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=2D----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 KDE Security Advisory: KDM vulnerabilities Original Release Date: 2003-09-16 URL: http://www.kde.org/info/security/advisory-20030916-1.txt 0. References http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/archive/suse/security/2002/12/ msg00101.html http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCAN-2003-0690 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCAN-2003-0692 1. Systems affected: All versions of KDM as distributed with KDE up to and including=20 KDE 3.1.3. 2. Overview: Two issues have been discovered in KDM: a) CAN-2003-0690: Privilege escalation with specific PAM modules b) CAN-2003-0692: Session cookies generated by KDM are potentially insecure KDM does not check for successful completion of the pam_setcred() call. In case of error conditions in the installed PAM modules, KDM might grant local root access to any user with valid login=20 credentials. It has been reported that a certain configuration of the MIT pam_kr= b5 module can result in a failing pam_setcred() call leaving the=20 session alive and providing root access to a regular user. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0690 to this issue. Additionally the session cookie generation algorithm used by KDM was considered too weak to supply full 128 bits of entropy. This enables non-authorized users to brute-force the session cookie. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0692 to this issue. 3. Impact: If KDM is used in combination with the MIT pam_krb5 module and given a valid username and password of an existing user, the login attempt succeeds and establishes a session with excessive privileges. This may enable a local root compromise of the system.=20 It is possible that the same vulnerability exists if KDM is used=20 with other PAM modules. At the date of this advisory we are however not aware of any other PAM module being affected by this vulnerability. The weak cookie generation may allow non-authorized users to guess the session cookie by a brute force attack, which allows, assuming hostname / IP restrictions can be bypassed, to authorize to the=20 running session and gain full access to it.=20 4. Solution: a) Privilege escalation with specific PAM modules: The patch listed in section 5 adds error checking to KDM and aborts the login attempt if an error occurs during the=20 pam_setcred() call. There is no intermediate workaround known. Users who do not use PAM with KDM and users who use PAM with regular Unix crypt/MD5 based authentication are not affected.=20 b) Weak cookie generation: The patch listed in section 5 adds a new cookie generation algorith= m, which uses /dev/urandom as non-predictable source of entropy.=20 Users of KDE 2.2.2 are advised to upgrade to KDE 3.1.4. A patch for KDE 2.2.2 is available for users who are unable to upgrade to=20 KDE 3.1. Users of KDE 3.0.x are advised to upgrade to KDE 3.1.4. A patch for KDE 3.0.5b is available for users who are unable to upgrade to=20 KDE 3.1. Users of KDE 3.1.x are advised to upgrade to KDE 3.1.4. 5. Patch: A patch for KDE 2.2.2 is available from=20 ftp://ftp.kde.org/pub/kde/security_patches : 4672868343b26e0c0eae91fffeff1f7e post-2.2.2-kdebase-kdm.patch A patch for KDE 3.0.5b is available from ftp://ftp.kde.org/pub/kde/security_patches : fde237203fc7b325c34d2f90a463db3f post-3.0.5-kdebase-kdm.patch A patch for KDE 3.1.3 is available from ftp://ftp.kde.org/pub/kde/security_patches :=20 8553c20798b321e333d8c516636f2297 post-3.1.3-kdebase-kdm.patch 6. Time line and credits: 12/06/2002 Posting on suse-security mailing list describing the=20 PAM vulnerability. 08/06/2003 Notification of KDE Security and the KDM maintainer=20 about the PAM vulnerability by Stephan Kulow. 08/09/2003 Patches for the PAM vulnerability applied to KDE CVS. 08/20/2003 George Lebl notifies Oswald Buddenhagen about weak session cookie generation in KDM. 08/26/2003 Impact analysis and advisory finished. 09/04/2003 Patches for the weak cookie vulnerability applied to CVS. 09/16/2003 Public advisory. =2D----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.2-rc1-SuSE (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQE/Z2ggvsXr+iuy1UoRArdYAKDA0BbwNgF+gNsrOAmxw3rxoT/SXQCgntoI 1xi7upr1BflAaUJHgYEYMZc=3D =3DQ/1c =2D----END PGP SIGNATURE-----