__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Center
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Oracle 8i TNS Listener Vulnerability
[Network Associates, Inc., Covert Labs Security Advisory #50]
July 9, 2001 22:00 GMT Number L-108
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Oracle 8i TNS
Listener that allows any user to execute arbitrary code on the
database server under a security context that grants full
control of the database services and, on some platforms, full
control of the operating system. The Oracle 8i TNS Listener is
responsible for establishing connections between the Oracle
database server and a client application. The buffer overflow
occurs before any authentication occurs so any user who can
send packets to the listener port (TCP: 1521) on the server
could exploit this vulnerability.
PLATFORM: Oracle 8i Standard and Enterprise Editions Version 8.1.5,
8.1.6, 8.1.7 and previous versions for Windows, Linux, Solaris,
AIX, HP-UX and Tru64 Unix. All servers currently in production
already have the patch.
DAMAGE: Remote users can gain root access on an Oracle server.
SOLUTION: Obtain and install patches from Oracle
(http://metalink.oracle.com/). Note that you must have an
Oracle service account to obtain security patches.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. Remote users who can send packets to port
ASSESSMENT: 1521 on an Oracle 8i server can potentially run arbitrary code
on that server.
______________________________________________________________________________
[Begin Network Associates, Inc., Covert Labs Security Advisory #50]
Vulnerability in Oracle 8i TNS Listener
Network Associates, Inc.
COVERT Labs Security Advisory
June 27, 2001
RISK FACTOR: HIGH
Synopsis
========
The Oracle 8i TNS (Transparent Network Substrate)
Listener is responsible for establishing and maintaining
remote communications with Oracle database services. The
Listener is vulnerable to a buffer overflow condition
that allows remote execution of arbitrary code on the
database server under a security context that grants
full control of the database services and, on some
platforms, full control of the operating system. Because
the buffer overflow occurs prior to any authentication,
the listener is vulnerable regardless of any enabled
password protection.
This vulnerability has been designated as CVE candidate
CAN-2001-499.
RISK FACTOR: HIGH
Vulnerable Systems
==================
Oracle 8i Standard and Enterprise Editions Version
8.1.5, 8.1.6, 8.1.7 and previous versions for Windows,
Linux, Solaris, AIX, HP-UX and Tru64 Unix.
[ Back to top ]
Vulnerability Overview
======================
Client connection requests to a remote Oracle service
are arbitrated by the TNS Listener. The TNS Listener
accepts the client request and establishes a TNS
(Transparent Network Substrate) data connection between
the client and the service. A TNS connection allows
clients and servers to communicate over a network via a
common API, regardless of the network protocol used on
either end (TCP/IP, IPX, etc). The TNS Listener must be
running if queries are to be made by remote clients or
databases even if the network protocol is the same.
A default installation listens on TCP port 1521.
Listener administration and monitoring can be done by
issuing specific commands to the daemon. Typical
requests, such as "STATUS", "PING" and "SERVICES" return
a summary of listener configuration and connections.
Other requests like "TRC_FILE", "SAVE_CONFIG" and
"RELOAD" are used to change the configuration of the
listener. An exploitable buffer overflow occurs when any
of the command's arguments contains a very large amount
of data.
The TNS Listener daemon runs with "LocalSystem"
privileges under Windows NT/2000, and with the
privileges of the 'oracle' user under Unix. Exploitation
of this vulnerability will lead to the remote attacker
obtaining these respective privileges.
Detailed Information
====================
The overflow can be triggered with a one-packet command
conforming to the Net8 protocol. The client will send a
Type-1 (NSPTCN) packet containing the proper Net8
headers and malformed command string with embedded
arbitrary code ("shellcode"). Although many of the TNS
listener's administrative commands can be limited to
trusted users by enabling password authentication, this
vulnerability can nevertheless be exploited by using
unauthenticated commands such as "STATUS". It is
important to note that authentication is not enabled by
default.
The command string includes several arguments such as
"SERVICE", "VERSION", "USER" and "ARGUMENTS". Any of
these can be overfilled with data to initiate the
overflow. Under both Windows and UNIX platforms, an
extended argument of several thousand bytes will induce
a stack overflow.
Under Windows, the stack overflow will facilitate the
execution of shellcode by manipulating the SEH
(Strunctured Exception Handling) mechanism. Since the
listener services runs as "LocalSystem", shellcode will
be executed in the same security context. Under UNIX,
the listener daemon will often be started by the
"oracle" user created during installation. If this is
the case, the attacker will gain the privileges of the
database administrator.
Resolution
==========
Oracle has produced a patch under bug number 1489683
which is available for download from the Oracle
Worldwide Support Services web site, Metalink
(http://metalink.oracle.com) for the platforms
identified in this advisory. The patch is in production
for all supported releases of the Oracle Database
Server.
Credits
=======
These vulnerabilities were discovered and documented by
Nishad Herath and Brock Tellier of the COVERT Labs at
PGP Security.
Contact Information
===================
For more information about the COVERT Labs at PGP
Security, visit our website at
http://www.pgp.com/research/covert/ or send e-mail to
covert@nai.com.
Legal Notice
============
The information contained within this advisory is
Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology Inc.
It may be redistributed provided that no fee is charged
for distribution and that the advisory is not modified
in any way.
Network Associates and PGP are registered Trademarks of
Network Associates, Inc. and/or its affiliated companies
in the United States and/or other Countries. All other
registered and unregistered trademarks in this document
are the sole property of their respective owners.
[End Network Associates, Inc., Covert Labs Security Advisory #50]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Network Associates, Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
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