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COMMAND ntop remote format string overflow in web interface SYSTEMS AFFECTED ntop 2.0, others ?? PROBLEM hologram <holo@brained.org> posted : --snipp-- The format string vulnerability lies within the traceEvent() function which is declared as: void traceEvent(int eventTraceLevel, char* file, int line, char * format, ...) in the file util.c. The third argument, as is apparent, is a format string to be later manipulated by the traceEvent() call. Further into the code, the following is made visible: ... va_list va_ap; va_start (va_ap, format); ... char buf[BUF_SIZE]; ... #ifdef WIN32 /* Windows lacks of vsnprintf */ vsprintf(buf, format, va_ap); #else vsnprintf(buf, BUF_SIZE-1, format, va_ap); #endif if(!useSyslog) { // syslog() logging is not enabled printf(buf); // vulnerability ... #ifndef WIN32 else { // syslog() logging is enabled #if 0 switch(traceLevel) { case 0: syslog(LOG_ERR, buf); // vulnerability break; case 1: syslog(LOG_WARNING, buf); // vulnerability break; case 2: syslog(LOG_NOTICE, buf); // vulnerability break; default: syslog(LOG_INFO, buf); // vulnerability break; } #else syslog(LOG_ERR, buf); ... Obviously, a call such as syslog(LOG_ERR, buf) should be replaced with syslog(LOG_ERR, \"%s\", buf) to remove the insecurity. The bug can be exploited whether or not syslog() logging is enabled because of the erroneous printf(buf) call, as well. One of the simplest points of entry I have determined is if the -w option was specified when ntop was ran, which allows web access to the ntop information. A HTTP request of the following: GET /%s%s%s HTTP/1.0 will cause program termination (the HTTP deamon for ntop is normally listening on port 3000). The vulnerability does allow remote execution of arbitrary commands, and if concerned, an appropriate fix should be quickly applied. --snapp-- SOLUTION fix available ??