TUCoPS :: SGI :: ciaci043.txt

SGI Irix Mailcap Vulnerability


                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                         SGI IRIX mailcap Vulnerability

July 22, 1998 21:00 GMT                                         Number I-043A
PROBLEM:       A vulnerability exists in the Mailcap entries for x-sgi-task and
PLATFORM:      IRIX 6.3 and 6.4.
DAMAGE:        If exploited, this vulnerability could lead to a local root
SOLUTION:      Apply patches or workaround.
VULNERABILITY  Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated this vulnerability and
ASSESSMENT:    recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure.
               It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on
               ALL vulnerable SGI systems.

[ UPDATED on July 22, 1998 with additional patch information from Silicon
  Graphics Inc. ]

[ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ]


                Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

        Title:   IRIX 6.3 & 6.4 mailcap vulnerability
        Number:  19980403-02-PX
        Date:    July 20, 1998

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.  In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.

- ---------------
- ---- Update ---
- ---------------

As part of on going security efforts, Silicon Graphics has replaced
patch 2336 with patch 3068.  Patch 2336 had an incorrect patch range.
The original text from SGI Security Advisory 19980403-01-PX has been updated
to reflect this change.

- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------

The System Manager sysmgr(1M) provides a web-browser-like GUI interface to
tasks that help you administer an SGI workstation. sysmgr(1M) uses multiple
tools to manage its GUI interface, two of them being runtask(1M) and

By mimicking the descriptor files of runtask(1M) or runexec(1M), an SGI user
browsing web pages or reading email can inadvertently download a
"trojan horse" runtask(1M) or runexec(1M) descriptor file. The "trojan horse"
descriptor file will execute a local System Manager Task with the privileges
of the user web browsing and can lead to a local root compromise.

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.  This
issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.

- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------

All IRIX 6.3/6.4 users that have Mailcap entries for x-sgi-task
and x-sgi-exec have this vulnerability. On IRIX 6.3/6.4, these vulnerable
Mailcap entries are installed by default in /usr/local/lib/netscape/mailcap .
Users can add their own Mailcap entries in their home directories
($HOME/.mailcap) and these need to be inspected for the vulnerable x-sgi-task
and x-sgi-exec entries.

By default, this vulnerability requires an IRIX 6.3/6.4 user to use
Netscape Navigator to web browse or read email from a malicious site
and download a "trojan horse" System Manager Task which will execute
locally with the privileges of the user web browsing. If the user is a
privileged or root user, the "trojan horse" System Manger Task will execute
with root privileges and can lead to a root compromise.

- --------------------------
- --- Temporary Solution ---
- --------------------------

Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.

     1) Become the root user on the system.

                % /bin/su -

     2) Edit the default Mailcap file.

                # vi /usr/local/lib/netscape/mailcap

     3) Remove the following vulnerable mailcap entries:

                application/x-sgi-task; /usr/sysadm/bin/runtask %s; \
                    description="System Administration Task"

                application/x-sgi-exec; /usr/sysadm/bin/runexec %s; \
                    description="System Administration Executable"

     4) Find any additional mailcap files and remove any vulnerable entries.

        You will need to run the find(1) command on each system you
        maintain because the command examines files on local disks only.

        Note that this is one long command, though we have separated it
        onto three lines using backslashes.

                 # find / -local -type f \( -name 'mailcap'  -o \
                   -name '.mailcap' \) -exec egrep 'runexec|runtask' {} \
                   /dev/null \;

        This command will find all files on a system that:
            are only in the local file system (/ -local)
            are regular files (-type f)
            have the name "mailcap" (-name 'mailcap') or the name ".mailcap"

        Once found, those files will be searched for the string "runexec" or
        "runtask" (-exec egrep 'runexec|runtask' {}) and have their path names
        printed .

        The addition of /dev/null as an argument causes egrep to list the
        full pathname of any file containing the string, rather than just the

        Edit the files that have the pathnames printed and remove any
        vulnerable runtask/runexec mailcap entries.

      5) Return to previous level.

