older versions of VMS, there is a well know inversion
for the password encryption algorithm and hence the attacker
doesn't need to guess at all once he can read the password file.

Changing the encryption method to some other method that is also
publically known doesn't help this set of problems, even if the
crypto-system itself is much stronger.  The weakness here is not
in the crypto-system but rather in the ease of making guesses.

It is vital to protect your password file from being read.  There
are two parts to this.  First you should prevent anonymous file
transfers from be able to remove a copy of the password file.
While this is generally very easy to do correctly, there is a
common mistake worth avoiding.  Most file transfer facilities
allow you to restrict the part of the file system from which
unauthenticated transfers can be made.  It is necessary to put a
partial password file in this subsection so that an anonymous
agent knows ``who it (itself) is''.  Many sites have put complete
password files here defeating one of the most important purposes
of the restrictions.  (Of course without this restriction ``World
Readable'' takes on a very literal meaning:::)

The second part of the solution is somewhat harder.  This is to
prevent unprivileged users who are using the system from reading
the encrypted password from the password file.  The reason that
this is difficult is that the password file has a great deal of
information that people and programs need in it other than the
passwords themselves.  Some version of some operating systems
have privileged calls to handle the details of all this and hence
their utilities have already been written to allow protection of
the encrypted passwords.

Most of the current versions of Unix are not among of these
systems.  Berkeley has distributed a set of patches to
incorporate this separation (called shadow passwords) and the


latest version of the SunOS has facilities for it.  For those who
are using an operating system that does not yet have shadow
passwords and cannot use one of the new releases, a number of ad
hoc shadowing systems have been developed.  One can install
shadow passwords by editing the binaries of /bin/login,
/bin/passwd and similar programs that actually need to use the
password fields and then modify /etc/vipw to work with both the
diminished and shadow password files.

Of course, since most of us use broadcast nets, there is a real
danger of passwords being seen as they go over the wire.  This
class of problems is discussed in the the Joys of Broadcast
appendix and the Guests appendix.

Kerberos, developed at MIT's Athena project has an alternative
means of handling passwords.  It allows one to remove all the
passwords from the normal use machines and to never have them
broadcasted in clear text.  While Kerberos is vulnerable to a
number of interesting password guessing and cryptographic attacks
and currently has problems with multi-home machines (Hosts with
more than one IP address), it does provide the first practical
attempt and network security for a university environment.

An often overlooked issue is that of passwords for games.  Many
multiplayer computer games, such as ``Xtrek'' and ``Empire''
require the user to supply a password to prevent users from
impersonating one another during the game.  Generally these
passwords are stored by the game itself and are in principle
unrelated to the passwords that the operating system itself uses.
Unfortunately, these passwords are generally stored unencrypted
and some users use the same password as they do for logging into
the machine itself.  Some games now explicitly warn the users not
use his login passwords.  Perhaps these games will eventually
check that the password is indeed not the same as the login

2.1.4 Many faces of a person

A single individual can have many different relationships to a
computer at different times.  The system programmers are acting
as ``just users'' when they read their mail or play a computer
game.  In many operating systems, a person gets all of his
privileges all of the time.  While this is not true in Multics,
it is true in the default configuration of almost every other
operating system.  Fortunately a computer doesn't know anything
about ``people'' and hence is perfectly happy to allow a single


person have several accounts with different passwords at
different privilege levels.  This helps to prevent the
accidentally disclosure of a privileged password.  In the case
where the privileged user has his unprivileged account having the
same password as his unprivileged account on other machines it
will at least be the case that his privileges are not compromised
when and if this other machine is compromised.

The one case where it is especially important to have separate
accounts or passwords for a single individual is for someone who
travels to give demos.  One can be assured that his password will
be lost when he is giving a demo and something breaks.  The most
common form of ``breakage'' is a problem with duplex of of delay.
It would nice if all that was lost was the demo password and for
the demo password to be of no use to an attacker.

2.1.5 Automated Checks for Dumb Passwords

Automated checks for dumb passwords come in three varieties.  The
first is to routinely run a password cracker against the
encrypted passwords and notice what is caught.  While this is a
good idea, it is currently used without either of the other two
mechanisms we will describe.  Since it is computationally less
efficient than the others by about a factor of 50,000, it should
be used to supplement the others rather than be used exclusively.
Among its many virtues is that an automated checking system that
reads the encrypted passwords does not require having source for
the operating system or making modification an system

The second method of preventing dumb password is to alter the
password changing facility so that it doesn't accept dumb
passwords.  This has two big advantages over the first method.
The first of these is computational.  The second is more
important.  By preventing the user from selecting the poor
password to begin with, one doesn't need an administrative
procedure to get him to change it later.  It can all happen
directly with no human intervention and no apparent
accountability.  As a general rule, people are not happy about
passwords and really don't want to hear from another person that
they need to change their password yet again.

While this change does require a system modification, it can
often be done without source code by writing a pre-processor to
screen the passwords before the new password is passed to the
existing utilities.  The weakness in this approach lies with the


users who are not required to use the new style of password
facility.  As a result, one finds that facilities that use only
this method have good passwords for everyone except the system
staff and new users who have had their initial passwords set by
the system staff.

The third method is designed primarily to catch the bad passwords
that are entered in despite the use of the second method.  Once
could check the ``dumbness'' of a password with each attempted
use.  While this is computationally more expensive than the
second method, it generally catches everyone.  Even the system
programmers tend to use the standard login utility.  It has the
nice feature of locking out anyone that finds a way to circumvent
the second method.  This generally requires a small amount of
system source and risks causing embarrassment to ``too clever''
system staff members.

In terms of dumb passwords, there are a number of ``attack
lists''.  An attack list is a list of common passwords that an
attacker could use to try to login with.  Several of these have
been published and more are constantly being formed.  These lists
are used for the automated password guesser and they may also be
used directly in the second and third method described above.
With the second and third method one may also use criteria
including minimum length, use of non-alphabetic characters, etc.
Finally, information about the individual user found in standard
system files can be scanned to see if the user has incorporated
this information into his password.

2.1.6 Machine Generated Passwords

Most users hate machine generated passwords.  Often they are
unrememberable and accompanied by a warning to ``Never write them
down'' which is a frustrating combination.  (We will discuss the
the writing down of passwords later.)  Machine generated
passwords come in four basic types

Gibberish. This is the most obvious approach to randomness.
     Independently selected several characters from the set of
     all printable characters.  For a six character password,
     this gives about 40 bits of randomness.  It is very hard to
     guess and perhaps even harder to remember.
     Often a little bit of post processing is done on these
     passwords as well as on the random syllables discussed
     below.  This post processing removes passwords that might


     prove offensive to the user.  When a potentially offensive
     password is generated, the program simply tries again.  The
     user often behaves the same way and runs the randomizer over
     and over again until a password that seems less random and
     more memorable to him is selected.  In principle, the clever
     user could write a program that kept requesting new random
     passwords until an English word was chosen for him; this
     would take much too long to be practical.

Numbers. Numbers are a lot like letters.  People don't try to
     pronounce them and there are very few numbers that are
     ``offensive'' per se.  An eight digit random number has
     about 26 bits of randomness in it and is of comparable
     strength to a 4 character random password chosen from the
     unrestricted set of printable characters.  (The amount of
     randomness in a password is the log (base 2) of the number
     of possible passwords if they were all equally likely to
     Eight digit numbers are hard to remember.  Fortunately
     ``chunking'' them into groups (as 184---25---7546) makes
     this less difficult than it would otherwise be.

