__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SGI IRIX mail(1), rmail(1M), sendmail(1M) Vulnerabilities
October 1, 1998 20:00 GMT Number I-064
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Several security vulnerabilities have been identified in
mail(1), rmail(1M), and sendmail(1M)
PLATFORM: Any SGI IRIX system running mail(1), rmail(1M), the default
version of sendmail 8.6.12.
Update includes version 8.8.8 of sendmail.
DAMAGE: The vulnerabilities in mail(1) and rmail(1M) may allow a local
user access to any file that is owned by the mail group(4). By
exploiting the vulnerabilities in sendmail(1M), an attacker may
obtain root access.
SOLUTION: Apply patches or workarounds.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends
ASSESSMENT: the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY
RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL
vulnerable SGI systems.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Update on October 1, 1998 with additional patch information ]
[ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: IRIX mail(1)/rmail(1M)/sendmail(1M) Security Vulnerabilities
Title: CERT CA-96.20
Number: 19980604-02-PX
Date: September 29, 1998
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- ---------------
- ---- Update ---
- ---------------
As part of on going security efforts, Silicon Graphics has replaced
patches: 2309 (IRIX 5.3), 2231 (IRIX 6.2) and 2310 (IRIX 6.3 & 6.4) with
patches: 3347 (IRIX 5.3), 3348 (IRIX 6.2), 3394 (IRIX 6.3 & 6.4) and
3393 (IRIX 6.5 with IRIX 6.5.1 Maintenance Release).
These new patches close a new Mail(1) security issue and fix some bugs in
sendmail 8.8.8 anti-spam configuration.
The original text from SGI Security Advisory 19980604-01-PX has been
updated to reflect this change.
- ------------------------
- ---- Issue Specifics ---
- ------------------------
This advisory covers two security issues that were publicly reported as
two different issues. Both these issues have been addressed together
as one issue by Silicon Graphics.
The first security issue involves mail(1)/rmail(1M) programs.
The mail(1) program, also know as mail_att, is used to read or send email.
The rmail(1M) program is usually invoked by uux(1C) to receive email
via UUCP(1C).
Several security vulnerabilities were discovered in mail(1)/rmail(1M) that
allow any local user with access to mail(1) and rmail(1M) programs to access
or modify any file that is owned by the mail group(4).
The second security issue involves sendmail(1M).
The sendmail(1M) program is used to deliver and receive email.
On a fully patched IRIX system, the default version of sendmail is 8.6.12.
Several vulnerabilities have been found in sendmail 8.7.5 and lower which are
referenced and documented in CERT CA-96.20 and can be found at:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-96.20.sendmail_vul.html
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This
issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- ---------------
- ---- Impact ---
- ---------------
The mail(1)/rmail(1M)/sendmail(1M) programs are installed by default on IRIX.
A user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to exploit
mail(1)/rmail(1M) locally and remotely.
A local user account is not needed to exploit the sendmail(1M) program locally
and remotely.
These vulnerabilities have been publicly discussed in Usenet newsgroups
and mailing lists.
- ---------------------------
- ---- Temporary Solution ---
- ---------------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.
The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing
the setgid permissions of the mail(1)/rmail(1M) programs.
There are no workarounds for sendmail 8.6.12 vulnerabilities.
The sendmail(1M) program must be disabled or the patches need to be installed
to upgrade it to sendmail 8.8.8.
1) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
2) Remove the setgid permissions on the vulnerable programs.
# /bin/chmod 555 /usr/bin/mail
# /bin/chmod 555 /usr/bin/rmail
4) Verify the new permissions on the program.
Note that the program size may be different depending on release.
# ls -al /usr/bin/mail /usr/bin/rmail
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root mail 53024 Feb 12 1996 mail
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root mail 14216 May 16 1996 rmail
5) Disable the vulnerable sendmail(1M) program.
# chkconfig sendmail off
# /etc/init.d/mail stop
6) Return to previous user level.
# exit
%
- -----------------
- ---- Solution ---
- -----------------
These patches fix the rmail(1)/mail(1M) security vulnerabilities and upgrade
sendmail(1M) to version 8.8.8.
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x yes not avail Note 1, 2 & 3
IRIX 4.x yes not avail Note 1, 2 & 3
IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1, 2 & 3
IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1, 2 & 3
IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1, 2 & 3
IRIX 5.3 yes 3347
IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1, 2 & 3
IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1, 2 & 3
IRIX 6.2 yes 3348
IRIX 6.3 yes 3394
IRIX 6.4 yes 3394
IRIX 6.5 yes not avail Note 4
IRIX 6.5.1m yes 3393 Note 5
NOTES
1) Upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system.
2) See "Temporary Solution" section for a workaround.
