TUCoPS :: SGI :: cvb9602.txt

Incorrect Permissions on Packing Subsystem Source: Silicon Graphics, Inc.

CERT(sm) Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-96.02
February 1, 1996

Topic: Incorrect Permissions on Packing Subsystem
Source: Silicon Graphics, Inc.

To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT
Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from Silicon
Graphics, Inc. (SGI), who urges you to act on this information as soon as
possible. SGI contact information is included in the forwarded text
below; please contact them if you have any questions or need further

========================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================

                Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

         Number:         19960102-01-P
         Date:           January 29, 1996

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI community
for its consideration, interpretation and implementation.   Silicon Graphics
recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics will not be liable for any consequential damages
arising from the use of, or failure to use or use properly, any of the
instructions or information in this Security Advisory.

Silicon Graphics has discovered a security vulnerability within the
"ATT Packaging Utility" (eoe2.sw.oampkg) subsystem available for the
IRIX operating system.  SGI has investigated this issue and recommends
the following steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems running IRIX 5.2, 5.3,
6.0, 6.0.1, 6.1.   This issue has been corrected for future releases of

- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------

The "ATT Packaging Utility" (eoe2.sw.oampkg) subsystem is not installed
as part of the standard IRIX operating system.  It is optionally installed
when manually selected to be installed when using the IRIX inst program.
Therefore, not all SGI systems will have this subsystem installed.

For those systems that the subsystem installed, both local and remote
users may be able to overwrite files and/or become root on a targeted SGI

- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------

To determine if the packaging system is installed on a particular system,
the following command can be used:

       % versions eoe2.sw.oampkg | grep oampkg
       I  eoe2.sw.oampkg       03/25/94  ATT Packaging Utility

In the above case, the packaging system is installed and the steps
below should be performed. If no output is returned by the command,
the subsystem is not installed and no further action is required.

*IF* the packaging subsystem is installed, the following steps can
be used to neutralize the exposure by changing permissions on select
programs of the eoe2.sw.oampkg subsystem.

There is no patch for this issue.

       1) Become the root user on your system.

              % /bin/su

       2) Change the permissions on the following programs.

              # /sbin/chmod 755 /usr/pkg/bin/pkgadjust
              # /sbin/chmod 755 /usr/pkg/bin/abspath

       3) Return to the previous user state.

              # exit

- -----------------------------------------
- --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------

Past SGI Advisories and security patches can be obtained via
anonymous FTP from sgigate.sgi.com or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com.
These security patches and advisories are provided freely to
all interested parties.   For issues with the patches on the
FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com.

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to

For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider.  A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

=========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE=============================

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