TUCoPS :: SGI :: ciacj033.txt

SGI X Server Font Path Vulnerability

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             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                      SGI X server font path vulnerability
                      SGI Security Advisory 19990301-01-PX

March 10, 1999 17:00 GMT                                         Number J-033
_____________________________________________________________________________

PROBLEM:       A buffer overflow vulnerability has been discovered in the X
               server's font path which can lead to a root compromise.
PLATFORM:      All IRIX platforms that have X server installed.
DAMAGE:        With a local account, this vulnerability can be exploited to
               create a root compromise.
SOLUTION:      Apply the available patches. There are no immediate or
               temporary workarounds.
_____________________________________________________________________________

VULNERABILITY  This vulnerability has been publicly discussed in public
ASSESSMENT:    forums. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be
               implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.
_____________________________________________________________________________


[ Start Silicon Graphics Advisory ]

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_____________________________________________________________________________
_
                Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

        Title:   X server font path buffer overflow vulnerability
        Number:  19990301-01-PX
        Date:    March 8, 1999
_____________________________________________________________________________
_

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.  In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
_____________________________________________________________________________
_


- - -----------------------
- - --- Issue Specifics ---
- - -----------------------

A buffer overflow vulnerability has been discovered in the X server's
font path which can lead to a root compromise.

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.
This issue has been corrected in future releases of IRIX.


- - --------------
- - --- Impact ---
- - --------------

An X server is installed by default on all IRIX platforms.

A local user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to
exploit X server font path.

The buffer overflow vulnerability can lead to a root compromise.

This X server's font path vulnerability has been publicly discussed in
Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists.



- - --------------------------
- - --- Temporary Solution ---
- - --------------------------

Unfortunately, there are no immediate or temporary workarounds for
this issue.  This issue can only be addressed with the installation
of a patch.



- - ----------------
- - --- Solution ---
- - ----------------


   OS Version     Vulnerable?     Patch #      Other Actions
   ----------     -----------     -------      -------------

   IRIX 3.x          not tested                Note 1
   IRIX 4.x          not tested                Note 1
   IRIX 5.0-5.2      not tested                Note 1
   IRIX 5.3          yes            3236       Note 1
   IRIX 5.3 IMPACT   yes            3237       Note 1
   IRIX 6.0-6.1      not tested                Note 1
   IRIX 6.2          yes            3238
   IRIX 6.3          yes            3239       Note 2
   IRIX 6.4          yes            3240       Note 2
   IRIX 6.5          yes            6.5.1
   IRIX 6.5.1        no                        Note 3
   IRIX 6.5.2        no                        Note 3
   IRIX 6.5.3        no                        Note 3


   NOTES

     1) Upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system.
        See http://support.sgi.com/news/irix2.html for more information.
     2) This version of the IRIX operating system is in maintenance mode
        and patches will no longer be produced when it retires.
        See http://support.sgi.com/news/irix1.html for more information.
     3) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.Xm Maintenance Release Stream
        CD, contact your SGI Support Provider or download the IRIX 6.5.X
        Maintenance Release Stream from http://support.sgi.com/ or
        ftp://support.sgi.com/support/relstream/

Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches can be
found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectively.

For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirror of sgigate)
lags behind and does not do a real-time update of ~ftp/security and
~ftp/patches



                 ##### Patch File Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:

Filename:                 README.patch.3236
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    06603 24 README.patch.3236
Algorithm #2 (sum):       38874 24 README.patch.3236
MD5 checksum:             B70B58BE09A31A295ADF5968E34868C9

Filename:                 patchSG0003236
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    55695 6 patchSG0003236
Algorithm #2 (sum):       60448 6 patchSG0003236
MD5 checksum:             8F0CD7AFC0F9C9ECD1E0EE9FEBE7D2F5

Filename:                 patchSG0003236.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    31257 11 patchSG0003236.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum):       28348 11 patchSG0003236.idb
MD5 checksum:             8EB37E65BE5520DC9580E1BC1BD7EDE3

Filename:                 patchSG0003236.x_eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    30512 5 patchSG0003236.x_eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum):       47606 5 patchSG0003236.x_eoe_man
MD5 checksum:             CF72676A2F5BEDFA82B0DF0906247932

Filename:                 patchSG0003236.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    31868 27352 patchSG0003236.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       27353 27352 patchSG0003236.x_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum:             F966D810B94B2C49DD916CE77D1349D3


