__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SGI rpcbind User-level Vulnerabilities
[SGI Security Advisory 20020903-02-P]
October 7, 2002 19:00 GMT Number N-004
[Revised 14 October 2002]
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the user-level commands
supplied with IRIX 6.5.
* rpcbind follows symlinks when using the "-w" switch,
and it should not.
* Some temporary files used by the desktop are world-writable.
* uux, which has sgid permissions, has a buffer overrun
vulnerability.
* fsr_efs follows symlinks and it should not.
* the mv command creates the directory with world-writable
permissions when it is used to move a directory.
PLATFORM: IRIX 6.5
DAMAGE: The worst vulnerability can result in world-writable permissions,
or escalation of user privilege.
SOLUTION: Install the appropriate patch or upgrade to IRIX 6.5.18 when it
becomes available. See NOTES section in SGI's bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. RPCBIND is widely used and commonly targeted
ASSESSMENT: by attackers. There is potential for world-writable user
privilege escalation.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-004.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN:
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/
20020903-02-P
______________________________________________________________________________
[***** Start SGI Security Advisory 20020903-02-P *****]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
______________________________________________________________________________
SGI Security Advisory
Title: rpcbind/fsr_efs/mv/errhook/uux vulnerabilities update
Number: 20020903-02-P
Date: October 14, 2002
______________________________________________________________________________
- --------------
- --- Update ---
- --------------
The patches in the original advisory are incompatible with R4000-class
hardware. patch4820 and patch4819 are the correct patches.
- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------
It's been reported that there are several vulnerabilities in user-level
commands supplied with IRIX 6.5:
o rpcbind, when using the "-w" switch, follows symlinks and should not
o Some temporary files used by the desktop are world-writable
o uux, which has sgid permissions, has a buffer overrun vulnerability
o fsr_efs follows symlinks and should not
o the mv command creates the directory with world-writable permissions
when it is used to move a directory.
SGI has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for
neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be
implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.
These issues have been corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------
The rpcbind binary is part of the optional "eoe.sw.svr4net" package and is
not installed by default.
The fsr_efs and mv binaries are installed by default on IRIX 6.5
systems as part of "eoe.sw.base".
The IRIX Indigo Magic Desktop is installed by default as part of
"desktop_eoe.sw".
The uux binary is part of the optional "eoe.sw.uucp" package and is not
installed by default.
To determine the version of IRIX you are running, execute the following
command:
# uname -R
That will return a result similar to the following:
# 6.5 6.5.16f
The first number ("6.5") is the release name, the second ("6.5.16f" in this
case) is the extended release name. The extended release name is the
"version" we refer to throughout this document.
To see if the affected programs are installed, execute the following
commands:
# versions eoe.sw.svr4net
I = Installed, R = Removed
Name Date Description
I eoe 07/19/2002 IRIX Execution Environment, 6.5.17f
I eoe.sw 07/19/2002 IRIX Execution Environment Software
I eoe.sw.svr4net 07/19/2002 System V Release 4 Networking
# versions desktop_eoe.sw
I = Installed, R = Removed
Name Date Description
I desktop_eoe 07/15/2002 IRIX Interactive Desktop, 6.5.16f
I desktop_eoe.sw 07/15/2002 IRIX Interactive Desktop Software,
6.5.16f
I desktop_eoe.sw.Confidence 07/15/2002 Desktop Confidence Tests
I desktop_eoe.sw.Desks 07/15/2002 Desktop Desks
I desktop_eoe.sw.control_panels 07/15/2002 Desktop Customization Panels
I desktop_eoe.sw.envm 07/15/2002 Desktop Environment
I desktop_eoe.sw.share 07/15/2002 Desktop Shared Files
I desktop_eoe.sw.toolchest 07/15/2002 Desktop Toolchest
# versions eoe.sw.uucp
I = Installed, R = Removed
Name Date Description
I eoe 07/15/2002 IRIX Execution Environment, 6.5.16f
I eoe.sw 07/15/2002 IRIX Execution Environment Software
I eoe.sw.uucp 07/15/2002 UUCP Utilities
It is not necessary to check for eoe.sw.base. If it is not installed, you
wouldn't have the "versions" command to check it with. It's installed.
Trust us on this.
If the output of the commands shows results similar to the above, then the
programs are installed and the system may be vulnerable.
- ----------------------------
- --- Temporary Workaround ---
- ----------------------------
SGI understands that there are times when upgrading the operating system or
installing patches are inconvenient or not possible. In those instances, we
recommend the following workarounds:
o rpcbind... don't use the "-w" option. Make sure that switch is not
used in /etc/config/rpcbind.options.
o Desktop temporary files... there is no effective workaround for this
issue, other than making each user's home directory readable only by
the user.
o uux... there is no effective workaround for this issue. However, if
the only reason you have eoe.sw.uucp installed is for PPP support,
you can safely chmod -x uux.
o fsr_efs... there is no effective workaround for this issue, but if you
don't have a EFS fs mounted rw, you can safely chmod -x fsr_efs.
o mv command... there is no effective workaround for this issue.
- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------
SGI has provided a series of patches for these vulnerabilities. Our
recommendation is to upgrade to IRIX 6.5.18 when available, or install the
appropriate patch.
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 4.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 5.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.0.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.1 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.2 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.3 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.4 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.5 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.1 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.2 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.3 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.4 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.5 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.6 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.7 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.8 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.9 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.10 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.11 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.12 yes Notes 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.13m yes 4820 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.13 yes 4819 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.14m yes 4820 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.14 yes 4819 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.15m yes 4820 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.15 yes 4819 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.16m yes 4820 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.16 yes 4819 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.17m yes 4820 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.17 yes 4819 Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.18 no
NOTES
1) This version of the IRIX operating has been retired. Upgrade to an
actively supported IRIX operating system. See
http://support.sgi.com/irix/news/index.html#policy for more
information.
2) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.X CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your
SGI Support Provider or URL: http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/
3) Install the appropriate patch or upgrade to IRIX 6.5.18 when it
becomes available.
4) Upgrade to 6.5.18 when it becomes available
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.4820
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45926 9 README.patch.4820
Algorithm #2 (sum): 25814 9 README.patch.4820
MD5 checksum: C1C2CCC16FD518B94406859E6B64821E
Filename: patchSG0004820
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 42930 9 patchSG0004820
Algorithm #2 (sum): 47055 9 patchSG0004820
MD5 checksum: 960DC5CEC3FC97D0309D42499B8376F6
Filename: patchSG0004820.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 63025 8 patchSG0004820.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 7979 8 patchSG0004820.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: 219D23BAA4BD0465D28A17C9924CEC95
Filename: patchSG0004820.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 12731 648 patchSG0004820.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 50154 648 patchSG0004820.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 8D1B6973516E9AF78A0FE7FF994D0D43
Filename: patchSG0004820.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52679 3 patchSG0004820.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 28346 3 patchSG0004820.idb
MD5 checksum: 26515A115DC239DBA0099C175B800314
Filename: patchSG0004820.sysmon_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52086 98 patchSG0004820.sysmon_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 34733 98 patchSG0004820.sysmon_sw
MD5 checksum: 97A90EA04EA5484756972CB12FDE19A1
Filename: README.patch.4819
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54997 9 README.patch.4819
Algorithm #2 (sum): 25845 9 README.patch.4819
MD5 checksum: 8587716B403DA7DAA1A9D153E66D32D6
Filename: patchSG0004819
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15718 9 patchSG0004819
Algorithm #2 (sum): 53288 9 patchSG0004819
MD5 checksum: 4DB11F014180165CBEEF9B6E52BE1E91
Filename: patchSG0004819.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 63025 8 patchSG0004819.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 7979 8 patchSG0004819.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: 219D23BAA4BD0465D28A17C9924CEC95
Filename: patchSG0004819.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 13771 657 patchSG0004819.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 47686 657 patchSG0004819.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 17C3F93F51C4DB6B48D1017AE4B8C4F9
Filename: patchSG0004819.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22936 3 patchSG0004819.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 28308 3 patchSG0004819.idb
MD5 checksum: 374F61E971C6289F7DD74573F9E9A441
Filename: patchSG0004819.sysmon_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32453 98 patchSG0004819.sysmon_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 32378 98 patchSG0004819.sysmon_sw
MD5 checksum: 2DB5F20910A4C2EA1626263BD4D08D36
- ------------------
- --- References ---
- ------------------
SGI Security Advisories can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/
SGI Security Patches can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/patches/
SGI patches for IRIX can be found at the following patch servers:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/
SGI freeware updates for IRIX can be found at:
http://freeware.sgi.com/
SGI fixes for SGI open sourced code can be found on:
http://oss.sgi.com/projects/
SGI patches and RPMs for Linux can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/linux/ or
http://oss.sgi.com/projects/sgilinux-combined/download/security-fixes/
SGI patches for Windows NT or 2000 can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/nt/
IRIX 5.2-6.4 Recommended/Required Patch Sets can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/patchset/
IRIX 6.5 Maintenance Release Streams can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html
IRIX 6.5 Software Update CDs can be obtained from:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is
patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are
located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/
For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirrors
patches.sgi.com security FTP repository) lags behind and does not do a
real-time update.
- ------------------------
- --- Acknowledgments ----
- ------------------------
SGI wishes to thank FIRST, Walter Roberson, NASA JPL, University of Alaska
and the users of the Internet Community at large for their assistance in
this matter.
- -----------------------------------------
- --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
------oOo------
SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI
community. This information is freely available to any person needing the
information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is
patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are
located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/
The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and
encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all
SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing
list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to
SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you wish
the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate
line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is
used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the
mail message.
------oOo------
SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is
located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ .
------oOo------
If there are general security questions on SGI systems, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support
contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties
and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any
way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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[***** End SGI Security Advisory 20020903-02-P *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics, Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24)
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@ciac.org
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
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employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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