__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Center
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/ | /_\ /
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__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SGI PCP Pmpost Symlink Vulnerability
[SGI Security Advisory 20010601-01-A]
June 25, 2001 21:00 GMT Number L-099
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: The pmpost command of the Performance Co-Pilot (PCP) suite has
a symlink handling vulnerability. If this runs in root context
(i.e., setuid root), this could result in root compromise.
PLATFORM: IRIX, Linux: PCP suite versions 2.1.11-5 and before.
DAMAGE: Depending on configuration, this could result in root
compromise.
SOLUTION: Apply the described workaround. Pmpost appends the text message
to the end of the PCP notice board file (IRIX:
/var/adm/pcplog/NOTICES, Linux: /var/adm/pcp/NOTICES), so
changing the permissions as described in the workaround will
prevent non-root processes from appending to this file.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY MEDIUM to HIGH, depending on configuration. This can be a
ASSESSMENT: remotely exploitable root compromise, if pmpost runs in root
context.
______________________________________________________________________________
[****** Start SGI Advisory ******]
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______________________________________________________________________________
SGI Security Advisory
Title: PCP pmpost vulnerability
Number: 20010601-01-A
Date: June 19, 2001
______________________________________________________________________________
SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its
consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. SGI recommends
that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis
only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied
or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability
or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall SGI be liable for
any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect,
special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising
from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions
or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
SGI acknowledges the PCP pmpost vulnerability reported by Paul Starzetz on
BUGTRAQ http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/191831 and is currently
investigating. No further information is available at this time.
As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be
issued.
For the protection of all our customers, SGI does not disclose, discuss
or confirm vulnerabilities until a full investigation has occurred and
any necessary patch(es) or release streams are available for all vulnerable
and supported Linux and IRIX operating systems.
Until SGI has more definitive information to provide, customers are
encouraged to assume all security vulnerabilities as exploitable and take
appropriate steps according to local site security policies and requirements.
To minimize the pmpost vulnerability until patches are made available run
the following command as root:
On IRIX: /sbin/chmod 555 /usr/pcp/bin/pmpost
On Linux: chmod 555 /usr/share/pcp/bin/pmpost
This workaround will disable the ability for non-root processes to append
to /var/adm/pcplog/NOTICES (IRIX) or /var/log/pcp/NOTICES (Linux).
As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be
issued via the normal SGI security information distribution methods
including the wiretap mailing list.
- -----------------------------------------
- --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
------oOo------
SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire
SGI community. This information is freely available to any person
needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches
is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches
are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/
The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and
encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all
SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing
list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html)
or by sending email to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is
located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ .
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and
may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way,
SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes
its valid PGP signature.
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[****** End SGI Advisory ******]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of SGI for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24)
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@ciac.org
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
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Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
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