Filename:                 README.patch.3237
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    42042 19 README.patch.3237
Algorithm #2 (sum):       32108 19 README.patch.3237
MD5 checksum:             1CD03DC13868BFE1AACD550937D41357

Filename:                 patchSG0003237
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    16708 5 patchSG0003237
Algorithm #2 (sum):       44408 5 patchSG0003237
MD5 checksum:             A1FE34B6B90FCE5605FEECACA69E2BC8

Filename:                 patchSG0003237.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    34597 4 patchSG0003237.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum):       62487 4 patchSG0003237.idb
MD5 checksum:             9DC65EDE40F656CF334397327F70FDBA

Filename:                 patchSG0003237.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    51638 4124 patchSG0003237.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       37973 4124 patchSG0003237.x_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum:             3EA20B696FC29D2FB2A2D17E0B0D67B1


Filename:                 README.patch.3238
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    37574 29 README.patch.3238
Algorithm #2 (sum):       41010 29 README.patch.3238
MD5 checksum:             2855F4846DB026E0C80D9FF2B24A50BE

Filename:                 patchSG0003238
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    01081 8 patchSG0003238
Algorithm #2 (sum):       194 8 patchSG0003238
MD5 checksum:             D26CAAC6EE15E00741D8422D4694C094

Filename:                 patchSG0003238.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    37049 11 patchSG0003238.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum):       29814 11 patchSG0003238.idb
MD5 checksum:             AAF2CD97023C45436C4F6467F8F8D508

Filename:                 patchSG0003238.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    46378 27624 patchSG0003238.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       15031 27624 patchSG0003238.x_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum:             2CA8349B26B271E2B1A55966B1988AA8

Filename:                 patchSG0003238.x_eoe_sw64
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    16113 155 patchSG0003238.x_eoe_sw64
Algorithm #2 (sum):       13358 155 patchSG0003238.x_eoe_sw64
MD5 checksum:             EB0BF0AB7BC4A443703059D03FA7B2A8


Filename:                 README.patch.3239
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    40708 17 README.patch.3239
Algorithm #2 (sum):       13305 17 README.patch.3239
MD5 checksum:             4EA449C73B4A69DB13B8F8905051191B

Filename:                 patchSG0003239
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    52072 4 patchSG0003239
Algorithm #2 (sum):       52924 4 patchSG0003239
MD5 checksum:             464803D134A9C28F496C30DD97F4172E

Filename:                 patchSG0003239.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    06842 3 patchSG0003239.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum):       36313 3 patchSG0003239.idb
MD5 checksum:             14596BE72DAABE5BB11CE25218FEE845

Filename:                 patchSG0003239.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    21439 6053 patchSG0003239.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       2458 6053 patchSG0003239.x_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum:             74060A329FCE4F5E7CFE1373CD1942CD


Filename:                 README.patch.3240
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    45983 19 README.patch.3240
Algorithm #2 (sum):       21359 19 README.patch.3240
MD5 checksum:             C04847F2849B33F650CA0D436EFDD55E

Filename:                 patchSG0003240
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    21895 4 patchSG0003240
Algorithm #2 (sum):       43144 4 patchSG0003240
MD5 checksum:             508EBB6CC7F1A8EF9DD6E7EE96A9D9F4

Filename:                 patchSG0003240.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    49776 2 patchSG0003240.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum):       8475 2 patchSG0003240.idb
MD5 checksum:             EA734B3660F3833918B2E5758F3F3E20

Filename:                 patchSG0003240.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    48894 4538 patchSG0003240.x_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum):       60561 4538 patchSG0003240.x_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum:             28CC420770E8C6CEE90E618C6933368E


- - ------------------------
- - --- Acknowledgments ---
- - ------------------------

Silicon Graphics wishes to thank CERT Coordination Center and the users
of the Internet Community at large for their assistance in this matter.


- - -----------------------------------------------------------
- - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- - -----------------------------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.

                      ------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community.  This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1).  Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.

                      ------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.

% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d

In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to.  The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.


                      ------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.

                      ------oOo------

For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider.  A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

_____________________________________________________________________________
_
  This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
  be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
  Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
  includes its valid PGP signature.


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[ End Silicon Graphics Advisory ]

_____________________________________________________________________________


CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_____________________________________________________________________________



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