Syllables. This is by far the most common method currently used.
     The idea is to make non-words that are easy to remember
     because they sound like words.  A three syllable, eight
     letter non-word often has about 24 bits of randomness in it
     making it not quite as strong as an 8 bit number but
     hopefully a little bit more memorable.
     The principle here is good.  In fact, this pseudo-word idea
     should work very well.  In practice it fails miserably
     because the standard programs for generating these
     pseudo-syllables are very poor.  Eventually we may find a
     good implementation of this and see a higher level of user

Pass Phrases. Pass phrases are the least common way to implement
     machine generated passwords.  The idea here is very simple.
     Take 100 nouns, 100 verbs, 100 adjective and 100 adverbs.
     Generate an eight digit random number.  Consider it as four
     2 digit random numbers and use that to pick one of each of
     the above parts of speech.  The user is then given a phrase
     like ``Orange Cars Sleep Quickly.''  The words within each
     list are uniquely determined by their first two characters.
     The user may then type the phrase, the first few letters of
     each word or the eight digit number.
     The phrases are easy to remember, the system remains just as
     secure if you publish the list of words and has about 26
     bits of randomness.  One can adapt the system down to three


     words with 20 bits of randomness and still be sufficiently
     safe for most applications.

I believe that machine generated passwords are generally a bad
solution to the password problem.  If you must use them, I
strongly urge the use of pass-phrases over the other methods.  In
any event, if your center is using machine generated passwords,
you should consider running an occasional sweep over the entire
user file system looking for scripts containing these passwords.
Proper selection of your password generation algorithm can make
this much easier than it sounds.

As with almost all password issues, the user of a single computer
center which gives him one machine generated password for access
to all the machines he will use will not have nearly the level of
difficulty as the user who uses computers at many centers and
might have to remember dozens or even hundreds of such passwords.

2.1.7 The Sorrows of Special Purpose Hardware

With the problems of broadcast networks and user selecting bad
passwords or rebelling at machine generated password, some
facilities have turned to special purpose hardware that generates
keys dynamically.  Generally these devices look like small
calculators (or smart card) and when a user enters a short
password (often four digits) they give him a password that is
good for a single use.  If the person wants to login again, he
must get a new password from his key-generator.

With a few exceptions, the technology of these devices works very
well.  The exceptions include systems with bad time
synchronization, unreliable or fragile hardware or very short
generated keys.  In at least one case the generated keys were so
short that it was faster to attack the machine by guessing the
password ``1111'' than by guessing at the user generated
passwords it replaced.

Despite the technology of these devices working well and the
installation generally being almost painless, there are two
serious problems with their use.  The first is cost.  Buying a
device for a user of large center can easily cost more than an
additional mainframe.  The second problem is more serious.  This
is one of user reluctance.  Most users are unwilling to carry an
extra device and the people who are users of many centers are
even less willing to hold a dozen such devices and remember which
is which.


In one center, these devices were used only for privileged
accesses initiated from insecure locations.  Only a handful of
them had to be made.  (Being innovative, the center staff built
them from old programmable calculators.)  They were used only by
the ``on call'' system programmer when handling emergencies and
provided some security without being to obtrusive.

2.1.8 Is Writing Passwords Down that Bad?

One of the first things that we were all told when we began using
timesharing is that one should never write down passwords.  I
agree that the users should not record their passwords on-line.
There have been a large number of break-ins enable by a user
having a batch script that would include a clear-text password to
let them login to another machine.

On the other hand, how often has your wallet been stolen?  I
believe that a password written down in wallet is probably not a
serious risk in comparison to other the problems including the
selection of ``dumb'' password that are easier to remember.  In
classified systems, this is, of course, not permitted.

2.1.9 The Truth about Password Aging

Some facilities force users to change their passwords on a
regular basis.  This has the beneficial side effect of removing
dormant accounts.  It is also the case that it limits the utility
of a stolen password.

While these are good and worthwhile effects, most system
administrators believe that changing passwords on a regular basis
makes it harder for an attacker to guess them.  In practice, for
an attacker that has gotten the crypt text of the password file,
he generally only needs a few hours to find the passwords of
interest and hence frequent changes do not increase the
difficulty of his task.  For the attacker who is guessing without
a copy of the encrypt password, even changing the password every
minute would at most double the effort he would be required to


2.1.10 How do you change a password

Users should be told to change their passwords whenever they have
reason to expect that another person has learned their passwords
and after each use of an ``untrusted'' machine.  Unfortunately
many users are neither told this, nor how to change the password.
Be sure both to tell you users how to change their passwords and
include these instructions in the on-line documentation in an
obvious place.  Users should not be expected to realize the
password changing is (1) an option for directory maintenance
under TOPS-20 and many versions of CMS, (2) is spelled passwd
under unix or (3) is an option to set under VMS.

2.2 Old Password Files

It is often the case at sites running shadow password systems,
someone forgets to prevent the shadow password file from being
publically readable.  While this is easy to prevent by having a
batch job that routinely revokes read permissions that were
accidently granted, there is an interesting variant of this
problem that is harder to prevent.

When password files are edited, some editors leave backup files
that are publically readable.  In fact when a new system is
installed a password file is often created by extracting
information from the password files of many existing systems.
The collection of password files is all too often left publically
readable in some forgotten disk area where it is found by an
attacker weeks or months later.  The attacker then uses this data
to break into a large number of machines.

2.3 Dormant Accounts

While requiring annual password changes does eventually remove
dormant accounts, it is worthwhile to try a more active approach
for their removal.  The exact nature of this approach will vary
from center to center.

2.3.1 VMS

In VMS, the account expiration field is a good method of retiring
dormant accounts, but care should be taken as no advance notice


is given that an account is near expiration.

Also VMS security auditing makes the removal of expired users a
bad idea.  Because one of the most common errors is typing the
password on the username line, DEC suppresses any invalid
username from the logs until a breaking attempt is detected.  But
if the username is valid and the password wrong, the username is

2.4 Default Accounts and Objects

One of the joys of many operating systems is that they come
complete with pre-built accounts and other objects.  Many
operating systems have enabled either accounts or prelogin
facilities that present security risks.

The standard ``accounts'' for an attacker to try on any system
include the following:

Open. A facility to automatically create new accounts.  It is
     often set by default to not require either a password or
     system manager approval to create the new accounts.
Help. Sometimes the pre-login help is too helpful.  It may
     provide phone numbers or other information that you wouldn't
     want to advertise to non-users.

Telnet. Or Terminal.  An account designed to let someone just use
     this machine as a stepping stone to get to another machine.
     It is useful for hiding origins of an attack.

Guest. Many operating systems are shipped with guest accounts
Demo. Not only are several operating systems shipped with a demo
     account, but when installing some packages, a demo account
     is automatically created.  All too often the demo account
     has write access to some of the system binaries (executable

Games. Or Play.  Often the password is Games when the account
     name is Play.  In some cases this account has the ability to
     write to the Games directory allowing an attacker to not
     only play games, and snoop around, but to also insert Trojan
     horses at will.

Mail. Quite often a system is shipped with or is given an
     unpassworded mail account so that people can report problems


     (like their inability to login) without logging in.  In
     two-thirds of the systems that I have observed with such an
     account, it was possible to break into the main system
     through this account.

Often these default accounts are normal accounts with an
initialization file (.login, .profile, login.cmd, login.bat,
etc.)  or alternate command line interpreter to make it do
something non-standard or restrict its action.  These are
generally called, ``Captive Accounts'' or ``Turnkey Logins.''
Setting up a restricted login so that it stays restricted is very
hard.  It should of course be very easy, but in most cases a
mistake is made.

Subjobs. It is often the case that a restricted account is set up
     to only run a single application.  This single application
     program is invoked by a startup script or instead of the
     standard command interpreter.  Very often this program has
     an option to spawn a subprocess.
     In some cases this might be an arbitrary job (e. g. the
     /spawn option to Mail in VMS or ``:!''  to vi in unix) or
     might be limited to a small number of programs.  In the
     former case the problem is immediate, in the latter case, it
     is often the case that one of these programs in turn allows
     arbitrary spawning.
     A carefully written subsystem will prevent this (and all
     other such problems).  Generally these subsystems are
     created quickly rather than carefully.

Editors. Most editors are sufficiently powerfully that if the
     restricted system can use an editor, a way can be found to
     cause problems.

