2nd Nov 2001 [SBWID-4839]
COMMAND
Lotus Domino web server allows anonymous access to .ntf files
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
Domino 5.0.8 and previous
PROBLEM
NISR have discovered a feature of Domino\'s web server that allows an
anonymous user to access the Web Administrator template file
(webadmin.ntf) and use some of its functionality. Normally webadmin.ntf
should not be accessible and as such this poses a high security threat
to systems running Lotus Domino.
Details
*******
Lotus Notes Databases can have one of several file extensions such as
.nsf, .ns4 or .box and when the Domino web server receives a client
request it examines the request to decide if it is for a Notes database
file. If it is Domino for looks for the file in the
\\lotus\\domino\\data directory; if it is not Domino looks in another
directory: \\lotus\\domino\\data\\domino\\html. Some Notes databases
are derived from template files that have a .ntf file extension. These
template files exist in the same directory as their .nsf children;
However, making a request for a template file causes Domino to search
in the latter directory, but as they exist in the former, the web
server fails to find the file and returns a File Not Found (404) reply.
Another way to make a request for a database resource is to use the
database\'s ReplicaID. A ReplicaID is a 16 digit hexadecimal number
that is use to track concurrent copies of the same database over
different systems. It is therefore possible for a user to access a
Notes database template file by making a request to the web server
using the template\'s ReplicaID. Of all the templates only the Web
Administrator template file seems to be dangerous. Anonymous users can
read any text based file on the system that Domino has the permission
to access as well as enumerate all databases on the system. If the
Domino web service process is running as root or SYSTEM then an
attacker would not be limited to the files they could access. This
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the webadmin.ntf
ReplicaID is the same on every system running Domino meaning that once
an attacker has the ReplicaID then they will be able to access the Web
Administrator running on any Domino system.
Update (05 February 2002) ======
Nicolas Gregoire added, auoted from the \"Hackproofing Lotus Domino Web
Server\" doc :
\"Another method of tricking Domino into opening the Web Administrator
template is through the use of buffer truncation. By making the
following request http://server/webadmin.ntf++++++_250_pluses+++++.nsf/
access to webadmin.ntf is granted. This works because Domino attempts
to protect itself from buffer overrun attacks and chops a user request
down to a safe size. In terms of events here\'s what happens. Domino
receives the request and converts all the pluses to spaces and sees it
has a .nsf file extention and therefore loads the database parser. The
database parser chops the end off of the request, (thus removing the
.nsf) to prevent any buffer overrun and then looks in the
lotus\\domino\\data directory for the file, webadmin.ntf
<space><space><space>.... which it finds and then opens. Thus
again the attacker can use webadmin.ntf\'s functionality.\"
SOLUTION
The best course of action is to remove the Web Administrator template
from the system. You should also consider removing the real Web
Administrator, webadmin.nsf as if someone were to gain a vaild user ID
and password for Domino then they will be able to perform undesirable
actions against the system.
Lotus were informed about this issue and, in their next release of
Domino, version 5.0.9, will ensure that the permissions set on the
webadmin.ntf file are such that anonymous access is prevented.
For those worried about attempts to access the Web Administrator
template file and wish to monitor potential attacks, you can get the
ReplicaID of webadmin.ntf from the Domino Catalog, catalog.nsf. Hold
the Control, Shift and H keys down whilst you open the catalog. This
key sequence causes the Notes client to show hidden views as well as
visible. One of the hidden views, $ReplicaID contains the ReplicaID of
every database and template on the system.
A check for this problem already exists in DominoScan, NGSSoftware\'s
Lotus Domino application security scanner, of which, more information
is available from http://www.nextgenss.com/dominoscan.html . NISR have
also written a white paper on how to secure Lotus Domino\'s web server
available from http://www.nextgenss.com/papers.html
TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2025 AOH