TUCoPS :: SGI :: ciacc020.txt

SGI Pseudo Tty

              The Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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                         Information Bulletin
		  SGI 3.3.X Pseudo-tty Vulnerability
March 6, 1992 1000 PST                                       Number C-20

PROBLEM: Non-root users have the ability to see the output of other
        users terminal activity. 
PLATFORM: Silicon Graphics systems running IRIX 3.3.X (3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3L)
DAMAGE: Potential disclosure of user sensitive data including passwords.
SOLUTION: SGI MIPS based machines should upgrade to 4.0.1 or to Trusted 
       Critical Facts about SGI 3.3.X Pseudo tty Vulnerability

CIAC has become aware of a possible security problem with Silicon
Graphics systems running IRIX 3.3.X (3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3L).  This
problem has been fixed under 4.0.1.
The IRIX psuedo-ttys (pttys) are protected mode 0666, which permits
non-root users to read unprotected terminals.  This might permit non-
authorized users to see confidential information, including passwords.

SGI and CIAC recommend that you upgrade your 3.3.X system either to
4.0.1 or to Trusted Irix immediately.  Contact your SGI
representative, or SGI Express (1-800-800-SGI1).  SGI customers under
support may call 1-800-800-4744 (1-800-800-4SGI)

Note, if you suspect that another user is reading from your terminal,
you may use the command: fuser -u `tty`.  This shows what processes
are connected to your tty, see fuser(8).  You should be able to
account for each of them using the ps(1) command.

For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC:

	David Brown
	(510) 423-9878/(FTS) 543-9878

Call CIAC at (510) 422-8193/(FTS) 532-8193 or send e-mail to
ciac@llnl.gov.  FAX messages to: (510) 423-8002/(FTS) 543-8002.

Previous CIAC bulletins and other information is available via
anonymous ftp from irbis.llnl.gov (ip address  

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE and ESnet computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins.  If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents.  Some of the other teams include the NASA NSI response
team, DARPA's CERT/CC, NAVCIRT, and the Air Force response team.  Your
agency's team will coordinate with CIAC.

CIAC would like to thank Lisa Amedeo of Fermi National Laboratory, and
Debby Derby of Silicon Graphics Inc. for their assistance with this

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