Full Filenames. Many restricted subsystems presume that by
     resetting the set of places the command interpreter looks
     for executable programs (called its ``search path'')
     functionality can be restricted.  In unix this might be done
     by altering the Path variable or the logical names table in
     All too often the clever attacker is able to defeat this
     plan by using the complete filename of the file of interest.
     Sometimes non-standard names for the file are necessary to
     circumvent a clever restriction program.

Removable Restriction Files. When a system relies on an
     initialization file to provide protection, it is important
     that this file cannot be altered or removed.  If an


     restricted application is able to write to its ``home
     directory'' where these initialization files are kept it can
     often free itself.

Non-standard Login. Some network access methods do not read or
     respect the startup files.  Among these are many file
     transfer systems.  I have often been able to gain privileged
     access to a machine by using the the login and password from
     a captive account with the file transfer facility that
     didn't know that these accounts weren't ``normal.''  Many
     file transfer facilities have methods for disabling the use
     of selected accounts.

Interrupts. It is sad that a number of the captive accounts won't
     withstand a single interrupt or suspend character.  Try it
     just to be sure.

Making sure that you have not made any of the above listed
mistakes is of course not sufficient for having a perfectly safe
system.  Avoiding these mistakes, or avoiding the use of captive
accounts at all, is enough to discourage the vast majority of

Each operating system for each vendor has some particular default
accounts that need to be disabled or otherwise protected.

2.4.1 Unix

Under unix there are a lot of possible default accounts since
there are so many different vendors.  Below is a partial list of
the default accounts that I have successfully used in the past
that are not mentioned above.

Sysdiag. Or diag.  This is used for doing hardware maintenance
     and should have a password.

Root. Or Rootsh or rootcsh or toor.  All to often shipped without
     a password.
Sync. Used to protect the disks when doing an emergency shutdown.
     This account should be restricted from file transfer and
     other net uses.

Finger. Or Who or W or Date or Echo.  All of these have
     legitimate uses but need to be set up to be properly


Among the things that one should do with a new unix system is

      grep ::  /etc/passwd

to see what unpassworded accounts exist on the system.  All of
these are worth special attention.

2.4.2 VMS

Since VMS is available from only one vendor, the default account
here are better known.  On large systems, these appear with
standard well known passwords.  On smaller systems, these
accounts appear with no passwords at all.  With the exception of
Decnet, all have been eliminated on systems newer than version





Many of the networking and mail delivery packages routinely added
to VMS systems also have well know password.  In the past six
months these accounts have been commonly used to break into VMS



The password on all of these accounts should be reset when a new
system is obtained.  There are many problems with the DECNET
account and the with the Task 0 object.  System managers should
obtain one of the standard repair scripts to remove these


2.4.3 CMS

It has been many years since I have seriously used CMS. At last
glance the default configuration seemed to include well know
passwords for two accounts.


2.5 File Protections

With file protections simple measures can avoid most problems.
Batch jobs should be run on a regular basis to check that the
protections are correct.

Writable Binaries and System Directories. The most common problem
     with file protections is that some system binary or
     directory is not protected.  This allows the attacker to
     modify the system.  In this manner, an attacker will alter a
     common program, often the directory listing program to
     create a privileged account for them the next time that a
     privileged user uses this command.
     When possible the system binaries should be mounted
     read-only.  In any event a program should systematically
     find and correct errors in the protection of system files.
     ``Public'' areas for unsupported executable should be
     moderated and these executable should never be used by
     privileged users and programs.  System data files suffer
     from similar vulnerabilities.

Readable Restricted System Files. Just as the encrypted passwords
     need to be protected, the system has other data that is
     worth protecting.  Many computers have passwords and phone
     numbers of other computers stored for future use.  The most
     common use of this type of information is for network mail
     being transported via UUCP or protected DECNET. It is
     difficult to rework these systems so that this information
     would not be necessary and hence it must be protected.  You
     have an obligation to protect this data about your neighbors
     just as they have a responsibility to protect similar data
     that they have about you.

Home Dir's and Init Files Shouldn't Be Writable. Checking that
     these directories and files can be written only by the owner


     will prevent many careless errors.  It is also worthwhile to
     check that peoples mail archives are not publically
     readable.  Though this is not directly a security threat, it
     is only one more line of code while writing the rest of

     In many versions of the common operating systems special
     checks are placed in the command interpreters to prevent
     them from using initialization files that were written by a
     third party.  In this case there are still at least two
     types of interesting attacks.  The first is to install a
     Trojan horse in the person's home directory tree rather than
     in the initialization file itself and the second is to
     simple remove the initialization files themselves.  Often
     security weaknesses are remedied through the proper
     initialization file and without these files the
     vulnerabilities are re-introduced.
No Unexpected Publically Writable Files or Directories. There are
     of course places and individual files that should be
     publically writable but these are stable quantities and the
     script can ignore them.  In practice user seems to react
     well to being told about files that they own that are
     publically overwritable.

When Parents aren't Owners. While it is not unusual for someone
     to have a link to a file outside of his directory structure,
     it is unusual for there to be a file to be in his home
     directory that is owned by someone else.  Flagging this when
     the link-count is ``1'' is worthwhile.

Automated scripts can find these errors before they are
exploited.  In general a serious error of one of the types
described above is entered into a given cluster university system
every other week.

2.6 Well Known Security Holes

While hundreds of security holes exist in commonly used programs,
a very small number of these account for most of the problems.
Under modern version of VMS, most of them relate to either DECNET
or creating Mailboxes.

Under unix, a handful of programs account for most of the
problems.  It is not that these bugs are any worse or easier to
exploit than the others, just that they are well known and


popular.  The interested reader is referred to the Hackman
Project for a more complete listing.

Set-Uid Shell Scripts. You should not have any set-uid shell
     scripts.  If you have system source, you should consider
     modifying chmod to prevent users from creating set-uid

FTP. The file transfer utilities has had a number of problems
     both in terms of configuration management (remembering to
     disallow accounts like ``sync'' from being used to transfer
     files) and legitimate bugs.  Patched version are available
     for most systems.
Login on the Sun 386i and under Dec Ultrix 3.0, until a better
     fix is available,

          chmod 0100 /bin/login

     to protect yourself from a serious security bug.
Sendmail. Probably the only program with as many security
     problems as the yellowpages system itself.  Again a patched
     version should be obtained for your system.

TFTP. This program should be set to run as an unprivileged user
     and/or chrooted.

Rwalld. This program needs to be set to run as an unprivileged
Mkdir. Some versions of unix do not have an atomic kernel call to
     make a directory and hence can leave the inodes in a ``bad''
     state if it is interrupted at just the right moment.  If
     your system is one of these it is worthwhile to write a
     short program that increases the job priority of a job while
     it is making a directory so as to make it more difficult to
     exploit this hole.

YP & NFS. Both present giant security holes.  It is important to
     arrange to get patches as soon as they become available for
     these subsystems because we can expect more security
     problems with them in the future.  Sun has recently started
     a computer security group that will help solve this set of

While the ambitious and dedicated system manager is encouraged to
fix all of the security problems that exist, fixing these few
will discourage most of the attackers.


2.7 New Security Holes

New security holes are always being found.  There are a number of
computer mailing lists and advisory groups the follow this.
Three groups of particular interest are CERT, ZARDOZ and CIAC.

2.7.1 CERT

Cert is a DARPA sponsored group to help internet sites deal with
security problems.  They may be contacted as
cert@cert.sei.cmu.edu.  They also maintain a 24 hour phone number
for security problems at (412) 268-7090.

2.7.2 ZARDOZ

Neil Gorsuch moderates a computer security discussion group.  He
may be contacted as zardoz!security-request@uunet.UU.NET
or security-request@cpd.com.

