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DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS: PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION __________________________________________________ The Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | / \ / \___ __|__ /___\ \___ _____________________________________________________ Information Bulletin SGI 3.3.X Pseudo-tty Vulnerability March 6, 1992 1000 PST Number C-20 _________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Non-root users have the ability to see the output of other users terminal activity. PLATFORM: Silicon Graphics systems running IRIX 3.3.X (3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3L) DAMAGE: Potential disclosure of user sensitive data including passwords. SOLUTION: SGI MIPS based machines should upgrade to 4.0.1 or to Trusted Irix. __________________________________________________________________________ Critical Facts about SGI 3.3.X Pseudo tty Vulnerability CIAC has become aware of a possible security problem with Silicon Graphics systems running IRIX 3.3.X (3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3L). This problem has been fixed under 4.0.1. The IRIX psuedo-ttys (pttys) are protected mode 0666, which permits non-root users to read unprotected terminals. This might permit non- authorized users to see confidential information, including passwords. SGI and CIAC recommend that you upgrade your 3.3.X system either to 4.0.1 or to Trusted Irix immediately. Contact your SGI representative, or SGI Express (1-800-800-SGI1). SGI customers under support may call 1-800-800-4744 (1-800-800-4SGI) Note, if you suspect that another user is reading from your terminal, you may use the command: fuser -u `tty`. This shows what processes are connected to your tty, see fuser(8). You should be able to account for each of them using the ps(1) command. For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC: David Brown (510) 423-9878/(FTS) 543-9878 dsbrown@llnl.gov Call CIAC at (510) 422-8193/(FTS) 532-8193 or send e-mail to ciac@llnl.gov. FAX messages to: (510) 423-8002/(FTS) 543-8002. Previous CIAC bulletins and other information is available via anonymous ftp from irbis.llnl.gov (ip address 128.115.19.60). PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE and ESnet computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Some of the other teams include the NASA NSI response team, DARPA's CERT/CC, NAVCIRT, and the Air Force response team. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. CIAC would like to thank Lisa Amedeo of Fermi National Laboratory, and Debby Derby of Silicon Graphics Inc. for their assistance with this bulletin. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government nor the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.