                # exit

- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------

   OS Version     Vulnerable?     Patch #      Other Actions
   ----------     -----------     -------      -------------

   IRIX 3.x          no
   IRIX 4.x          no
   IRIX 5.0.x        no
   IRIX 5.1.x        no
   IRIX 5.2          no
   IRIX 5.3          no
   IRIX 6.0.x        no
   IRIX 6.1          no
   IRIX 6.2          no
   IRIX 6.3          yes           3068
   IRIX 6.4          yes           2339
   IRIX 6.5          no

Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.

The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com ( or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com.   Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.

                 ##### Patch File Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:

Filename:                 README.patch.3068
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    54529 8 README.patch.3068
Algorithm #2 (sum):       33465 8 README.patch.3068
MD5 checksum:             E91EB7C7124D8A40DD81DD1CB8CC9DA2

Filename:                 patchSG0003068
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    54264 2 patchSG0003068
Algorithm #2 (sum):       7687 2 patchSG0003068
MD5 checksum:             6EE55314047752A8B7BFA96EB551DE9F

Filename:                 patchSG0003068.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    31861 2 patchSG0003068.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum):       13383 2 patchSG0003068.idb
MD5 checksum:             5ACBB5E60F27283E8099C0F310E3BBC9

Filename:                 patchSG0003068.netscape_gold_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    07593 20 patchSG0003068.netscape_gold_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       3826 20 patchSG0003068.netscape_gold_sw
MD5 checksum:             893D690FA20C0AC4E6E4B7E67465B0E2

Filename:                 patchSG0003068.netscape_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    04774 6 patchSG0003068.netscape_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       24847 6 patchSG0003068.netscape_sw
MD5 checksum:             B6FD69352794F52288D536320CBB4A77

Filename:                 README.patch.2339
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    11695 8 README.patch.2339
Algorithm #2 (sum):       21823 8 README.patch.2339
MD5 checksum:             114563D0D67F80E371C71EF3E6262900

Filename:                 patchSG0002339
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    37814 2 patchSG0002339
Algorithm #2 (sum):       40753 2 patchSG0002339
MD5 checksum:             E0B519F8ECD83396E29DFE07DF23517E

Filename:                 patchSG0002339.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    59311 2 patchSG0002339.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum):       54667 2 patchSG0002339.idb
MD5 checksum:             8E39530FD44C9087F0C07B1F75043764

Filename:                 patchSG0002339.netscape_gold_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    39233 20 patchSG0002339.netscape_gold_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       53498 20 patchSG0002339.netscape_gold_sw
MD5 checksum:             7FF56E22472B0797499920BAAB8CA9C5

- -------------------------
- ---- Acknowledgments ---
- -------------------------

Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center, and
AUSCERT for their assistance in this matter.

- ------------------------------------------------------------
- ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- ------------------------------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to


Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community.  This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (  Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.


Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.

% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>

In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to.  The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.


Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.


For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider.  A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

  This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
  be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
  Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
  includes its valid PGP signature.

Version: 2.6.2


[ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ]


CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
    Voice:    +1 925-422-8193
    FAX:      +1 925-423-8002
    STU-III:  +1 925-423-2604
    E-mail:   ciac@llnl.gov

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

   World Wide Web:      http://www.ciac.org/
                        (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
   Anonymous FTP:       ftp.ciac.org
                        (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
   Modem access:        +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
                        +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)

CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
   information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
   (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
   use of SPI products.

Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:

E-mail to       ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov:
        subscribe list-name
  e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin

You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the
instructions in the email.  This is a partial protection to make sure
you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question.

If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins.  If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)

I-033: Sun Solaris Vulnerabilities (ndd, rpc.cmsd)
I-034: Internet Cookies
I-035: SGI Vulnerabilities (startmidi/stopmidi, datman/cdman, cdplayer)
I-036: FreeBSD Denial-of Service LAND Attacks
I-037: FreeBSD mmap Vulnerability
I-038: Ascend Routing Hardware Vulnerabilities
I-039: HP-UX inetd Vulnerability
I-040: SGI Netscape Navigator Vulnerabilities
I-041: Performer API Search Tool 2.2 pfdispaly.cgi Vulnerability
I-042: SGI IRIX lp(1) Security Vulnerability

Version: 4.0 Business Edition


TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2024 AOH