2.7.3 CIAC

CIAC is the Department of Energy's Computer Incident Advisory
Capability team led by Gene Schultz.  This team is interested in
discovering and eliminating security holes, exchanging security
tools, as well as other issues.  Contact CIAC as

2.8 Excess Services

Every extra network service that a computer offers potentially
poses an additional security vulnerability.  I am emphatically
not suggesting that we remove those services that the users are
using, I am encouraging the removal of services that are unused.
If you are not getting a benefit from a service, you should not
pay the price in terms of system overhead or security risk.
Sometimes, as with rexecd under unix, the risks are not
immediately apparent and are caused by unexpected interactions
that do not include any bugs per se.


2.9 Search Paths

If a user has set his search path to include the current
directory (``.''  on Unix), he will almost always eventually have
a serious problem.  There are a number of security
vulnerabilities that this poses as well as logistical ones.
Searching through the all of the users initialization files
and/or through the process table (with ps -e on unix) can detect
this problem.

2.10 Routing

Routing can provide a cheap partial protection for a computer
center.  There are some machines that don't need to talk to the
outside world at all.  On others, one would might like to be able
to initiate contact outward but not have any real need to allow
others to contact this machine directly.

In an academic computer when administrative computers are placed
on same network as the student machines, limiting routing is
often a very good idea.  One can set up the system such that the
users on administrative machines can use the resources of the
academic machines without placing them at significant risk of
attack by the student machines.

Ideally one would wish to place the machines that need to be
protected on their own local area net with active routers to
prevent an attacker from ``listening in'' on the broadcast net.
This type of an attack is becoming increasingly popular.

2.11 Humans

In almost all technological systems, the weakest link is the
human beings involved.  Since the users, the installers and the
maintainers of the system are (in the average case) all humans,
this is a serious problem.

2.11.1 Managers

Managers, bosses, center directors and other respected people are
often given privileged accounts on a variety of machines.
Unfortunately, they often are not as familiar with the systems as


the programmers and system maintainers themselves.  As a result,
they often are the targets of attack.  Often they are so busy
that do not take the security precautions that others would take
and do not have the same level of technical knowledge.  They are
given these privileges as a sign of respect.  They often ignore
instructions to change passwords or file protections

The attackers rarely show this level of respect.  They break into
the unprotected managerial account and use it as a vector to the
rest of the system or center.  This leads to an embarrassing
situations beyond the break-in itself as the manager is made to
look personally incompetent and is sometimes accused of being
unfit for his position.

Prevent this type of situation form occurring by giving
privileges only to people that need and know how to use them.

2.11.2 Secretaries

Secretaries are often give their bosses passwords by their
bosses.  When a secretary uses his bosses account, he has all the
privileges that his boss would have and generally does not have
the training or expertise to use them safely.

It is probably not possible to prevent bosses from giving their
passwords to their secretaries.  Still one can reduce the need
for this by setting up groups correctly.  One might consider
giving ``bosses'' two separate accounts one for routine use and
one for privileged access with a hope that they will only share
the former with their secretary.

2.11.3 Trojan Horses

Having an ``unsupported'' or ``public'' area on disk where users
place binaries for common use simplifies the placement of Trojan
horse programs.  Having several areas for user maintained
binaries and a single user responsible for each reduces but does
not eliminate this problem.

2.11.4 Wizards

Wizards and system programmers often add their own security
problems.  They are often the ones to create privileged programs


that are needed and then forgotten about without being disabled.
Thinking that an account doesn't need to be checked/audited
because it is owned by someone that should know better than to
make a silly mistake is a risky policy.

2.11.5 Funders

Funders are often giving accounts on the machines that they
``paid for.''  All to often these accounts are never used but not
disabled even though they are found to be dormant by the
procedures discussed above.  Again, this is a mistake to be

2.12 Group Accounts

A group account is one that is shared among several people in
such a way that one can't tell which of the people in the group
is responsible for a given action.

Those of you familiar with Hardin's ``The Tragedy of The Common''
will understand that this is a problem in any system computer or
otherwise.  Part of the problem here is with passwords.

  1. You can't change the password easily.  You have to find
     everyone in the group to let them know.
  2. If something Dumb happens you don't know who to talk to
     about it.

  3. If someone shares the group password with another person,
     you can never find out who did or who all the people who
     knew the password were.

Group accounts should always be avoided.  The administrative work
to set up several independent accounts is very small in
comparison to the extra effort in disaster recovery for not doing

One must not only avoid the explicit group accounts, but also the
implicit ones.  This is where an individual shares his password
with dozens of people or allows dozens, perhaps hundreds of them
to use his through proxy logins or .rhosts.


2.13 .rhosts and proxy logins

Just as some people trust each other, some accounts trust each
other and some machines trust each other.  There are several
mechanism for setting up a trust relationship.  Among these are
hosts.equiv, .rhosts, and proxy logins.

These mechanisms essentially allow a user to login from one
machine to another without a password.  There are three basic
implications to this.

  1. If you can impersonate a machine, you can gain access to
     other machines without having to provide passwords or find
  2. Once you get access to one account on one machine, you are
     likely to be able to reach many other accounts on other

  3. If you gain control of a machine, you have gained access to
     all the machines that trusts it.

Various experiments have shown that by starting almost anywhere
interesting, once one has control of one medium size machine, one
can gain access to tens of thousands of computers.  In my most
recent experiment, starting from a medium size timesharing
system, I gained immediate access to 150 machines and surpassed
5000 distinct machines before completing the second recursion

2.14 Debugging

About one third of the security holes that I have come across
depend on a debugging option being enabled.  When installing
system software, always check that all the ``debugging'' options
that you are not using are disabled.

2.15 Getting People Mad at You

It is sad but true that a small number of sites have gotten
groups of hackers angry at them.  In at least two cases, this was
because the hackers had found an interesting security hole, had


tried to contact the administrators of the center and were given
a hard time when they were seriously trying to help.

When one is given a ``tip'' from someone that won't identify
themselves about a security problem, it is generally worth
investigating.  It is not worth trying to trick the informant
into giving his phone number to you.  It almost never works, and
it is the ``type of dirty trick'' that will probably get people
mad at you and at the very least prevent you from getting early
warnings in the future.


3 Pre-Planning your Incident Handling

3.1 Goals

Despite your best plans to avoid incidents they may very well
occur.  Proper planning can reduce their serverity, cost and
inconvenience levels.  There are about half dozen different goals
that one can have while handling an incident.

  1. Maintain and restore data.
  2. Maintain and restore service.

  3. Figure out how it happenned.

  4. Avoid the future incidents and escalation.
  5. Avoid looking foolish.

  6. Find out who did it.

  7. Punish the attackers.

The order shown above is what I believe the order of priorities
generally should be.  Of course in a real situation there are
many reasons why this ordering might not be appropriate and we
will discuss the whens and why of changing our priorities in the
next section.

For any given site, one can expect that a standard goal
prioritization can be developed.  This should be done in advance.
There is nothing so terrible as being alone in a cold machine
room at 4 on a Sunday morning trying to decide whether to shut
down the last hole to protect the system or try to get a phone
trace done to catch the attacker.  It is similarly difficult to
decide in the middle of a disaster whether you should shut down a
system to protect the existing data or do everything you can to
continue to provide service.

Noone who is handling the technical side of an incident wants to
make these policy decisions without guidance in the middle of a
disaster.  One can be sure that these decisions will be replayed
an re-analyzed by a dozen ``Monday Morning Quarterbacks'' who
will explain what should have been done could not be bothered to
make up a set of guidelines before.

Let us look at each of these goals in a little more detail.


3.1.1 Maintaining and restoring data

To me, the user data is of paramount importance.  Anything else
is generally replacable.  You can buy more disk drives, more
computers, more electrical power.  If you lose the data, though a
security incident or otherwise, it is gone.

Of course, if the computer is controlling a physical device,
there may be more than just data at stake.  For example, the most
important goal for the computer in Pacemaker is to get the next
pulse out on time.

In terms of the protection of user data, there is nothing that
can take the place of a good back-up strategy.  During the week
that this chapter was written, three centers that I work with
suffered catastrophic data loss.  Two of the three from air
conditioning problems, one from programmer error.  At all three
centers, there were machines with irreplacable scientific data
that had never been backed up in their lives.

