-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SGI IRIX Vulnerabilities (NetWare Client, diskperf/diskalign)
May 28, 1998 23:00 GMT Number I-055
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: SGI has identified vulnerabilities in:
1) NetWare Client 1.0
2) diskalign(1) and diskperf(1)
PLATFORM: 1) IRIX 6.3
2) IRIX 6.4
DAMAGE: If exploited, these vulnerabilities could lead to root access.
SOLUTION: Apply patches or workaround.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on
ASSESSMENT: ALL vulnerable SGI systems. SGI has produced an additional
advisory that is included at the end of this bulletin. The
advisory outlines a methodology where scans of port number 1
are used in an attempt to identify SGI hosts. The positive
results of these scans are then targeted for well known SGI
security vulnerabilities.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisories ]
1) NetWare Client 1.0
- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: IRIX 6.3 NetWare Client 1.0 Vulnerabilities
Number: 19980501-01-P2869
Date: May 27th, 1998
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- -------------------------
- ----- Issue Specifics ---
- -------------------------
The NetWare Client subsystem provides software to communicate with NetWare
Servers with file sharing and remote printing capabilities.
Unfortunately, several vulnerabilities have been discovered with NetWare
Client
1.0 on IRIX 6.3 which can lead to a root compromise on the system.
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.
This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- ----------------
- ----- Impact ---
- ----------------
The NetWare Client 1.0 software subsystem is installed by default on IRIX 6.3.
A user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to exploit
NetWare Client 1.0 locally and remotely which can lead to root access.
This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups
and mailing lists.
- ----------------------------
- ----- Temporary Solution ---
- ----------------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.
The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing
the permissions of the NetWare Client 1.0 programs.
1) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
2) Verify a vulnerable NetWare Client 1.0 software subsystem is
installed.
Only NetWare Client 1.0 on IRIX 6.3 is vulnerable.
# versions -b netwr_client
I = Installed, R = Removed
Name Date Description
I netwr_client 04/30/97 NetWare Client 1.0
3) Change the permissions on the vulnerable NetWare Client 1.0 programs.
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/etc/netware/ipxchk
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/etc/netware/ipxlink
4) Verify the new permissions on the program.
Note that the program sizes may be different depending on release.
# ls -l /usr/etc/netware/ipxchk
-r-x------ 1 root sys 9076 Feb 18 13:50 ipxchk
# ls -l /usr/etc/netware/ipxlink
-r-x------ 1 root sys 21412 Feb 18 13:50 ipxlink
5) Return to previous user level.
# exit
$
- ------------------
- ----- Solution ---
- ------------------
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x no
IRIX 4.x no
IRIX 5.0.x no
IRIX 5.1.x no
IRIX 5.2 no
IRIX 5.3 no
IRIX 6.0.x no
IRIX 6.1 no
IRIX 6.2 no
IRIX 6.3 yes 2869
IRIX 6.4 no
Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.2869
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52839 9 README.patch.2869
Algorithm #2 (sum): 1764 9 README.patch.2869
MD5 checksum: 1236AB82847EC3E53277B70989766F47
Filename: patchSG0002869
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52950 3 patchSG0002869
Algorithm #2 (sum): 40584 3 patchSG0002869
MD5 checksum: 8164932F4667258378598852C64090BC
Filename: patchSG0002869.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 12067 6 patchSG0002869.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 30180 6 patchSG0002869.idb
MD5 checksum: A33FB43AADBC15B98ABF42079BB63336
Filename: patchSG0002869.netwr_client_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 08086 210 patchSG0002869.netwr_client_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 55842 210 patchSG0002869.netwr_client_sw
MD5 checksum: 49C619A6FA7FBA9102D1C566C9B1E736
Filename: patchSG0002869.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22870 690 patchSG0002869.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 28194 690 patchSG0002869.sysadmdesktop_sw
MD5 checksum: 4932DB35E7C275CC846B31293A0BE5F6
- --------------------------
- ----- Acknowledgments ---
- --------------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT and the Internet community at
large for their assistance in this matter.
