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The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Unauthorized Access to IIS Servers through ODBC Data Access with RDS
Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-025)
July 26, 1999 23:00 GMT Number J-054
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: This vulnerability has been used to gain unauthorized access
to Internet-connected systems.
This vulnerability was first announced in MS98-004 on July 19,
1998. MS98-004 was then re-released as MS99-025 on July 19,
1999, and followed by a correction on July 20, 1999.
PLATFORM: Systems that have Microsoft(r) Internet Information Server
3.0 or 4.0 and Microsoft Data Access Components 1.5.
DAMAGE: An unauthorized web user may be able to perform privileged
actions.
SOLUTION: The solution depends upon your particular situation. Consult
the "Summary" section of MS99-025 and its correction for
the details.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Risk is high. This vulnerability is being actively exploited.
ASSESSMENT: Patch your systems as soon as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-025) ]
********************************
Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-025)
- --------------------------------------
Re-Release: Unauthorized Access to IIS Servers through ODBC Data Access with
RDS
Originally Released as MS98-004, July 17, 1998
Re-Released as MS99-025, July 19, 1999
Preface
=======
This bulletin is a re-release of Microsoft Security Bulletin MS98-004,
issued July 17, 1998. It has recently been brought to our attention that
this vulnerability has been used to gain unauthorized access to
Internet-connected systems that have not been updated as per the
instructions in MS98-004. The intent of re-releasing this bulletin is to
serve as a reminder about this vulnerability, to restate the threat, and
encourage system administrators to evaluate their systems to determine if
their systems have been correctly configured and updated to protect against
this vulnerability.
Summary
=======
Microsoft encourages the following actions be taken on systems that have
Microsoft(r) Internet Information Server 3.0 or 4.0 and Microsoft Data
Access Components 1.5, both of which are installed during a default
installation of the Windows NT(r) 4.0 Option pack:
- Install the latest version of MDAC (currently MDAC 2.1 SP2).
However, simply upgrading from MDAC 1.5 to MDAC 2.0, or MDAC 2.1 is not
sufficient. For systems not explicitly utilizing RDS functionality, you
should also:
- Delete the /msdac virtual directory from the default Web site, or
- Apply registry settings that disable the DataFactory object. (See
the Q&A for the registry settings to adjust, or to download a .REG
file that can make the changes for you.)
For systems implicitly utilizing RDS functionality, you should:
- Disable Anonymous Access for the /msadc directory in the default
Web site, and/or
- Create a Custom Handler to control or filter incoming requests.
(http://www.microsoft.com/Data/ado/rds/custhand.htm)
If you do not complete these steps, unauthorized access as described below
may still be possible.
Frequently asked questions regarding this vulnerability and updating
systems to protect against it can be found at
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/MS99-025faq.asp
Issue
=====
The RDS DataFactory object, a component of Microsoft Data Access Components
(MDAC), exposes unsafe methods. When installed on a system running Internet
Information Server 3.0 or 4.0, the DataFactory object may permit an
otherwise unauthorized web user to perform privileged actions, including:
- Allowing unauthorized users to execute shell commands on the
IIS system as a privileged user.
- On a multi-homed Internet-connected IIS system, using MDAC to
tunnel SQL and other ODBC data requests through the public connection
to a private back-end network.
- Allowing unauthorized accessing to secured, non-published files on
the IIS system.
Affected Software Versions
==========================
- Microsoft Internet Information Server 3.0 or 4.0 that have or
have had Microsoft Data Access Components 1.5 installed on it.
NOTE: IIS can be installed as part of other Microsoft products like
Microsoft BackOffice and Microsoft Site Server.
NOTE: MDAC 1.5 is installed during a default installation of the Windows NT
4.0 Option Pack.
Patch Availability
==================
Newer versions of Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC versions 2.0 and
2.1) resolve these known vulnerabilities. However, a system that had MDAC
1.5 installed on it, and then upgraded to MDAC 2.0 or MDAC 2.1 must still
take actions to disable the DataFactory object. (See the Q&A for the
registry settings to adjust, or to download a .REG file that can make the
changes for you.)
Current versions of Microsoft Data Access Components can be downloaded from
the following web site:
- Microsoft Data Access Download Site
(http://www.microsoft.com/data/download.htm)
More Information
================
Please see the following references for more information related to this
issue.
- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS99-025: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/MS99-025faq.asp
- Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q184375,
Security Implications of RDS 1.5, IIS, and ODBC,
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q184/3/75.asp
- Microsoft Universal Data Access Download Page,
http://www.microsoft.com/data/download.htm
- Installing MDAC Q&A,
http://www.microsoft.com/data/MDAC21info/MDACinstQ.htm
- Microsoft Security Advisor web site,
http://www.microsoft.com/security/default.asp
- IIS Security Checklist,
http://www.microsoft.com/security/products/iis/CheckList.asp
Obtaining Support on this Issue
===============================
Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) is a fully supported set of
technologies. If you require technical assistance with this issue,
please contact Microsoft Technical Support. For information on
contacting Microsoft Technical Support, please see
http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp.
Acknowledgments
===============
Microsoft acknowledges Greg Gonzalez of ITE (http://www.infotechent.net) for
bringing additional information regarding this vulnerability to our
attention. Microsoft also acknowledges Russ Cooper (NTBugTraq) for his
assistance around this issue.
Revisions
=========
- July 19, 1999: Bulletin Created as re-release of MS98-004.
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS"
WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS
SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES,
EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE
FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.
(c) 1999 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of Use.
*******************************************************************
[ End Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-025) (Correction follows) ]
[ Start of correction to Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-025) ]
********************************
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS99-025
(http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/MS99-025.asp), which was
released on July 19, 1999, discussed a vulnerability associated with
Internet Information Server and Microsoft Data Access Components. The
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) page for this bulletin
(http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/MS99-025faq.asp) provided
instructions on how to manually change the registry in order to protect
vulnerable systems, and also provided an automated method for making the
changes. However, we have discovered that the automated method is
incorrect.
If you manually changed the registry entries as discussed in the bulletin,
you do not need to take any further action. All of the information in the
bulletin and FAQ regarding registry keys is correct. However, if you
downloaded HANDUNSF.REG and used it to automatically change the registry,
you should download the corrected file and run it on all affected systems.
The corrected file is named HANDSAFE.REG, in order to make it easy to tell
that you are using the right file. The file can be downloaded from the FAQ
page; the link to the file is contained in the answer to "I have MDAC 2.x
installed, what should I do?".
Even if you are not affected by this error, we recommend that you review the
FAQ page again. We have made a number of changes to the original version of
the FAQ, in order to provide a clearer description of the security
vulnerability and the steps that customers should take.
We regret the error and any inconvenience that it has caused. We are taking
steps to ensure that the problem will not happen again. Sincerely,
The Microsoft Product Security Team
*******************************************************************
[ End of correction to Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-025) ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge Microsoft for the information contained in this
bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
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