Many backup failures are caused by more subbtle problems than
these.  Still it is instructive to note that many sites never
make a second copy of their data.  This means than any problem
from a defective disk drive, to a water main break, to a typing
mistake when updating system software can spell disaster.

If the primary goal is that of maintaining and restoring data,
the first thing to do during an incident needs to be to check
when the most recent backup was completed.  If it was not done
very recently, an immediate full system dump must be made and the
system must be shutdown until it is done.  Of course, one can't
trust this dump as the attacker may have already modified the

3.1.2 Maintaining and restoring service

Second to maintaining the data, maintaining service is important.
Users have probably come to rely on the computing center and will
not be pleased if they can't continue to use it as planned.

3.1.3 Figuring how it happenned

This is by far the most interesting part of the problem and in
practice seems to take precident over all of the others.  It of


course strongly conflicts with the two preceeding goals.

By immediately making a complete copy of the system after the
attack, one can analyze it at one's leisure.  This means that we
don't need to worry about normal use destroying evidence of about
the attacker re-entering to destroy evidence of what happenned.

Ultimately, one may never be able to determine how it happenned.
One may find several ways that ``could have happenned''
presenting a number of things to fix.

3.1.4 Avoiding the Future Incidents and Escalation

This needs to be an explicit goal and often is not realized until
much too late.  To avoid future incidents one of course should
fix the problem that first occurred and remove any new security
vulnerabilities that were added either by the attackers or by the
system staff while trying to figure out what was going on.

Beyond this, one needs to prevent turning a casual attacker who
may not be caught into dedicate opponent, to prevent enticing
other attackers and to prevent others in one's organization and
related organizations from being forced to introduce restrictions
that would be neither popular nor helpful.

3.1.5 Avoiding looking foolish

Another real world consideration that I had not expected to
become an issue is one of image management.  In practice, it is
important not to look foolish in the press, an issue that we will
discuss more fully in an appendix.  Also it is important for the
appropriate people within the organization to be briefed on the
situation.  It is embarrising to find out about an incident in
one's own organization from a reporter's phone call.

3.1.6  Finding out who did it

This goal is often over emphasized.  There is definitely a value
in knowing who the attacker was so that one can debrief him and
discourage him from doing such things in the future.

In the average case, it effort to determine the attackers
identity than it is worth unless one plans to prosecute him.


3.1.7 Punishing the attackers

This merits of this goal have been seriously debated in the past
few years.  As a practical matter it is very difficult to get
enough evidence to prosecuter someone and very few succesful
prosecutions.  If this is a one of the goals, very careful record
keeping needs to be done at all times during the investigation,
and solving the problem will be slowed down as one waits for
phone traces and various court orders.

3.2 Backups

It should be clear that accomplishing most of the goals requires
having extra copies of the data that is stored on the system.
These extra copies are called ``Backups'' and generally stored on
magnetic tape.

Let us consider two aspects of keeping backup copies of your
data.  First, we will look at why this important and what the
backups are used for and then we will examine the charateristics
of a good backup strategy.

3.2.1 Why We Need Back Ups

Good back ups are needed for four types of reasons.  The first
three of these are not security related per se, though an
insufficeint back up strategy will lead to problems with these
first three as well.

If a site does not have a reliable back up system, when an
incident occurs, one must seriously consider immediate shutdown
of the system so as not to endanger the user data.

User Errors. Every once in a while, a user delete a file or
     overwrites data and then realizes that he needs it back.  In
     some operating systems, ``undelete'' facilities or version
     numbering is enough to protect him, if he notices his
     mistake quickly enough.  Sometimes he doesn't notice the
     error for a long time, or deletes all of the versions, or
     expunges them and then wants the data back.
     If there is no backup system at all, the users data is just
     plain lost.  If there is a perfect backup system, he quickly
     is able to recover from his mistake.  If there is a poor


     back up system, his data may be recovered in a corrupted
     form or with incorrect permission set on it.

     There have been cases where back up systems returned data
     files to be publically writeable and obvious problems have
     ensued from it.  Perhaps as seriously, there are sites that
     have stored all of the back up data in a publically readable
     form, including the data that was protected by the
     individual user.
System Staff Errors. Just as users make mistakes, staff members
     do as well.  In doing so, they may damage user files, system
     files or both.  Unless there is a copy of the current system
     files, the staff must restore the system files from the
     original distribution and then rebuild all of the site
     specific changes.  This is an error prone process and often
     the site specific changes including removing unwanted
     debugging features that pose security vulnerabilities.

Hardware/Software Failures. Hardware occassionally fails.  If the
     only copy of the data is on a disk that has become
     unreadable it is lost.  Software occasionally fails.  Given
     a serious enough error, it can make a disk unreadable.

Security Incidents. In this document, our main concern is with
     security incidents.  In determining what happen and
     correcting it, backups are essential.
     Basically, one would like to return every file to the state
     before the incident except for those that are being modified
     to prevent future incidents.  Of course, to do this, one
     needs a copy to restore from.  Naively, one would think that
     using that modification date would allow us to tell which
     files need to be updated.  This is of course not the case.
     The clever attack will modify the system clock and/or the
     timestamps on files to prevent this.
     In many attacks, at one the following types of files are

       ? The system binary that controls logging in.
       ? The system authorization file lists the users and their

       ? The system binary that controls one or more daemons.
       ? The accounting and auditing files.
       ? User's startup files and permission files.

       ? The system directory walking binary.

Now that we understand why we need back ups in order to recover


3.2.2 How to form a Back Up Strategy that Works

There are a few basic rules that provide for a good backup

   ? Every file that one cares about must be included.
   ? The copies must be in non-volitile form.  While having two
     copies of each file, one on each of two separate disk drives
     is good for protection from simple hardware failures, it is
     not defense from an intelligent attacker that will modify
     both copies, of from a clever system staffer who saves time
     by modifying them both at once.

   ? Long cycles.  It may take weeks or months to notice a
     mistake.  A system that reuses the same tape every week will
     have destroyed the data before the error is noticed.

   ? Separate tapes.  Overwriting the existing backup before
     having the new one completed is an accident waiting to
   ? Verified backups.  It is necessary to make sure that one can
     read the tapes back in.  One site with a programming bug in
     its back up utility had a store room filled with unreadable

3.3 Forming a Plan

While the first major section (avoidance) contained a lot of
standard solutions to standard problems, planning requires a
great deal more thought and consideration.  A great deal of this
is list making.

Calls Lists. If there a system staffer suspects security incident
     is happening right now, who he should call?
     And if he gets no answer on that line?

     What if the people are the call list are no longer employees
     or have long since died?
     What if it Christmas Day or Sunday morning?

Time--Distance. How long will it take for the people who are
     called to arrive?
     What should be done until they get there?


This a user notices. If a user notices something odd, who should
     he tell?

     How does he know this?
Threats and Tips. What should your staffers do if they receive a
     threat or a tip-off about a breakin?

Press. What should a system staffer do when he receives a call
     from the press asking about an incident that he, himself
     doesn't know about?
     What about when there is a real incident underway?

Shutting Down. Under what circumstances should the center be
     shutdown or removed from the net?
     Who can make this decision?

     When should service be restored?
Prosecution. Under what circumstances do you plan to prosecute?

Timestamps. How can you tell that the timestamps have been
     What should you do about it?

     Would running NTP (the network time protocal) help?
Informing the Users. What do you tell the users about all this?

List Logistics. How often to you update the incident plan?
     How does you system staff learn about it?

3.4 Tools to have on hand

File Differencing Tools


Spying tools

Backup Tapes

Blanks Tapes



3.5 Sample Scenarios to Work on in Groups

In order to understand what goal priorities you have for you
center and as a general exercise in planning, let us consider a
number of sample problems.  Each of these is a simplified version
of a real incident.  What would be appropriate to do if a similar
thing happenned at your center?  Each new paragraph indicates new
information that is received later.