- -------------------------------------------------------------
- ----- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- -------------------------------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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2) diskalign(1) and diskperf(1)
- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: IRIX 6.4 diskperf/diskalign Vulnerabilities
Number: 19980502-01-P3030
Date: May 27, 1998
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- -------------------------
- ----- Issue Specifics ---
- -------------------------
IRIX 6.4 Patch 2291 and its successors introduced several new tools for
the Digital Media Community. Two of these new tools introduced are
diskalign(1) and diskperf(1) which are used to assist in configuring
IRIX for data streaming applications, like uncompressed digital video,
to/from an XLV volume set of stripped disks.
Unfortunately, a security hole was discovered that allows diskalign(1) and
diskperf(1) to create arbitrary root-owned files which can lead to a root
compromise.
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This
issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- ----------------
- ----- Impact ---
- ----------------
The diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs are installed by default from the
January Recommended/Required Patch Set for IRIX 6.4.
Patch 2291 and 2848 are vulnerable to this exploit.
A user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to exploit
diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) locally and remotely.
This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups
and mailing lists.
- ----------------------------
- ----- Temporary Solution ---
- ----------------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.
The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing
the setuid permissions of the diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs.
1) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
2) Verify the vulnerable diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs
are installed. Only patch 2291 and 2848 are vulnerable.
# versions -b patchSG0002291 patchSG0002848
I = Installed, R = Removed
Name Date Description
I patchSG0002291 02/02/98 Patch SG0002291: rollup for platform
independent dmedia
I patchSG0002848 03/04/98 Patch SG0002848: rollup for platform
independent dmedia
3) Change the permissions on the vulnerable diskalign(1)/diskperf(1)
programs.
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/diskalign
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/diskperf
************
*** NOTE ***
************
Removing the permissions from the vulnerable program will
prevent non-root users from accessing diskalign(1)/diskperf(1).
4) Verify the new permissions on the program.
Note that the program size may be different depending on release.
# ls -al /usr/sbin/diskalign /usr/sbin/diskperf
-r-x------ 1 root sys 17756 Mar 4 14:02 diskalign
-r-x------ 1 root sys 42424 Mar 4 14:02 diskperf
5) Return to previous user level.
# exit
$
- ------------------
- ----- Solution ---
- ------------------
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x no
IRIX 4.x no
IRIX 5.0.x no
IRIX 5.1.x no
IRIX 5.2 no
IRIX 5.3 no
IRIX 6.0.x no
IRIX 6.1 no
IRIX 6.2 no
IRIX 6.3 no
IRIX 6.4 yes 3030
Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.3030
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05597 34 README.patch.3030
Algorithm #2 (sum): 21922 34 README.patch.3030
MD5 checksum: DD5ABFFEAEAF479FEFF1FE0FB6DD9C0D
Filename: patch3030.chksums.only
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 06000 4 patch3030.chksums.only
Algorithm #2 (sum): 45369 4 patch3030.chksums.only
MD5 checksum: 7D994C28C59CCF796F6FC5E7C8E44D65
Filename: patch3030.pgp.and.chksums
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39517 11 patch3030.pgp.and.chksums
Algorithm #2 (sum): 12406 11 patch3030.pgp.and.chksums
MD5 checksum: 503702949B44D83249E2C27747F3E411
Filename: patchSG0003030
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 57797 20 patchSG0003030
Algorithm #2 (sum): 41233 20 patchSG0003030
MD5 checksum: D9CDFB195EB0EF3928AE5752E62817A8
Filename: patchSG0003030.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32697 48 patchSG0003030.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 25898 48 patchSG0003030.desktop_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 55CB2D9182FE8CE45F240DFFC2D10342
Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 26486 51 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 26722 51 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_man
MD5 checksum: 700D287F5A02173EFD68B34E7434AF68
Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_src
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 57124 209 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_src
Algorithm #2 (sum): 35449 209 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_src
MD5 checksum: DC07141CDF0A989A3D7CAA8C2BA5FBD6
Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40323 4971 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 39176 4971 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_sw
MD5 checksum: B52C5EC6B0822EEFBB11DBEA1589D12A
Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 12852 125 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 63193 125 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_man
MD5 checksum: 8909E51934CDCF28058B54FDE17FD1AB
Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 06229 12946 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 28437 12946 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 7D33CFF002A66B6A1C1A9914F4C01A48
Filename: patchSG0003030.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 65347 227 patchSG0003030.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 16579 227 patchSG0003030.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 08AC9BE254FAEB7E7880EA32B2FA3D3E
Filename: patchSG0003030.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33473 42 patchSG0003030.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 8655 42 patchSG0003030.idb
MD5 checksum: 3BFC27BA00AEE38686FA0961240F1F23
Filename: patchSG0003030.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 16622 27 patchSG0003030.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 52053 27 patchSG0003030.sysadmdesktop_sw
MD5 checksum: 8837A995D8439365442BF8E95188236D
- --------------------------
- ----- Acknowledgments ---
- --------------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT for their assistance in this matter.
