__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SGI IRIX lpd Daemon Vulnerabilities via sendmail and dns
[SGI Security Advisory 20021104-01-P]
November 15, 2002 19:00 GMT Number N-015
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A flaw exists in the authentication method of the lpd daemon
that could permit remote access to the server by sending
options to sendmail.
AFFECTED ldp Daemon
SOFTWARE:
DAMAGE: Remote attackers could resolve their IP address to the
printer's hostname and then escalate privileges and possibly
gain root access.
SOLUTION: SGI recommends upgrading to IRIX 6.5.19, or install appropriate
patches.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. The lpd/dns vulnerability could be
ASSESSMENT: exploited by a remote user and can be used to work around lpd's
security mechanisms. However, a local account on the system
would be required to be successful.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-015.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN: ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/
20021104-01-P
ADDITIONAL http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/30308
INFORMATION: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/39001
______________________________________________________________________________
[***** Start SGI Security Advisory 20021104-01-P *****]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
______________________________________________________________________________
SGI Security Advisory
Title : IRIX lpd daemon vulnerabilities via sendmail and dns
Number : 20021104-01-P
Date : November 12, 2002
Reference: CERT VU#30308
Reference: CERT VU#39001
Reference: SGI BUGS 864917 and 865485
Fixed in : IRIX 6.5.19
Fixed in : SGI PATCH 4835
______________________________________________________________________________
- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------
It's been reported that the IRIX lpd daemon has vulnerabilities related to
dns and sendmail.
See: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/30308
and: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/39001
...for additional details on these vulnerabilities.
No CVE candidates were assigned by CERT for these issues.
The lpd / dns vulnerability can be exploited by a remote user and can be
used to work around lpd's security mechanisms, but the lpd / sendmail
vulnerability requires a local account on the system and can be used to gain
root access.
SGI has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for
neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be
implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.
These issues have been corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------
The /usr/etc/lpd binary is not installed by default on IRIX 6.5 systems. It
is part of the optional print.sw.bsdlpr printing package.
To determine the version of IRIX you are running, execute the following
command:
# /bin/uname -R
That will return a result similar to the following:
# 6.5 6.5.16f
The first number ("6.5") is the release name, the second ("6.5.16f" in this
case) is the extended release name. The extended release name is the
"version" we refer to throughout this document.
To see if lpd is installed, execute the following command:
$ versions print.sw.bsdlpr
I = Installed, R = Removed
Name Date Description
I print 07/15/2002 Printing Tools, Release 1.15.5f
I print.sw 07/15/2002 Printing Tools Software 1.15.5f
I print.sw.bsdlpr 07/15/2002 Berkeley 'lpr' Printer Spooler
If the output is similar to that shown above, then lpd is installed and the
system may be vulnerable.
- ----------------------------
- --- Temporary Workaround ---
- ----------------------------
SGI understands that there are times when upgrading the operating system or
installing patches are inconvenient or not possible. In those instances, we
recommend the following workaround.
Uninstall the bsd printing system and use the System V (lp) system
instead. The IRIX lp system understands and accepts bsd printing commands.
$ su -
# versions remove print.sw.bsdlpr
You will then need to configure your printers under the System V lp system.
It is not necessary to reboot the system after using this workaround.
- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------
SGI has provided a series of patches for these vulnerabilities. Our
recommendation is to upgrade to IRIX 6.5.19 when available, or install the
appropriate patch.
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 4.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 5.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.0.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.1 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.2 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.3 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.4 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.5 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.1 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.2 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.3 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.4 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.5 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.6 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.7 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.8 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.9 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.10 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.11 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.12 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.13 yes Notes 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.14m yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.14f yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.15m yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.15f yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.16m yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.16f yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.17m yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.17f yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.18m yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.18f yes 4835
IRIX 6.5.19 no
NOTES
1) This version of the IRIX operating has been retired. Upgrade to an
actively supported IRIX operating system. See
http://support.sgi.com/irix/news/index.html#policy for more
information.
2) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.X CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your
SGI Support Provider or URL: http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/
IRIX Maintenance releases can be downloaded from:
http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html
3) Upgrade to IRIX 6.5.19 when it is released.
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.4835
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05603 8 README.patch.4835
Algorithm #2 (sum): 28528 8 README.patch.4835
MD5 checksum: 7A7B340C28EE2818D77296F1D3305F67
Filename: patchSG0004835
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32912 3 patchSG0004835
Algorithm #2 (sum): 19629 3 patchSG0004835
MD5 checksum: BC092B72061F4724E2EB176B61E3DD69
Filename: patchSG0004835.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 65140 3 patchSG0004835.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 31061 3 patchSG0004835.idb
MD5 checksum: 8C51E0B1EB1A6827FCC211C15DABB456
Filename: patchSG0004835.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45169 263 patchSG0004835.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 38519 263 patchSG0004835.print_sw
MD5 checksum: CB4ADD4EFA7905446C2FE4FCAC237AFE
- ------------------------
- --- Acknowledgments ----
- ------------------------
SGI wishes to thank the USAF, CERT, FIRST and the users of the Internet
Community at large for their assistance in this matter.
- -------------
- --- Links ---
- -------------
SGI Security Advisories can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/
SGI Security Patches can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/patches/
SGI patches for IRIX can be found at the following patch servers:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/
SGI freeware updates for IRIX can be found at:
http://freeware.sgi.com/
SGI fixes for SGI open sourced code can be found on:
http://oss.sgi.com/projects/
SGI patches and RPMs for Linux can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/linux/ or
http://oss.sgi.com/projects/sgilinux-combined/download/security-fixes/
SGI patches for Windows NT or 2000 can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/nt/
IRIX 5.2-6.4 Recommended/Required Patch Sets can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/patchset/
IRIX 6.5 Maintenance Release Streams can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html
IRIX 6.5 Software Update CDs can be obtained from:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is
patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are
located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/
For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirrors
patches.sgi.com security FTP repository) lags behind and does not do a
real-time update.
- -----------------------------------------
- --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
------oOo------
SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI
community. This information is freely available to any person needing the
information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is
patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are
located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/
The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and
encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all
SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing
list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to
SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress such as aaanalyst@sgi.com >
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you wish
the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate
line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is
used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the
mail message.
------oOo------
SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is
located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ .
------oOo------
If there are general security questions on SGI systems, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support
contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties
and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any
way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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[***** End SGI Security Advisory 20021104-01-P *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. and CERT Coordination Center for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
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