   ? A system programmer notices that at midnight each night,
     someone makes 25 attempts to guess a username--password
     Two weeks later, he reports that each night it is the same
     username--password combination.

   ? A system programmer gets a call reporting that a major
     underground cracker newsletter is being distributed from the
     administrative machine at his center to five thousand sites
     in the US and Western Europe.
     Eight weeks later, the authorities call to inform you the
     information in one of these newsletters was used to disable
     ``911'' in a major city for five hours.

   ? A user calls in to report that he can't login to his account
     at 3 in the morning on a Saturday.  The system staffer can't
     login either.  After rebooting to single user mode, he finds
     that password file is empty.
     By Monday morning, your staff determines that a number of
     privileged file transfer took place between this machine and
     a local university.
     Tuesday morning a copy of the deleted password file is found
     on the university machine along with password files for a
     dozen other machines.

     A week later you find that your system initialization files
     had been altered in a hostile fashion.
   ? You receive a call saying that breakin to a government lab
     occurred from one of your center's machines.  You are
     requested to provide accounting files to help trackdown the

     A week later you are given a list of machines at your site
     that have been broken into.
   ? A user reports that the last login time/place on his account
     aren't his.


     Two weeks later you find that your username space isn't
     unique and that unauthenticated logins are allowed between
     machines based entirely on username.

   ? A guest account is suddenly using four CPU hours per day
     when before it had just been used for mail reading.
     You find that the extra CPU time has been going into
     password cracking.

     You find that the password file isn't one from your center.
     You determine which center it is from.

   ? You hear reports of computer virus that paints trains on
     You login to a machine at your center and find such a train
     on your screen.
     You look in the log and find not notation of such a feature
     being added.

     You notice that five attempts were made to install it within
     an hour of each before the current one.
     Three days later you learn that it was put up by a system
     administrator locally who had heard nothing about the virus
     scare or about your asking about it.

   ? You notice that your machine has been broken into.
     You find that nothing is damaged.
     A high school student calls up and apologizes for doing it.

   ? An entire disk partition of data is deleted.  Mail is
     bouncing bouncing because the mail utilities was on that
     When you restore the partition, you find that a number of
     system binaries have been changed.  You also notice that the
     system date is wrong.  Off by 1900 years.

   ? A reporter calls up asking about the breakin at your center.
     You haven't heard of any such breakin.
     Three days later you learn that there was a breakin.  The
     center director had his wife's name as a password.

   ? A change in system binaries is detected.
     The day that it is corrected they again are changed.

     This repeats itself for some weeks.


4 Incident Handling

The difficulty of handling an incident is determined by several
factors.  These include the level of preparation, the sensitivity
of the data, and the relative expertise levels of the attacker(s)
and the defender(s).  Hopefully, preliminary work in terms of
gathering tools, having notification lists, policies and most
importantly backup tapes, will make the actual handling much

This section is divided into three parts.  The first of these
deal with general principles.  The second presents some
particular (simple) techniques that have proven useful in the
past.  Finally, the third section presents a description of a
simulation exercise based a set of real attacks.

4.1 Basic Hints

There are a number of basic issues to understand when handling a
computer incident.  Most of these issues are present in handling
most of these issues and techniques are relevant in a wide
variety of unusual and emergency situations.

4.1.1 Panic Level

It is critical to determine how much panic is appropriate.  In
many cases, a problem is not noticed until well after it has
occurred and another hour or day will not make a difference.

4.1.2 Call Logs and Time Lines

All (or almost all) bad situations eventually come to an end.  At
that point, and perhaps at earlier points, a list of actions and
especially communications is needed to figure out what happened.

4.1.3 Accountability and Authority

During an incident it is important to remind people what
decisions they are empowered to make and what types of decisions
that they are not.  Even when this is explicitly discussed and


formulated in a contingency plan, people have a tendency to
exceed their authorities when they are convinced that they know
what should be done.

4.1.4 Audit Logs

Audit logs need to be copied to a safe place as quickly as
possible.  It is often the case that an attacker returns to a
computer to destroy evidence that he had previously forgotten

4.1.5 Timestamps

The second most powerful tool (second only to backup tapes) in an
incident handlers arsenal is timestamps.  When in doubt as to
what to do, try to understand the sequencing of the events.  This
is especially true when some of the actions will change the value
on the system clock.

4.2 Basic Techniques

There are five basic sets of techniques for understanding what
has happened.

4.2.1 Differencing

Differencing is that act of comparing the state of a part of the
computer system to the state that it was in previously.  In some
cases we have compared every executable system file with the
corresponding file on the original distribution tape to find what
files the attacker may have modified.  Checksums are often used
to decrease the cost of differencing.  Sometimes people look only
for differences in the protection modes of the files.

4.2.2 Finding

Finding is generally cheaper than differencing.  Finding is the
act of looking at a part of a computer system for files that have
been modified during a particular time or have some other
interesting property.


4.2.3 Snooping

Snooping is the act of placing monitors on a system to report the
future actions of an attacker.  Often a scripting version of the
command line interpreter is used or a line printer or PC is
spliced in to the incoming serial line.

4.2.4 Tracking

Tracking is the use of system logs and other audit trails to try
to determine what an attacker has done.  It is particularly
useful in determining what other machines might be involved in an

4.2.5 Psychology

A wide range of non-technical approaches have been employed over
the years with an even wider range of results.  Among these
approaches have been leaving messages for the attacker to find,
starting talk links, calling local high school teachers, etc.

4.3 Prosecution

Prosecution has historically been very difficult.  Less than a
year ago, the FBI advised me that it was essentially impossible
to succeed in a prosecution.  More recently, FBI agent Dave
Icove, (icove@dockmaster.cnsc.mil, 703--640--1176) has assured me
that the FBI will be taking a more active role in the prosecution
of computer break-ins and has expressed interest in lending
assistance to investigation where prosecution is appropriate.

4.4 Exercise

The bulk of this class hour is reserved for an incident handling
simulation.  A facility will be described.  A consensus policy
for incident handling will be agreed upon and then the simulation
will begin.

During the simulation, the effects of the attackers actions and
those of third parties will be described.  The participants can


choose actions and take measurements and will be informed of the
results of those actions and measurements.  In a sufficiently
small working group that had several days, we would run a
software simulation; but as many of the actions take hours (ega
full system comparison to the original distribution), we will
proceed verbal in the short version of this workshop.


5 Recovering From Disasters

Incident recovery is the final portion of the of the incident
handling process.  Like the other portions of incident handling,
it is not particularly difficult but is sufficiently intricate to
allow for many errors.

Telling everyone that is over. For a large incident, it is not
     unusual to have contacted people at a dozen or more sites.
     It is important to let everyone know that you are done and
     to be sure to give your colleagues the information that they
     need.  It is also important that your staff knows that
     things are over so that they can return to normal work.
     Generally a lot of people need to thanked for the extra
     hours and effort that they have contributed.
Removing all Tools. Many of the tools that were installed and
     using during an incident need to removed from the system.
     Some will interfere with performance.  Others are worth
     stealing by a clever attacker.  Similarly a future attacker
     that gets a chance to look at the tools will know a lot
     about how you are going to track him.  Often extra accounts
     are added for handling the incident.  These need to be

File and Service Restoration. Returning the file system to a
     ``known good state'' is often the most difficult part of
     recovery.  This is especially true with long incidents.

Reporting Requirements. Often, especially if law enforcement
     agencies have become involved, a formal report will be
History. After everything is over, a final reconstruction of the
     events is appropriate.  In this way, everyone on your staff
     is telling the same story.

Future Prevention. It is important to make sure that all of the
     vulnerabilities that were used in or created the incident
     are secured.

Just after an incident, it is likely to be a good time to create
sensible policies where they have not existed in the past and to
request extra equipment or staffing to increase security.
Similarly, it is a logical time for someone else to demand
stricter (nonsensical) policies to promote security.