- -------------------------------------------------------------
- ----- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- -------------------------------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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3)
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______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: tcpmux Port Scanning and Root Compromises
Number: 19980503-01-I
Date: May 28, 1998
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics has been in communication with the CERT Coordination
Center in regards to observed increases in tcpmux/port 1 scanning and
root compromises on IRIX based systems.
Upon examining this trend, Silicon Graphics and the CERT Coordination
Center have theorized that a new methodology is currently being used
to identify the continually increasing number of Silicon Graphics IRIX
based systems on the Internet, in order to then target them for potential
attack and compromise.
- ------------------------
- ---- Issue Specifics ---
- ------------------------
Silicon Graphics believes at this time that no new IRIX vulnerability has
been found. However, this new methodology is based upon an understanding
of the default IRIX environment and could lead to a system compromise.
The tcpmux protocol is used by many computing platforms. By default,
Silicon Graphics based IRIX systems have the tcpmux protocol activated
for use on port 1. Utilizing this fact, widespread scanning of networks
for systems that respond to probes of port 1 could be used to obtain a
list of systems that might be running IRIX. Again, at this time, there
is no known vulnerability in the tcpmux protocol or the services it
provides and responding to a probe of port 1 is normal behavior for
the tcpmux protocol.
Using a scan generated list, the next component of the methodology would
be to attempt to exploit IRIX-specific security problems. This may include
attempting to log into well known accounts that are unpassworded by default
and upon successfully finding any open default account, attempting security
exploits requiring local account access. These accounts are shipped
unpassworded
by default to foster a "collaborative" environment and are documented in SGI
system documentation and also in SGI security advisory 19951002.
Additionally, the scan generated list could be used to target systems for
remote exploits, which do not require local account access.
In both local and remote cases, a system compromise is possible if security
patches have not been installed and/or the system is misconfigured.
- -----------------
- ---- Solution ---
- -----------------
At this time, Silicon Graphics does not believe any new vulnerability
exists in regards to this issue and therefore has no patches to offer.
All current security patches and information can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html
ftp://sgigate.sgi.com/patches
ftp://sgigate.sgi.com/security
Silicon Graphics believes the best measures for preventing exposure
to this new methodology is to 1) ensure all accounts have good passwords
or are disabled, and 2) that all current security patches are installed.
Furthermore, keeping current with new security information and system
monitoring for intrusions would be considered prudent.
If your IRIX machine currently has unpassworded accounts, it would
be prudent to inspect your system for signs of intrusion. Please
refer to the "Recovering from an Incident" section at the CERT
Coordination Center website (www.cert.org).
- -------------------------
- ---- Acknowledgments ---
- -------------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center for their
assistance in this matter.
- ------------------------------------------------------------
- ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- ------------------------------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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[ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisories ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
(or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
(or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)
CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.
Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:
E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name
e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin
You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the
instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure
you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question.
If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)
I-045: SGI IRIX LicenseManager(1M) Vulnerabilities
I-046: Open Group xterm and Xaw Library Vulnerabilities
I-047: HP-UX OpenMail Vulnerability
I-048: SunOS mountd Vulnerability
I-049: SunOS ufsrestore Vulnerability
I-050: Digital UNIX softlinks - advfs Vulnerability
I-051: FreeBSD T/TCP Vulnerability
I-052: 3Com(r) CoreBuilder and SuperStack II LAN Vulnerabilities
I-053: ISC DHCP Distribution Vulnerability
I-054: Cisco Web Cache Control Protocol Router Vulnerability
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