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__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI IRIX Vulnerabilities (systour, OutOfBox, cdplayer, datman) December 12, 1996 19:00 GMT Number H-14 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Four problems have been identified for SGI IRIX: 1) systour, 2) OutOfBox, 3) cdplayer, and 4) datman/cdman. PLATFORM: All SGI systems running IRIX versions related to the following vulnerabilities: 1 and 2) 5.x, 6.0.x, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, 3 and 4) 5.x and 6.x. DAMAGE: 1 and 2) The inst program could be manipulated to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. 3 and 4) These vulnerabilities may allow local users to gain root privileges. SOLUTION: Apply the workarounds and solutions indicated below. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Exploit details involving these vulnerabilities have been ASSESSMENT: widely distributed. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start CERT Advisory ] 1. and 2. systour and OutOfBox Vulnerabilities ============================================================================= CERT(sm) Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-96.19 December 10, 1996 Topic: Possible Vulnerabilities in systour and OutOfBox Source: Silicon Graphics Inc. To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from Silicon Graphics Inc. SGI urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. SGI contact information is included in the forwarded text below; please contact them if you have any questions or need further information. =======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: Possible Vulnerabilities in systour and OutOfBox Title: Subsystems for IRIX 5.x, 6.0.x, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 Number: 19961101-01-I Date: November 6, 1996 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics will not be liable for any indirect, special, or consequential damages arising from the use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ Recently, potential security vulnerabilities in the OutOfBox and systour subsystems have been advertised in several public forums. Additionally, the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team (AUSCERT) released an advisory (AA-96.08) on this issue. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issues and recommends the following steps for neutralizing exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems running IRIX versions 5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2, 5.3, 6.0.x, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. --------------- ---- Impact --- --------------- The Silicon Graphics Indigo Magic System Tour and OutOfBox Experience packages are factory installed on all Silicon Graphics Indy systems. The Indigo Magic System Tour and OutOfBox Experience packages are not factory installed with any Silicon Graphics Indigo2 systems however, CDs with these packages are provided with the systems. The OutOfBox Experience subsystem is factory installed on all Silicon Graphics O2 systems. The System Tour subsystem is not part of the software provided for the O2 system. Note that either or both the Indigo Magic System Tour and OutOfBox Experience subsystems maybe be installed from CD on any Silicon Graphics system. The purpose of these two packages, systour and OutOfBox, are to demonstrate and highlight the features and capabilities of the user environment and system. Due to the disk space requirements of these subsystems, most sites will remove these subsystems for disk space reclamation as part of initial system setup. Those sites which have done this will not be vulnerable. On those systems that the subsystems are still installed on, both subsystems provide background setuid root programs to perform a subsystem removal when a user decides to remove the software. This removal is done using the standard IRIX /usr/sbin/inst program that manages IRIX software. Provided with the right environment, the inst program could be manipulated to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. An account on the vulnerable system is required for exploit. With an account, these vulnerabilities are exploitable by both local and remote access. ----------------- ---- Solution --- ----------------- There are no patches for these issues. However, using the information below steps can be taken to eliminate the exposure. To determine if the OutOfBox and systour subsystems are installed on a particular system, the following command can be used: % versions OutOfBox.sw systour.sw I = Installed, R = Removed Name Date Description I OutOfBox 11/05/96 OutOfBox Experience, 1.1 I OutOfBox.sw 11/05/96 OutOfBox Experience Software, 1.1 I OutOfBox.sw.complete 11/05/96 Complete OutOfBox Experience I OutOfBox.sw.intro 11/05/96 OutOfBox Intro Movies I systour 02/12/96 Indigo Magic System Tour, 5.2 I systour.sw 02/12/96 System Tour Execution Environment I systour.sw.eoe 02/12/96 System Tour Execution Environment In the above case, the subsystems of concern are installed and the steps below should be performed. If no output is returned by the command, the subsystems are not installed and no further action is required. **** IRIX 4.x **** The 4.x version of IRIX is not vulnerable as the System Tour and OutOfBox Experience subsystems are not part of available software for this IRIX version. No action is required. **** IRIX 5.x, 6.0, 6.0.1, 6.1, 6.2 **** There are no patches for this issue. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by either changing the program permissions (use step 2a) or by removing the subsystems (use step 2b). 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Choose either step 2a or 2b depending on which has the desired result. 2a) Change the setuid root permissions on the programs of concern. # /bin/chmod u-s /usr/lib/tour/bin/RemoveSystemTour # /bin/chmod u-s /usr/people/tour/oob/bin/oobversions ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Removing the setuid root permissions from these tools will prevent non-root users from removing the subsystems. Removal of the subsystems will only be possible if the systour or OutOfBox user is a root user or if the inst IRIX software manager is used by root for removal. 2b) Remove the vulnerable subsystems. # /usr/sbin/versions -v remove systour OutOfBox 4) Return to previous level. # exit $ **** IRIX 6.3 **** The IRIX operating system version 6.3 does not have the System Tour subsystem but does have the OutOfBox Experience subsystem. There are no patches for this issue. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by either changing the program permissions (use step 2a) or by removing the subsystems (use step 2b). 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Choose either step 2a or 2b depending on which has the desired result. 2a) Change the setuid root permissions on the program of concern. # /bin/chmod u-s /usr/people/tour/oob/bin/oobversions ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Removing the setuid root permissions from this program will prevent non-root users from removing the subsystem. Removal of the subsystem will only be possible if the OutOfBox user is a root user or if the inst IRIX software manager is used by root for removal. 