A Micro Computers

While the bulk of this book and class has concerned multi-user
computers on networks, micro computers are also worth some

Basically there are four issues that cause concern.

Shared Disks. In many settings, micro computers are shared among
     many users.  Even if each user brings his own data, often
     the system programs are shared on communal hard-disk,
     network or library or floppies.  This means that a single
     error can damage the work of many people.  Such errors might
     include destruction of a system program, intentional or
     accidental modification of a system program or entry of a
     To combat this, systematic checking or reinstallation of
     software from a known protected source is recommended.  In
     most shared facilities, refreshing the network, hard-disk or
     floppy-library weekly should be considered.  Shared floppies
     should be write protected and the original copies of
     programs should be kept under lock and key and used only to
     make new copies.
     Trusted server the provide read only access to the system
     files have been successfully used in some universities.  It
     is absolute critical that these machines be used only as

Viruses. A number of computer viruses have been found for
     micro-computers.  Many experts consider this problem to be
     practically solved for Macintoshes an soon to be solved for
     IBM-style PC's.
     Two basic types of anti-viral software are generally
     available.  The first type is installed into the operating
     and watches for virus's trying to infect a machine.
     Examples of this on the Mac include Semantic's SAM (Part 1),
     Don Brown's vaccine and Chris Johnson's Gate Keeper.
     The second type of anti-viral software scans the disk to
     detect and correct infected programs.  On the Mac, SAM (Part
     2), H. G. C. Software's Virex, and John Norstab's Disinfinct
     are commonly used disk scanners.

     On the PC type of machines we find three types of virus.
     The first of these is a boot sector virus that alters the
     machine language start up code found on the diskette.  The
     second infects the command.com startup file and the third
     alters the exe (machine language executable files).


     Flu Shot Plus by Ross Greenberg is an example of a program
     to deal with command.com & some exe virus.  Novirus and
     cooperatively built by Yale, Alemeda and Merit is one of the
     boot track repair systems.
     There are a number of electronic discussion groups that deal
     with computer virus.  On BITNET (and forwarded to other
     networks), virus-l supports discussion about PC and Mac
     virus, while valert is used to announce the discovery of new
     ones.  Compuserve's macpro serves as a forum to discuss
     Macintosh viruses.

Network. The third is issue is the placement of single user
     computers on networks.  Since there is little or no
     authentication on (or of) these machines, care must be taken
     to not place sensitive files upon them in such a

Reliability. Finally there is a reliability issue.  Most single
     user computers were never designed for life and time
     critical applications.  Before using such a computer in such
     an application, expert advise should be sought.

In the use of single user computers, there are some basic issues
that need be considered and some simple advice that should be

In the advice column, there are a few basic points.

  1. Where practical, each user should have his own system disks
     and hence be partially insulated from potential mistakes.
  2. When people are sharing disks have an explicit check out
     policy logging the users of each disk.  Be sure to set the
     write-protect them and teach the users how to write protect
     there own system disks.  (Most PC programs are sold on
     write-protected disks, this is not true of most Macintosh

  3. Keep a back up copy of all system programs and system
     programs to allow for easy restoration of the system.
  4. Write lock originals and keep them under lock and key for
     emergency use only.

  5. Have an explicit policy and teach users about software theft
     and software ethics.

  6. Teach users to back up their data.  Just as with large
     computers, the only real defense from disaster is


Even when the computer center is not providing the machines
themselves, it should generally help to teach users about
backups, write protection, software ethics and related issues.
Most PC users do not realize that they are their own system
managers and must take the responsibility of care for their
systems or risk the consequences.


B VMS Script

This script is courtesy of Kevin Oberman of Lawrence Livermore
National Labs.  It is used on DEC VMS systems to close a number
of the standard created by the normal installation of DECNET.
Rather than typing this in by hand, please request one by
electronic mail.  This DCL script is provided for reference
purposes only and is not guaranteed or warranted in any way.


countpandedure  changes the  password for the  default DECnet  ac-
sets  up a  new account  for FAL  activity.  It prevents  unautho-
rized users
from  making  use of  the  default  DECnet account  for  any  pur-
pose except
file transfer.

This procedure assumes  a default DECnet account named  DECNET us-
ing a
directory on  SYS$SYSROOT. If this  is not the  case on this  sys-
tem, do
readypinceed!   It will  use UIC  [375,375]. If  this  UIC is  al-
use, do not continue.

$ Read/End=Cleanup/Prompt="Continue [N]: " SYS$COMMAND OK
$ If .NOT. OK Then Exit
$ Say := "Write SYS$OUTPUT"
$ Current_Default = F$Environment("DEFAULT")
$ Has_Privs = F$Priv("CMKRNL,OPER,SYSPRV")
$ If Has_Privs Then GoTo Privs_OK
$ Say "This procedure requires CMKRNL, OPER, and SYSPRV."
$ Exit
$POnvControl_Y Then GoTo Cleanup
$ On Error Then GoTo Cleanup
$ Set Terminal/NoEcho
$ Read/End=Cleanup/Prompt="Please  enter new default DECnet  pass-
word: " -
 SYS$Command DN_Password
$ Say " "
$ If F$Length(DN_Password) .GT. 7 Then GoTo DN_Password_OK
$ Say "Minimum password length is 8 characters"
$ GoTo Privs_OK
$ Sayd"E"d=Cleanup/Prompt="Enter new FAL password: " SYS$COMMAND FAL_Password
$ If F$Length(FAL_Password) .GT. 7 Then GoTo FAL_Password_OK


$ Say "Minimum password length is 8 characters"
$ GoTo DN_Password_OK
$ Set Terminal/Echo

The FAL account requires a disk quota. This quota should be large
enough to accomodate the the files typically loaded into this account.
formldefaultqouta  be  exhausted, the  system  will fail  to  per-
DECnet file transfers.

It  is  also  advisable  to  clear  old   files  from  the  direc-
tory on a daily

$ If .NOT. F$GetSYI("CLUSTER_MEMBER") Then GoTo Not_Cluster
$ Say "This system is a cluster member.
$ Read/Prom="Has this procedure already been run  on another clus-
ter member: "-
$ IfSClusterCTheneGoTo No_Create
$ Read/End=Cleanup -
  /Prompt="Disk  quota  for FAL  account  (0  if  quotas  not  en-
abled): " -
$ If F$Type(Quota) .EQS. "INTEGER" Then GoTo Set_Quota
$ Say "Diskquota must be an integer"
$ GoTo FAL_Password_OK
$ Say "Setting up new FAL account."
$ Set NoOnult SYS$SYSTEM
$ UAF := "$Authorize"
$ UAF Copy DECNET FAL/Password='FAL_Password'/UIC=[375,375]/Directory=[FAL]
$ Create/Directory SYS$SYSROOT:[FAL]/Owner=[FAL]
$ NCP := "$NCP"
$ NCP Define Object FAL USER FAL Password 'FAL_Password'
$ NCP Set Object FAL USER FAL Password 'FAL_Password'
$ If (Quota .eq. 0) .OR. Cluster Then GoTo NO_QUOTA
$ Say "Entering disk quota for FAL account.
$ Set Default SYS$SYSTEM
$ Open/WritetQuota"SET_QUOTA'PID'.COM
$ Write Quota "$ Run SYS$SYSTEM:DISKQUOTA"
$ Write Quota "Add FAL/Perm=''Quota'"
$ Close Quota


$ Say "Resetting default DECNET account password"
$ NCP Define Executor Nonpriv Password 'DN_Password'
$ NCP Set Executor Nonpriv Password 'DN_Password'
$ UAF Modify DECNET/Password='DN_Password'
$ Set Default 'Current_Default'
$ Set Terminal/Echo
$ Exit


C Highly Sensitive Environments

An computing environment should be considered highly sensitive
when it is potentially profitable to covert the data or when
great inconvenience and losses could result from errors produced
there.  In particular, you should consider you site sensitive if
any of the following conditions apply:

  1. You process data that the government considers sensitive.
  2. You process financial transactions such that a single
     transaction can exceed $25,000.00 or the total transactions
     exceed 2.5 Million dollars.

