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SGI Multiple Local SendMail Vulnerability
M-020: SGI Multiple Local SendMail Vulnerability Privacy and Legal Notice


M-020: SGI Multiple Local SendMail Vulnerability

[SGI Security Advisory 20011101-01-I]

November 20, 2001 23:00 GMT

PROBLEM: Due to programming bugs in Sendmail, local users can manipulate the mail queue on their system.
PLATFORM: All SGI platforms and SGI systems with Sendmail versions before 8.12.1, without the "RestrictQRun" option enabled.
DAMAGE: A user can obtain unauthorized access to mail. Sensitive data could be revealed. Mail may be lost by the setting of specific flags and the mail system may be compromised.
SOLUTION: A patch is not currently available. Apply the temporary solution as specified by SGI.

The risk is LOW. A local user account is required.

  CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/m-020.shtml

[***** Start SGI Security Advisory 20011101-01-I *****]


                          SGI Security Advisory

        Title:   Multiple Local Sendmail Vulnerabilities
        Number:  20011101-01-I
     Reference:  CVE CAN-2001-0714 and CAN-2001-0715
          Date:  November 19, 2001

SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its
consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   SGI recommends
that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis
only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied
or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability
or fitness for a particular purpose.  In no event shall SGI be liable for
any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect,
special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising
from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions
or information in this Security Advisory.

- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------

The Sendmail mail delivery subsystem is vulnerable to multiple
local attacks that lead to information loss, disclosure of
possibly sensitive information and possible mail system compromise.

Sendmail versions before 8.12.1, without the "RestrictQRun"
option enabled, allow local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information about the mail queue by setting flags to
enable debug mode.

All versions of Sendmail allow any user to process the whole
mail queue unless this feature is disabled by the administrator.
Due to a programming bug, specific attacker-specified mail delivery
options will be honored. It is possible to, for example, force Sendmail
to drop queue contents by setting initial message hop count above the

Systems that do not allow users to run the queue ("RestrictQRun"
option) are not vulnerable to these exploits. "RestrictQRun" is
not set by default.

SGI has investigated these issues and recommends the following
steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI

- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------

The sendmail daemon is installed by default on IRIX.

A local user account on the vulnerable system is required in order
to exploit the sendmail daemon.

These sendmail vulnerabilities were assigned the following CVEs:

This issue was reported by BindView RAZOR team:

These sendmail vulnerabilities have been publicly discussed in
Usenet newsgroups and security mailing lists.

- --------------------------
- --- Temporary Solution ---
- --------------------------

The steps below can be used to configure sendmail so that users
are not allowed to run the queue.

     1) Become the root user on the system.

                % /bin/su -

     2) Edit the file /etc/sendmail.mc

                # vi  /etc/sendmail.mc

       {Add the following line}

       define(`confPRIVACY_FLAGS', `restrictqrun')dnl

       {Save the file and exit}

     3) Rebuild the sendmail.cf file from the modified
        sendmail.mc file.

                # /usr/etc/configmail mc2cf

     4) Stop and restart sendmail

                # /etc/init.d/mail stop
		# /etc/init.d/mail start

     5) Return to previous level.

                # exit

- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------

Currently, there are no patches available from SGI to address these issues.

SGI recommends following the steps from the Temporary Solution section to
disable users from being able to run the queue.

All versions of IRIX are vulnerable to these exploits unless the
above steps are taken.

- -------------
- --- Links ---
- -------------

SGI Security Advisories can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and

SGI Security Patches can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and

SGI patches for IRIX can be found at the following patch servers:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/

SGI freeware updates for IRIX can be found at:

SGI fixes for SGI open sourced code can be found on:

SGI patches and RPMs for Linux can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/linux/ or

SGI patches for Windows NT or 2000 can be found at:

IRIX 5.2-6.4 Recommended/Required Patch Sets can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/patchset/

IRIX 6.5 Maintenance Release Streams can be found at:

IRIX 6.5 Software Update CDs can be obtained from:

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches
is patches.sgi.com (  Security advisories and patches
are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/

For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirrors
patches.sgi.com security FTP repository) lags behind and does not
do a real-time update.

- ------------------------
- --- Acknowledgments ----
- ------------------------

SGI wishes to thank the BindView RAZOR team and the users of the Internet
Community at large for their assistance in this matter.

- -----------------------------------------
- --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to


SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI
community.  This information is freely available to any person needing
the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches
is patches.sgi.com (  Security advisories and patches
are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/

The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL:

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.


SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and
encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all
SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing
list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html)
or by sending email to SGI as outlined below.

% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap 

In the example above,  is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to.  The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.


SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is
located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/.


If there are general security questions on SGI systems, email can be
sent to security-info@sgi.com.

For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider.  A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

      This information is provided freely to all interested parties
      and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any
      way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and
      includes its valid PGP signature.

Version: 2.6.2


[***** End SGI Security Advisory 20011101-01-I *****]

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of SGI for the information contained in this bulletin.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE Contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at:

    Voice:          +1 925-422-8193 (7 x 24)

    FAX:            +1 925-423-8002

    STU-III:        +1 925-423-2604

    E-mail:          ciac@llnl.gov

    World Wide Web:  http://www.ciac.org/


                     (same machine -- either one will work)

    Anonymous FTP:   ftp.ciac.org


                     (same machine -- either one will work)

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
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