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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= CERT(sm) Advisory CA-95:12 Original issue date: October 18, 1995 Last revised: August 30, 1996 References to README files were removed. A complete revision history is at the end of this file. Topic: Sun 4.1.X Loadmodule Vulnerability - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of problems with the loadmodule(8) program. An exploitation script is available and has been used by local users to gain root privileges. The problem is present in SunOS 4.1.X only, and there is a patch available for sun4 architectures. The CERT staff recommends that you install the appropriate patch as soon as possible and take the steps in Section III.B. to further protect your system. We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description The loadmodule(8) program is used by the xnews(1) window system server to load two dynamically loadable kernel drivers into the currently running system and to create special devices in the /dev directory to use those modules. These modules and special files are used to provide a SunView binary compatibility mode while running the X11/NeWS windowing system. Because of the way the loadmodule(8) program sanitizes its environment, unauthorized users can gain root access on the local machine. A script is publicly available and has been used to exploit this vulnerability. This problem is present in SunOS 4.1.X only. II. Impact Local users can gain root privileges. III. Solution The CERT staff recommends that you take the steps described in both A and B below. A. Obtain and install the appropriate patches according to the instructions included with the patches. Patches are available through your local Sun Answer Center and by FTP from ftp://sunsolve1.sun.com/pub/patches/100448-03.tar.Z Module Patch ID Filename ---------- --------- --------------- loadmodule 100448-03 100448-03.tar.Z Checksum: MD5 (100448-03.tar.Z) = 183a22f0a2f6020f1389b6aeea5ca6c6 B. Because, in general, a set-user-id program can lead to security exposures, you should also do at least step 1 below. We recommend doing steps 2 and 3 as well. The intent of these directions is make the loadmodule(8) program work only for the super-user (currently it works for all users because it is set-user-id) and to execute it each time the system boots. By following these directions, users who require SunView binary compatibility will have it available to them. 1. If you do not need SunView binary compatibility, then as root, turn off setuid root on the loadmodule(8) program with # /bin/chmod u-s /usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule 2. If your users need SunView binary compatibility, you can enable it immediately--that is without having to reboot your system--with the following script. ------------------------cut here--8<------------------------ ARCH=`/bin/arch -k` OBJ=/sys/${ARCH}/OBJ LM=/usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule /bin/chmod u-s $LM if [ -f $OBJ/evqmod-${ARCH}.o ]; then if /usr/etc/modstat | /bin/egrep -s evqmod ; then echo evq: already loaded elif $LM evqmod-${ARCH}.o evqload; then echo evq: loaded else echo evq: unable to load module fi fi if [ -f $OBJ/winlock-${ARCH}.o ]; then if /usr/etc/modstat | /bin/egrep -s winlock ; then echo winlock: already loaded elif $LM winlock-${ARCH}.o winlockload; then echo winlock: loaded else echo winlock: unable to load module fi fi ------------------------cut here--8<------------------------ As a suggestion, store this script in /tmp/esbc and then execute it as root with: # sh /tmp/esbc 3. If you've done step 2 above, the module loadings will disappear the next time you reboot your system. To make them permanent-- that is to make these module loadings occur each time your system is rebooted--add the script to the end of your /etc/rc.local file. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Wolfgang Ley and Sun Microsystems for their support in the development of this advisory. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the email be encrypted. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org), or PEM (contact CERT staff for details). Internet email: cert@cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request@cert.org. Past CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. Copyright 1995, 1996 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for non-commercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Revision history Aug. 30, 1996 References to README files were removed because updates are added to the advisories themselves. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMiS6Y3VP+x0t4w7BAQG08AQAxkv/NSVeGn/jkvGs7gZNTPFE6bdpqXhM NN9dsYqRVnhRk7tsxnzSAx842zdJDlDTE5cRn/qYLR/rcVfr07vKqVNCq62CgvFH ViqKbuam0EBPBxu4moWXfFuZcbVhWwNlaQg5Y4mxx2OYPpj5Pvq66yp3lyaP1scU 6oco/Kivg98= =VwuA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----