TUCoPS :: SGI :: ciach093.txt

SGI Irix Ordist Buffer Overrun


[  For Public Release  ]            

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                  SGI IRIX ordist Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
                       Update to ordist in Bulletin H-62

August 5, 1997 20:00 GMT                                           Number H-93
PROBLEM:       A vulnerability has been identified in the ordist(lc) program
               on the SGI IRIX operating system.
PLATFORM:      All SGI systems running IRIX 5.x and 6.x.
DAMAGE:        This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root
SOLUTION:      Apply patches or workarounds listed below.
VULNERABILITY  Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made
ASSESSMENT:    publicly available. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED by SGI that these
               corrective measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems.

[ Start SGI Advisory ]


                Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

        Title:   IRIX ordist Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
        Number:  19970509-02-PX
        Date:    August 5, 1997

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.  In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.

- - -----------------------
- - --- Issue Specifics ---
- - -----------------------

The ordist(1c) program is used to maintain identical copies of files
over multiple hosts.  The program is setuid root and as part of normal
usage accepts user arguments to establish specific ordist operation.

It has been determined that an appropriately crafted set of arguments
could be input to the ordist program allowing execution of arbitrary
user commands with root privileges.   This resulting buffer overflow
condition is considered a security vulnerability in the ordist program.

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems.  This issue will
be corrected in future releases of IRIX.

- - --------------
- - --- Impact ---
- - --------------

The ordist program (/usr/bsd/ordist) is installed on all IRIX systems by

A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability both
locally and remotely.

This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root

This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups
and mailing lists by several individuals and reported in AUSCERT Advisory
AA-97.23 and CERT Advisory CA-97.21.

- - --------------------------
- - --- Temporary Solution ---
- - --------------------------

Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.

The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing
the permissions of the ordist program.

     1) Become the root user on the system.

                % /bin/su -

     2) Change the permissions on the ordist program.

                # /bin/chmod 500 /usr/bsd/ordist

                           *** NOTE ***

               Removing the setuid root permissions from the ordist
               program will prevent non-root users from using the ordist
               program including any user level programs utilizing the
               the ordist program.

     3) Return to previous level.

                # exit

- - ----------------
- - --- Solution ---
- - ----------------

   OS Version     Vulnerable?     Patch #      Other Actions
   ----------     -----------     -------      -------------

   IRIX 3.x          no
   IRIX 4.x          no
   IRIX 5.0.x        yes          not avail    Note 1
   IRIX 5.1.x        yes          not avail    Note 1
   IRIX 5.2          yes          not avail    Note 1
   IRIX 5.3          yes          2212
   IRIX 6.0.x        yes          not avail    Note 1
   IRIX 6.1          yes          not avail    Note 1
   IRIX 6.2          yes          2213
   IRIX 6.3          yes          2213
   IRIX 6.4          yes          2213


     1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section.

Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.

The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com ( or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com.   Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.

                 ##### Patch File Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:

Filename:                 README.patch.2212
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    55665 8 README.patch.2212
Algorithm #2 (sum):       21084 8 README.patch.2212
MD5 checksum:             63D2F78F2A053FBCF20B7B4F261F69E6

Filename:                 patchSG0002212
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    30446 1 patchSG0002212
Algorithm #2 (sum):       25510 1 patchSG0002212
MD5 checksum:             34C8AFD6D5AF0C8DC8186340DF0FB5F6

Filename:                 patchSG0002212.eoe2_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    35919 83 patchSG0002212.eoe2_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       21443 83 patchSG0002212.eoe2_sw
MD5 checksum:             24BCC0E339DA5E77EE02DABB80CD25CD

Filename:                 patchSG0002212.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    27980 1 patchSG0002212.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum):       35351 1 patchSG0002212.idb
MD5 checksum:             669956DF29236E6F575F53CBAC36120C

Filename:                 README.patch.2213
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    43157 8 README.patch.2213
Algorithm #2 (sum):       25429 8 README.patch.2213
MD5 checksum:             5EBFCA7C2A62CCF9ABC21A0AE35C65ED

Filename:                 patch2213.pgp.and.chksums
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    26202 3 patch2213.pgp.and.chksums
Algorithm #2 (sum):       28902 3 patch2213.pgp.and.chksums
MD5 checksum:             E9973C7F6877C589FC0C87C548BC98AA

Filename:                 patchSG0002213
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    45834 1 patchSG0002213
Algorithm #2 (sum):       28307 1 patchSG0002213
MD5 checksum:             8DEC766B3F70C64C89CC1A486A5F969F

Filename:                 patchSG0002213.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    54215 83 patchSG0002213.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       35616 83 patchSG0002213.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum:             296C50BAF715BCE2A593990E4EF60EE9

Filename:                 patchSG0002213.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    43355 1 patchSG0002213.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum):       35527 1 patchSG0002213.idb
MD5 checksum:             98DC9A6AEA6C4FAE34433EEBE5C84A6F

- - ------------------------
- - --- Acknowledgments ---
- - ------------------------

Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the worldwide Internet community and the
AUSCERT and CERT Coordination Center organizations for their assistance
in this matter.

- - -----------------------------------------------------------
- - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- - -----------------------------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to


Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community.  This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (  Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.


Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.

% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>

In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to.  The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.


Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.


For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider.  A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

  This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
  be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
  Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
  includes its valid PGP signature.

Version: 2.6.2


[ End SGI Advisory ]

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