2b) Remove the vulnerable subsystem. # /usr/sbin/versions -v remove OutOfBox 4) Return to previous level. # exit $ ------------------------- ---- Acknowledgments --- ------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT and FIRST members worldwide for their assistance in this matter. ------------------------------------------ ---- SGI Security Information/Contacts --- ------------------------------------------ If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress> end ^d In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= [ End CERT Advisory ] ***************************************************************************** [ Start AUSCERT Advisories ] 3. cdplayer Vulnerability =========================================================================== AA-96.11 AUSCERT Advisory SGI IRIX cdplayer Vulnerability 22 November 1996 Last Revised: 10 December 1996 Removed comment about using cdman(1) in Section 3.1. The cdman program has since been found vulnerable (see AA-96.20). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- AUSCERT has received information that there is a vulnerability in the "cdplayer" program distributed with IRIX 5.x and 6.x. cdplayer(1) is a Motif based control panel used for playing audio compact disks. This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges. Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been widely distributed. This vulnerability can be exploited without a CD-ROM drive being attached to the machine being attacked. At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor patches are made available. This advisory will be updated as new information becomes available. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Description cdplayer(1) is a program that creates a Motif based control panel used for playing audio Compact Discs on a CD-ROM drive. There is a vulnerability in cdplayer that allows directories to be created anywhere on the system. These directories are created using root privileges with permissions following the umask of the person running the program. Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made publicly available. Sites should note that a CD-ROM drive does not need to be attached for this vulnerability to be exploited. This program may be installed under both IRIX 5.x and 6.x. By default, it is installed under /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer. To determine whether the cdplayer program is installed, sites should check for its presence with the command: % ls -l /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer If this program is installed, sites should take the actions recommended in Section 3 immediately. 2. Impact Local users may be able to create arbitrary directories anywhere on the system. This may be leveraged to gain root privileges. 3. Workarounds/Solution AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability in cdplayer by immediately applying the workaround given in Section 3.1. Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be installed when they are made available. 3.1 Remove setuid and execute permissions Until official vendor patches are made available, sites should remove the setuid root and execute permissions from cdplayer. To do this, the following command should be run as root: # chmod 400 /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer # ls -l /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer -r-------- 1 root sys 127648 Jul 17 12:28 /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer Note that this will remove the ability for users to run this program. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. datman/cdman Vulnerability =========================================================================== AA-96.20 AUSCERT Advisory SGI IRIX datman/cdman Vulnerability 10 December 1996 Last Revised: -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- AUSCERT has received information that there is a vulnerability in the datman(1) program distributed with IRIX 5.x and 6.x. datman is a program used for playing audio tapes and CDs. This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges. Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been widely distributed. At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor patches are made available. This advisory will be updated as new information becomes available. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Description datman(1) is a program for playing audio tapes and CDs. When called as datman it works as a tape recorder. When called as cdman or when the -cd option is specified, datman works as a CD player. By default, the file /usr/sbin/cdman is a symbolic link to /usr/sbin/datman. There is a vulnerability in datman that allows local users to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made publicly available. This program may be installed under both IRIX 5.x and 6.x. By default, it is installed under /usr/sbin/datman. To determine whether the datman program is installed, sites should check for its presence with the command: % ls -l /usr/sbin/datman If this program is installed, sites should take the actions recommended in Section 3 immediately. 2. Impact Local users may be able to run arbitrary commands with root privileges. 3. Workarounds/Solution AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability in datman by immediately applying the workaround given in Section 3.1. Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be installed when they are made available. 3.1 Remove setuid and execute permissions Until official vendor patches are made available, sites should remove the setuid root and execute permissions from datman. To do this, the following command should be run as root: # chmod 400 /usr/sbin/datman # ls -l /usr/sbin/datman -r-------- 1 root sys 795200 Nov 22 1994 /usr/sbin/datman Note that this will remove the ability for users to run this program. 4. Additional measures Most Unix systems ship numerous programs which have setuid or setgid privileges. Often the functionality supplied by these privileged programs is not required by many sites. The large number of privileged programs that are shipped by default are to cater for all possible uses of the system. AUSCERT encourages sites to examine all the setuid/setgid programs and determine the necessity of each program. If a program does not absolutely require the setuid/setgid privileges to operate (for example, it is only run by the root user), the setuid/setgid privileges should be removed. Furthermore, if a program is not required at your site, then all execute permissions should be removed. A sample command to find all setuid/setgid programs is (run as root): # find / \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -exec ls -ld {} \; It is AUSCERT's experience that many vulnerabilities are being discovered in setuid/setgid programs which are not necessary for the correct operation of most systems. Sites can increase their security by removing unnecessary setuid/setgid programs. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ End AUSCERT Advisories ] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT, AUSCERT, and SGI for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). 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