3) Unsupported by SGI, "freeware" sendmail distributions can be found at
http://www.sendmail.org/
4) For IRIX 6.5, you must first install IRIX 6.5.1 Maintenance Release
and then install patch 3393. If you have not received an IRIX
6.5.1m CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your SGI Support Provider
or download the Maintenance Release from http://support.sgi.com/
5) Patchsets have been replaced with quarterly Maintenance Releases
Streams starting with IRIX 6.5. Information about Maintenance Release
Streams can be found in the IRIX 6.5 Technical Brief at:
http://www.sgi.com/software/irix6.5/
Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectively.
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.3347
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 61881 11 README.patch.3347
Algorithm #2 (sum): 20212 11 README.patch.3347
MD5 checksum: EC4353F140F0926BA1EAC5E8F6A47827
Filename: patchSG0003347
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 61339 4 patchSG0003347
Algorithm #2 (sum): 55594 4 patchSG0003347
MD5 checksum: FD956A1D65BD01717D95AF59CFDE9F72
Filename: patchSG0003347.eoe1_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 11384 69 patchSG0003347.eoe1_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23294 69 patchSG0003347.eoe1_man
MD5 checksum: E3201B231A10E89FF1376D1BA9DFBB65
Filename: patchSG0003347.eoe1_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 27750 850 patchSG0003347.eoe1_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 3662 850 patchSG0003347.eoe1_sw
MD5 checksum: DDE33397D29F3CC17593FB68C98093F0
Filename: patchSG0003347.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54110 7 patchSG0003347.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 20457 7 patchSG0003347.idb
MD5 checksum: 7F63FB32C0D3392909556D833ACF00A2
Filename: README.patch.3348
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 02655 10 README.patch.3348
Algorithm #2 (sum): 52305 10 README.patch.3348
MD5 checksum: 6579FF9DBF69D8449FA41E62FA002D14
Filename: patchSG0003348
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 25807 4 patchSG0003348
Algorithm #2 (sum): 47261 4 patchSG0003348
MD5 checksum: 12EED5A4099C1E63AFBE1C439339C71F
Filename: patchSG0003348.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 01364 69 patchSG0003348.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23234 69 patchSG0003348.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: AA90D2858E7D2BBD02A2FDE25685B1A2
Filename: patchSG0003348.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 42080 910 patchSG0003348.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 36251 910 patchSG0003348.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: DA8B126611F0D4C0B28E676919BB3D66
Filename: patchSG0003348.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43633 7 patchSG0003348.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 20449 7 patchSG0003348.idb
MD5 checksum: 8F447F20F2828C12EC6CBF7E53686EF7
Filename: README.patch.3393
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 16419 8 README.patch.3393
Algorithm #2 (sum): 46041 8 README.patch.3393
MD5 checksum: CF5A08C1EACC7B8242E7BC05C914C6EC
Filename: patchSG0003393
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 29657 3 patchSG0003393
Algorithm #2 (sum): 15111 3 patchSG0003393
MD5 checksum: 4B3CAFD8ED102F154DECCCAADF4760E0
Filename: patchSG0003393.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 26033 69 patchSG0003393.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23233 69 patchSG0003393.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: F03552977EA408EACB85B0772F3D3EC2
Filename: patchSG0003393.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 11507 1160 patchSG0003393.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 54353 1160 patchSG0003393.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 523494C66C94EA50E6C3D60E56B04E75
Filename: patchSG0003393.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 01437 8 patchSG0003393.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 38192 8 patchSG0003393.idb
MD5 checksum: 2EA142047CCD22B7E536A6720B9136A2
Filename: README.patch.3394
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22031 10 README.patch.3394
Algorithm #2 (sum): 40712 10 README.patch.3394
MD5 checksum: 89B34B7222723BFCA4220C18C2CA40E0
Filename: patchSG0003394
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 61693 3 patchSG0003394
Algorithm #2 (sum): 32311 3 patchSG0003394
MD5 checksum: 23748EB8970E3CD8295C54E9AA8961BA
Filename: patchSG0003394.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 26033 69 patchSG0003394.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23233 69 patchSG0003394.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: F03552977EA408EACB85B0772F3D3EC2
Filename: patchSG0003394.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55501 1153 patchSG0003394.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 4669 1153 patchSG0003394.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 5698C5642874FED5E95D9B5989BBF0D1
Filename: patchSG0003394.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10153 8 patchSG0003394.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 36831 8 patchSG0003394.idb
MD5 checksum: B85E01E783292D03AEF7778F14B61E18
- -------------------------
- ---- Acknowledgments ---
- -------------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center and the users
of the Internet Community at large for their assistance in this matter.
- ------------------------------------------------------------
- ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- ------------------------------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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[ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
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global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
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CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
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STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
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or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
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Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
(or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
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Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
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e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin
You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
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