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__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SGI IRIX rld Security Vulnerability
May 29, 1997 20:00 GMT Number H-65
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A vulnerability has been identified with the runtime linker
program, rld.
PLATFORM: All SGI systems running IRIX 5.x and 6.x.
DAMAGE: This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root
privileges.
SOLUTION: There are no immediate or temporary workarounds or patches
available. SGI HIGHLY RECOMMENDS that the steps indicated below
be used to neutralize exposure.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made
ASSESSMENT: publicly avalable. Silicon Graphics recommends that this
information be acted upon as soon as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ]
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______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: IRIX rld security vulnerability
Number: 19970504-01-PX
Date: May 28, 1997
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
SGI be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or
for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages
of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of
any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- - ------------------
- - --- Background ---
- - ------------------
A security vulnerability has been found with the runtime linker program,
rld, distributed in IRIX 5.x and 6.x.
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems running
IRIX 5.x and 6.x versions. This issue has been corrected in more
recent releases of IRIX and will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- - --------------
- - --- Impact ---
- - --------------
With normal installation, the runtime loader comes from the
compiler_eoe.sw.unix subsystem and installs the program as /lib/rld.
The compiler_eoe.sw.unix subsystem is installed by default on all systems.
When running setuid and setgid programs, the rld program could be
manipulated to bypass existing permissions. Local non-privileged
users could gain root access.
A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability both
locally and remotely.
It is believed that this vulnerability information is not public
knowledge and this has afforded SGI the opportunity to fully investigate
this issue and provide the following information and solutions.
- - --------------------------
- - --- Temporary Solution ---
- - --------------------------
Unfortunately, there are no immediate or temporary workarounds for
this issue. The issue can only be addressed with a patch.
- - ----------------
- - --- Solution ---
- - ----------------
**** IRIX 5.0.x, 5.1.x, and 5.2 ****
For the IRIX operating systems versions 5.0.x, 5.1.x and 5.2, an
upgrade to 5.3 or better is required first. When the upgrade is
completed, then the patches described in the following sections
can be applied depending on the final version of the upgrade.
**** IRIX 5.3 ****
For the IRIX operating system version 5.3, an inst-able patch has
been generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your
service/support provider. The patch is number 2064 and will
install only on IRIX 5.3.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 2064 can be found in the following
directories on the FTP server:
~ftp/Security
or
~ftp/Patches/5.3
##### Checksums #####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.2064
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30021 10 README.patch.2064
Algorithm #2 (sum): 64614 10 README.patch.2064
MD5 checksum: DD579D28C4E03681E3DDC37FAF9AFCFF
Filename: patchSG0002064
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 24134 2 patchSG0002064
Algorithm #2 (sum): 45870 2 patchSG0002064
MD5 checksum: 1F2D5ECB6ADBDAFB6365406AA4827A12
Filename: patchSG0002064.compiler_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55484 1216 patchSG0002064.compiler_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 37740 1216 patchSG0002064.compiler_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 1532F8A3921D9DD3AC6D50198442A67A
Filename: patchSG0002064.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 38368 2 patchSG0002064.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 48314 2 patchSG0002064.idb
MD5 checksum: DC0FA7FF3F858ED0ACC534CD2D40A3C8
**** IRIX 6.0.X ****
For the IRIX operating system version 6.0.X an upgrade to 6.2 or
better is required first. When the upgrade is completed, then the
patches described in the following sections can be applied depending
on the final version of the upgrade.
**** IRIX 6.1 ****
For the IRIX operating system version 6.1, an inst-able patch has
been generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your
service/support provider. The patch is number 2063 and will install
only on IRIX 6.1.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 2063 can be found in the following
directories on the FTP server:
~ftp/Security
or
~ftp/Patches/6.1
##### Checksums #####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.2063
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 31314 13 README.patch.2063
Algorithm #2 (sum): 56210 13 README.patch.2063
MD5 checksum: 0E17E595A7ABC2613FF18C91467E2BDF
Filename: patchSG0002063
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 04658 3 patchSG0002063
Algorithm #2 (sum): 30916 3 patchSG0002063
MD5 checksum: 7CE1365338900953F1D7A5B1272E7A9D
Filename: patchSG0002063.compiler_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 11620 1565 patchSG0002063.compiler_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 20697 1565 patchSG0002063.compiler_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 597EC199F813C9A9A0C6BFF3E267FE9F
Filename: patchSG0002063.compiler_eoe_sw32
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 47091 1362 patchSG0002063.compiler_eoe_sw32
Algorithm #2 (sum): 4329 1362 patchSG0002063.compiler_eoe_sw32
MD5 checksum: 897D631C08C82C2BE835DA7CCE6A1D19
Filename: patchSG0002063.compiler_eoe_sw64
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 01609 1492 patchSG0002063.compiler_eoe_sw64
Algorithm #2 (sum): 18813 1492 patchSG0002063.compiler_eoe_sw64
MD5 checksum: 1EA6F43DAB7AFD6F23BF3E9009634DF6
Filename: patchSG0002063.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 07313 3 patchSG0002063.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 35453 3 patchSG0002063.idb
MD5 checksum: C86B5B7340226153B1B76CE149056011
**** IRIX 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 ****
For the IRIX operating system version 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 an inst-able
patch has been generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your
service/support provider. The patch is number 2044 and will install
only on IRIX 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 2044 can be found in the following
directories on the FTP server:
~ftp/Security
or
~ftp/Patches/6.2
~ftp/Patches/6.3
~ftp/Patches/6.4
##### Checksums #####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.2044
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 65374 16 README.patch.2044
Algorithm #2 (sum): 56364 16 README.patch.2044
MD5 checksum: 107FBCD8A9724184CD94D01222812FFC
Filename: patchSG0002044
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05889 4 patchSG0002044
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23416 4 patchSG0002044
MD5 checksum: C4AE7226F10EA100EE94F79CF026BA46
Filename: patchSG0002044.compiler_eoe_hdr
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 21917 2 patchSG0002044.compiler_eoe_hdr
Algorithm #2 (sum): 33214 2 patchSG0002044.compiler_eoe_hdr
MD5 checksum: C98020C4E1BE50D4F3F62F57B3004671
Filename: patchSG0002044.compiler_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 25902 2928 patchSG0002044.compiler_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 33620 2928 patchSG0002044.compiler_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: DF381409E88A75FC90F36C6411C0373D
Filename: patchSG0002044.compiler_eoe_sw64
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 53052 1492 patchSG0002044.compiler_eoe_sw64
Algorithm #2 (sum): 18816 1492 patchSG0002044.compiler_eoe_sw64
MD5 checksum: 50BF2098C4B45A8E23991A43348DD59B
Filename: patchSG0002044.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 29600 3 patchSG0002044.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 47757 3 patchSG0002044.idb
MD5 checksum: 8B986CF0C42FB8C48667DAA91C214E00
- - ------------------------
- - --- Acknowledgments ---
- - ------------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank Marko Laakso from the University of Oulu
and AUSCERT for their assistance and cooperation in this matter.
- - -----------------------------------------
- - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- - -----------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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[ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc.,AUSCERT
and Marko Laakso from the University of Oulu for the information contained in
this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 510-422-8193
FAX: +1 510-423-8002
STU-III: +1 510-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/
Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53)
Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)
CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles;
3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
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4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
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Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
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subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
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ciac-bulletin, ciac-notes, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:
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subscribe list-name
e.g., subscribe ciac-notes
You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
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If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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