Louhi Networks Information Security Research
                        Security Advisory


     Advisory: IBM BladeCenter Advanced Management Module
	       Multiple vulnerabilities
               (XSS type 2 & 1, CSRF, Information Disclosure)
 Release Date: 2009-04-09
Last Modified: 2009-04-09
Authors: Henri Lindberg [henri.lindberg@louhi.fi], CISA 
=09
       Device: IBM BladeCenter H AMM
               Main application: BPET36H
               Released: 03-20-08
               Rev:  54
         Risk: Low - Moderate
               High if Web Access is in active use and
               access to login page is unrestricted
Vendor Status: Vendor notified, patch available.
References: http://www.louhinetworks.fi/advisory/ibm_090409.txt 

Affected devices (from vendor):
  IBM BladeCenter E (1881, 7967, 8677)
  IBM BladeCenter H (7989, 8852)
  IBM BladeCenter HT (8740, 8750)
  IBM BladeCenter S (1948, 8886)
  IBM BladeCenter T (8720, 8730)
  IBM BladeCenter JS12 (7998)
  IBM BladeCenter JS21 (7988, 8844)
  IBM BladeCenter JS22 (7998)
  IBM BladeCenter HC10 (7996)
  IBM BladeCenter HS12 (8014, 1916, 8028)
  IBM BladeCenter HS20 (1883, 8843)
  IBM BladeCenter HS21 (8853, 1885)
  IBM BladeCenter HS21 XM (7995, 1915)
  IBM BladeCenter LS20 (8850)
  IBM BladeCenter LS21 (7971)
  IBM BladeCenter LS41 (7972)
  IBM BladeCenter QS21 (0792)
  IBM BladeCenter QS22 (0793)

Overview:

   Quotes from

http://www-03.ibm.com/systems/bladecenter/hardware/chassis/bladeh/index.html 

   "In today=E2=80=99s high-demand enterprise environment, organizations
    need a reliable infrastructure to run compute-intensive
    applications with minimal maintenance and downtime.
    IBM BladeCenter H is a powerful platform built with the
    enterprise customer in mind, providing industry-leading performance,
    innovative architecture and a solid foundation for virtualization."

   "Provides easy integration to promote innovation and help manage
    growth, complexity and risk"

   During a quick overview of BladeCenter AMM web access, it was
   discovered that web administration interface has multiple
   vulnerabilities regarding input and request validation.

Details:

   Cross Site Scripting
   ===================
   Type 2:
   -------
   Most serious issue discovered was the persistent XSS
   vulnerability on the event log page resulting from
   displaying unsanitized user input received from an invalid
   login attempt.

   This can be exploited without valid credentials or social
   engineering. Access to device administration IP address is
   needed and an administrator has to view event log at some point,
   however.

   Successful attack requires that an administrator visits event
   log page, thus enabling the attacker to control the chassis
   and blade configuration by running the injected content which
   is interpreted by the administrator's browser.

   For example, all blades can be shut down or new admnistrative
   users can be added, depending on administrator's access rights.

   Unsuccessful login attempts are displayed without HTML encoding
   or input sanitation in the event log. It is possible to inject
   a reference to a remote javascript file by using eg following
   username:
   , dynamic javascript is spilled
   out on the page and it is quite easy to mess up formatting
   of the event log page.

   Log can be cleared by an authenticated administrator from URL:
http://1.2.3.4/private/clearlog 

   Event log javascript format:
   parent.LogEntryArray[i++] = new LogEntry( "1","2","Audit
   ","SN#420420313370","09/09/08","04:20:42","Remote login failed
   for user ' 

   Information Disclosure
   =====================
   A readonly operator (for example, a Blade operator with
   a scope assigment to one Blade) can view security
   permissions of other users (access roles and scopes) by
   forcefully browsing to their respective login profile pages:

http://1.2.3.4/private/login.ssi?WEBINDEX=&JUNK=1 
   where  is the assigned integer value (1..12) of the user
   account

   Cross Site Request Forgery
   =========================
   BladeCenter AMM does not validate the origin of an HTTP request.

   If attacker is able to lure or force an authenticated
   administrator to view malicious content, the Advanced Management
   Module web administration interface can be controlled by
   submitting suitable forms. Attacker is then effectively acting
   as an administrator.

   Successful attack requires that the attacker knows the management
   interface address for the target device.

   As the management interface allows "No session timeout" option,
   user can be vulnerable to this attack even after closing a tab
   containing the management interface, if cached authentication
   is not cleared from browser.

   Proof of Concept:
   -----------------
   Example form (Powers off Blades 1-4):

   
   

   
action="http://1.2.3.4/private/blade_power_action" 
   style="display:none">
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

   
   
   

Summary:

    Further research on BladeCenter AMM is strongly encouraged as
    this brief overview touched only the surface of the device.

    Management module supports a variety of networking protocols
    and contains features also from Telco version. These can be
    found by reading the commented HTML-code. One example feature is
http://1.2.3.4/private/get_telco_system_health_summary 

    It is also apparent that session timeout is not enforced.

More information:
http://www-947.ibm.com/systems/support/supportsite.wss/docdisplay?lndocid=MIGR-5076204&brandind=5000020 
http://www-947.ibm.com/systems/support/supportsite.wss/docdisplay?lndocid=MIGR-5076206&brandind=5000020 

Mitigation:

  * Do not use Web Access for configuring the chassis and blades.
  * Limit access to web administration interface.
  * Do not use "No session timeout" option.
  * Always logout and close all browser windows after performing
    administrative tasks.
  * Do not browse untrusted sites while performing administrative
    tasks
  * Only grant access to web administration to trusted users

Disclosure Timeline (highlights from the eight month effort):

    9. September 2008     - Contacted CERT-FI by email

   22. October   2008     - Provided IBM with a clarification
                            why SSL usage does not fix CSRF
                            vulnerability

    9. April     2009     - Advisory released


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