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Vulnerability Inoculan Affected Inoculan Client Description Glenn Corbett found following. A problem has been discovered with the InocuLAN client on Windows NT workstations. If an account lockout policy is present on a Windows NT domain, large numbers of repeating account lockouts can occur. Incorrect password events (event id 529) are being logged from workstations when running applications from UNC paths. The username that has logged the incorrect password is different to that of the logged on user. This was tested on Windows NT WKS SP3 and SP4, with InocuLAN V4.0(373) or InocuLAN V4.0(375). To reproduce the problem: 1. Install InocuLAN V4.0(373) or V4.0(375) onto an NT workstation with SP3 or SP4 (SP5 not tested yet) 2. Configure InocuLAN as described below: Options: Direction - Incoming and Outgoing files Action upon Virus detection - Cure File Cure Action for Macro Viruses - Remove Infected Macros Copy File before Cure Rename File when Cure Fails Rename Extension - AVB Move Directory - C:\Inoculan\VIRUS Protected Areas: Protect Floppy Drives Protect Network Drives Protect CD-ROM Drives Scan Type - Secure Scan 3. Reboot the workstation 4. Log into WorkstationA as Domain UserA, Logout Domain UserA 5. From another workstation change the password of Domain UserA 6. Log into WorkstationA as Domain UserB. 7. From WorkstationA run an application from a remote share on WorkstationX where Logon and Logoff, Success/Failure, are being audited. Run an application from the cmd window using a UNC path with no other connections to the WorkstationX. Eg \\WorkstationX\shareX\notepad 8. The application will take several seconds to run and there will be a failure security event (529) for UserA from Workstation A. From server manager remotely stop the Cheyenne InocuLAN Anti-Virus Server on Workstation A and repeat step 7. You will see that the application will start immediately and no errors will be recorded in the security event log. The above problem also causes problems when running logon scripts. If an application is called from the logon script and that application does not exit on the local workstation, the version in the logon share will be run. As soon as the application in the logon script is called there is an event 529 error recorded on the logon server security event log. Even if subsequent different users log into Workstation A, these problem will continue until the workstation is rebooted. This behaviour can also been seen if in Step 4, a local userA logs on. The subsequent error 529's have the local userA account in the security event. It appears as though InocuLAN is storing the user credentials for the first logged on user and using them to scan network drives for virus' even when a different user subsequently logs on until workstation reboot. It is not yet apparent if this username / password is being stored in the registry / temporary file or memory, and therefore open to exploit. Solution That assertion is inaccurate, the username/password credential combination is NOT stored on the client side by Inoculan, (which is why the efforts to locate these credentials in shared memory, in a file or in the registry have been unsuccessful). Clearly, in order for the InocuLAN real-time scanner to access files on a remote server, the software must have valid security contexts in place to permit the requisite access to the file systems and files. The techniques utilized by Inoculan (using low level, but fully documented and supported standard vendor API's) do NOT require that traditional user credentials (user account/ password) be presented in order to gain the necessary access. Rather, Inoculan is able to gain the required access in a completely secure manner without prompting for username and password information. In addition, it is important to point out that NO attempt to retrieve credential data is done without the user's explicit advance knowledge and consent. Computation/generation of the requisite credential information is done at Inoculan driver initialization time, and can be easily refreshed by simply rebooting the machine (which of course will in turn result in Inoculan initialization routines being invoked as part of system restart). The particular behaviour observed and reported can be attributed to the fact that AFTER Inoculan initialization was completed, the user access credentials for the user in question were modified, rendering the originally computed credential that Inoculan would otherwise utilize, invalid. An enhancement is being developed presently to provide a configuration setting that will instruct the Inoculan real-time scanner to recompute credentials automatically thus eliminating the need to reboot the client machine. The enhancement can be downloaded from our Computer Associates support web sites at http://support.cai.com/Download/patches/inocnt.html and the file is called LO49393.CAZ.