  3. You process data whose time of release is tightly controlled
     and whose early release could give significant financial

  4. Your function is life critical.
  5. Your organization has enemies that have a history of
     ``terrorism'' or violent protests.

  6. Your data contains trade secrete information that would be
     of direct value to a competitor.

Essentially money is more directly valuable than secrets and a
``vilian'' can potentially steal more from one successful attack
on one financial institution than he will ever be able to get
selling state secrets for decades.  There is significant concern
that the electrical utility companies and and bank conducting
electronic funds transfer will be targets of terrorists in thee
next decade.

For centers the must support sensitive processing it is strongly
advised to completely separate the facilities for processing this
data from those facilities used to process ordinary data and to
allow absolutely no connection from the sensitive processing
systems to the outside world.  There is No substitute for
physical security and proper separation will require an attacker
to compromise physical security in order to penetrate the system.
Techniques for coping with the remaining ``insider threat'' are
beyond the scope of this tutorial.

In analysis of computing in sensitive environments, there are two
different security goals.  The first is that of protecting the
system.  All of the advice in this booklet should be considered


as a first step towards that goal.  The second goal is the
protection of job or ``Technical Compliance.''  This is is the
goal of showing that all of the regulations have been followed
and that protecting the system has been done with ``due

It is important to realize that these two security goals are
separate and potentially conflicting.  It may be necessary to
work towards the latter the goal and that is often more a legal
and bookkeeping question than a technical one.  It is also beyond
the scope of this work.


D Handling the Press

Often media inquiries can absorb more time than all of the others
issues in incident handling combined.  It is important to
understand this and to use your public affairs office if it
exists.  In the excitement, people, especially those who are not
experience speakers will often forget that they are not empowered
to speak for the center and that nothing is ever really said,
``Off the record.''

D.1 Spin Control

The phrase ``Spin Control'' was first used in political circles.
It refers to altering the perceptions about an incident rather
than the delaying with the facts of the incident themselves.
Consider the two statements.

  1. To keep our machines safe, we decided to disconnect them
     from the network.
  2. We were forced to shut down our network connections to
     prevent damage to our machines.

I have found that the giving the press a state like the former
tends to produce a laudatory piece about one's staff while a
statement like the latter, produces an embarrassing piece.  The
two statements are of course essentially identical.

Your public affairs group is probably familiar with these issues
and can help you form press statements

D.2 Time Control

With a sufficiently large incident, the media attention can
absorb almost unbounded amounts of time.  The press will often
call employees at home.  It is important the staff that are
solving a problem understand that the solving the incident is
more important that dealing with the press.  At the very least
insist that all press representatives go through the public
affairs often so that the standard questions can be easily and
time-efficiently be answered.


D.3 Hero Making

The press likes to find outstanding heroes and villains.  As a
result, the media will tend to make one of your staff members
into a hero if at all possible from them to do so.  It is more
likely than not that the Hero will not be the person who has
worked the hardest or the longest.

D.4 Discouraging or Encouraging a Next Incident

The attention that an incident receives greatly affect the
likelihood of future incidents at that particular site.  It
probably also influences the decision process or potential future
crackers in the community at large.  Claiming that your site is
invulnerable is an invitation to a future incident.  Giving the
media step by step instructions on how to break in to a computer
is also not a wonderful idea.

I (personally) suggest stressing the hard work of your staff and
the inconvenience to the legitimate users and staff members.  To
the extent practical portray the cracker as inconsiderate and
immature and try to avoid making him seem brilliant at one
extreme or the attack seem very simple at the other.

D.5 Prosecution

If you considering prosecution, you need to consult with your
legal counsel and law enforcement official for advise on press

D.6 No Comment

One common strategy for avoiding (or at least bounding) time loss
with the press is to simply decline to comment on the situation
at all.  IF you are going to adopt this approach, your public
affairs office can advise you on techniques to use.  It is
important to tell everyone who is involved in the incident that
they should not discuss the situation; otherwise people will leak
things accidently.  Also, without correct information from your
center, the press may print many inaccurate things that represent
their best guesses.


D.7 Honesty

I recommend against trying to mislead the press.  It is hard to
keep a secret forever and when and if the press finds that you
have lied to them, the negative coverage that you may receive
will probably far exceed the scope of the actual incident.


E Object Code Protection

To keep object code safe from human attackers and virus, a
variety of techniques may be employed.

Checksums. Saving the checksums of each of the system files in a
     protected area an periodically comparing the stored checksum
     with those computed from the file's current contents is a
     common and moderately effective way to detect the alteration
     of system files.
Source Comparisons. Rather than just using a checksum the
     complete files may be compared against a known set of
     sources.  This requires a greater storage commitment.

File Properties. Rather the computing a checksum, some facility
     store certain attributes of files.  Among these are the
     length and location on the physical disk.  While these
     characteristics are easy to preserve, the naive attacker may
     not know that they are important.

Read-Only Devices. Where practical, the system sources should be
     stored on a device that does not permit writing.  On many
     system disk partitions may be mounted as ``Read-Only.''
Dates. On many systems the last modification date of each file is
     stored and recent modifications of system files are reported
     to the system administrator.

Refresh. Some system automatically re-install system software
     onto there machines on a regular basis.  Users of TRACK
     often do this daily to assure that systems have not be


F The Joy of Broadcast

The majority of the local area nets (LAN's) use a system called
broadcast.  It is somewhat like screaming in a crowded room.
Each person tends to try to ignore messages that weren't meant
for them.

In this type of environment, eaves-dropping is undetectable.
Often passwords are sent unencrypted between machines.  Such
passwords are fair game to an attacker.

Various cryptographic solutions including digital signature and
one time keys have been used to combat this problem.  Kerberos,
developed at the MIT Athena project is available without cost and
presents one of the few promising potential solutions to the
broadcast problem.


G Guest Accounts

The computer center guest policy is among the most hotly debated
topics at many computer centers.  From a security standpoint, it
should be obvious that an attacker who has access to a guest
account can break into a computer facility more easily.

G.1 Attack Difficulty Ratios

Basically it is a factor of ten easier to break into a machine
where you can easily get as far as a login prompt that one where
you can't.  Being able to reach the machine through a standard
networking discipline and open connections to the daemons is
worth another order of magnitude.  Access to a machine that is
run by the same group is worth another factor of three and access
to a machine on the same LAN would grant a factor of three beyond
that.  Having a guest account on the target machine makes the
attack still another order of magnitude easier.

Essentially, having a guest account on the target simplifies an
attack at least a thousand fold from having to start cold.

G.2 Individual Sponsors

I strongly suggest requiring each guest to have an individual
staff sponsor who takes responsibility for the actions of his

G.3 The No Guest Policy

In centers that prohibit guests, staff members often share their
passwords with their guests.  Since these are generally
privileged accounts, this is a significant danger.


H Orange Book

You have doubtlessly by now heard of the ``Orange Book'' and
perhaps of the whole rainbow series.

Much of the ``Orange Book'' discusses discretionary and mandatory
protection mechanism and security labeling.  Another section
deals with ``covert channels'' for data to leak out.  While most
of these issues are not important in a university, the ideas of
protecting password files (even when encrypted), individual
accountability of users and password aging are worth implementing
in an unclassified environment.


I Acknowledgements

-- Help of a lot of people.  -- copies were sent out to 48 people
for peer review

Jerry Carlin. For examples from his training course.
Joe Carlson. For help with spelling and grammar.

James Ellis. For help with organization.

Alan Fedeli.
Paul Holbrook. For help getting this document distributed.

David Muir. For help with spelling, grammar and comments about
     computer games.

Kevin Oberman. For help with VMS issues, spelling and grammar.
Mike Odawa. For help with the microcomputers section.


TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2024 AOH