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__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
IRIX runpriv Program Vulnerability
May 15, 1997 17:00 GMT Number H-58
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A security vulnerability exist in the /usr/sysadm/bin/runpriv
program.
PLATFORM: All SGI systems running IRIX 6.3 and 6.4.
DAMAGE: Using a local account to exploit this vulnerability, remote or
local users may obtain unauthorized root access.
SOLUTION: Apply patches or workaround as indicated below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made
ASSESSMENT: publicly available. CIAC recommends that the patches be
implemented to eliminate exposure immediately.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start SGI Security Advisory ]
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______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: Program runpriv Security Issue
Number: 19970503-01-PX
Date: May 14, 1997
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
SGI be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or
for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages
of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of
any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- - ------------------
- - --- Background ---
- - ------------------
The /usr/sysadm/bin/runpriv program is used by the System Desktop
to allow unprivileged users to run selected privileged commands.
Silicon Graphics has been informed of a potential security
vulnerability involving this program.
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems running IRIX versions
6.3 and 6.4. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- - --------------
- - --- Impact ---
- - --------------
The /usr/sysadm/bin/runpriv program is part of the Indigo Magic System
Administration subsystem of IRIX 6.3 and 6.4. Although other IRIX
versions will have similar Desktop System Administration subsystems,
only the IRIX 6.3 and 6.4 subsystems have the runpriv program. On
IRIX 6.3 and 6.4, the Indigo Magic System Administration subsystem
is installed by default.
A potential security vulnerability has been found that can result in
root privileges being obtained.
A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability both
locally and remotely.
Publicity of this vulnerability has been limited and has afforded
Silicon Graphics Inc. the opportunity to fully investigate this issue
and provide the following information and solutions.
- - ---------------------
- - --- Temporary Fix ---
- - ---------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately many
not be possible.
The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by turning
off the privileges capability.
***************
*** WARNING ***
***************
Turning off the privileges capability will disable unprivileged
users using the visual administration tools. Only the root user
will be able to run these programs.
1) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
2) Turn off the privileges capability.
# chkconfig privileges off
3) Return to previous level.
# exit
$
- - ----------------
- - --- Solution ---
- - ----------------
**** IRIX 3.x and 4.x ****
Silicon Graphics Inc, no longer supports the IRIX 3.x and 4.x operating
systems and therefore has no patches to provide.
**** IRIX 5.x, 6.0, 6.0.1, 6.1, and 6.2 ****
These versions of IRIX do not have the /usr/sysadm/bin/runpriv program
and are therefore not vulnerable. No further action is required for
these versions.
**** IRIX 6.3 ****
For the IRIX operating system version 6.3 an inst-able patch has been
generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your service/support
provider. The patch is number 2077 and will install on IRIX 6.3 only.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 2077 can be found in the following
directories on the FTP server:
~ftp/Security
or
~ftp/Patches/6.3
##### Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.2077
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 34622 8 README.patch.2077
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22197 8 README.patch.2077
MD5 checksum: B3DFE9BAE87AFF4153A1CF3BFAD7B522
Filename: patchSG0002077
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 53668 1 patchSG0002077
Algorithm #2 (sum): 32550 1 patchSG0002077
MD5 checksum: EC35AE80FB77125305EA8BE98CC15C98
Filename: patchSG0002077.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 01148 1 patchSG0002077.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 40537 1 patchSG0002077.idb
MD5 checksum: A23D679D06167F20DE125486592BABC9
Filename: patchSG0002077.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10875 15 patchSG0002077.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 46398 15 patchSG0002077.sysadmdesktop_sw
MD5 checksum: 8B03D59C0E3A9748B90FED6C5994A739
**** IRIX 6.4 ****
For the IRIX operating system version 6.4 an inst-able patch has been
generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your service/support
provider. The patch is number 2078 and will install on IRIX 6.4 only.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 2078 can be found in the following
directories on the FTP server:
~ftp/Security
or
~ftp/Patches/6.4
##### Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.2078
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 24207 8 README.patch.2078
Algorithm #2 (sum): 24278 8 README.patch.2078
MD5 checksum: 32AD0F5DB530D6E31315C31C76B45DD3
Filename: patchSG0002078
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 57740 1 patchSG0002078
Algorithm #2 (sum): 33268 1 patchSG0002078
MD5 checksum: C9AEEF6551A7280B3A7695B63B40B37C
Filename: patchSG0002078.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 49797 1 patchSG0002078.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 40655 1 patchSG0002078.idb
MD5 checksum: 18FE323A8FB7DAC71DD623B5DDA2B6E7
Filename: patchSG0002078.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 06501 15 patchSG0002078.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 28499 15 patchSG0002078.sysadmdesktop_sw
MD5 checksum: 3020CBAE24B094CECB6C6C5FD73D0E97
- - -----------------------
- - --- Acknowledgments ---
- - -----------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank Joe Bester and Quay Ly of Harvey Mudd
College for bringing this issue to Silicon Graphics attention, and then
cooperating with Silicon Graphics during the generation of patches.
- - -----------------------------------------
- - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- - -----------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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[ End SGI Security Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc., Joe
Bester and Quay Ly of Harvey Mudd College for the information contained in
this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 510-422-8193
FAX: +1 510-423-8002
STU-III: +1 510-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/
Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53)
Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)
CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles;
3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.
Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
ciac-bulletin, ciac-notes, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:
E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name
e.g., subscribe ciac-notes
You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the
instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure
you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question.
If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
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disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
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