TUCoPS :: SunOS/Solaris :: ciacg002.txt

SunOS 4 1 X Loadmodule

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             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

   		     SunOS 4.1.X Loadmodule Vulnerability

November 3, 1995 01:00 GMT                                          Number G-02
_______________________________________________________________________________


PROBLEM:        A bug exists in the loadmodule(8) program which, when exploited,
                can allow a user to gain root access.
PLATFORM:	SunOS 4.1.x
DAMAGE:         This problem makes it possible for a local user to obtain root
                access.
SOLUTION:       Apply either the fix or the patch described below.
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VULNERABILITY   An exploitation script has been found to be publicly available.
ASSESSMENT:     
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Introduction

    The loadmodule(8) program is used by the xnews(1) window system to
    dynamically load kernel driver modules. Two of these module provide a SunView
    binary compatibility mode. However, these modules introduce a vulnerability
    which makes it possible for a normal user to gain unauthorized access.

Solutions

     A. Obtain and install the appropriate patches according to the
        instructions included with the patches. Patches are available through
        your local Sun Answer Center and by FTP from

             ftp://sunsolve1.sun.com/pub/patches/100448-03.tar.Z 

        Module           Patch ID        Filename
        ----------       ---------       ---------------
        loadmodule       100448-03       100448-03.tar.Z

        Checksum:
            MD5 (100448-03.tar.Z) = 183a22f0a2f6020f1389b6aeea5ca6c6

     B. Because, in general, a set-user-id program can lead to security
        exposures, you should also do at least step 1 below. We recommend
        doing steps 2 and 3 as well.

        The intent of these directions is make the loadmodule(8) program
        work only for the super-user (currently it works for all users because
        it is set-user-id) and to execute it each time the system boots. By
        following these directions, users who require SunView binary
        compatibility will have it available to them.  

        1. If you do not need SunView binary compatibility, then as root,
           turn off setuid root on the loadmodule(8) program with

                # /bin/chmod u-s /usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule

        2. If your users need SunView binary compatibility, you can
           enable it immediately--that is without having to reboot
           your system--with the following script.

        ------------------------cut here--8<------------------------
        ARCH=`/bin/arch -k`
        OBJ=/sys/${ARCH}/OBJ
        LM=/usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule
        /bin/chmod u-s $LM
        if [ -f $OBJ/evqmod-${ARCH}.o ]; then
          if /usr/etc/modstat | /bin/egrep -s evqmod ; then
            echo evq: already loaded
          elif $LM evqmod-${ARCH}.o evqload; then
            echo evq: loaded
          else
            echo evq: unable to load module
          fi
        fi
        if [ -f $OBJ/winlock-${ARCH}.o ]; then
          if /usr/etc/modstat | /bin/egrep -s winlock ; then
            echo winlock: already loaded
          elif $LM winlock-${ARCH}.o winlockload; then
            echo winlock: loaded
          else
            echo winlock: unable to load module
          fi
        fi
        ------------------------cut here--8<------------------------

        As a suggestion, store this script in /tmp/esbc and then
        execute it as root with:

                # sh /tmp/esbc

     3. If you've done step 2 above, the module loadings will disappear
        the next time you reboot your system. To make them permanent--
        that is to make these module loadings occur each time your system
        is rebooted--add the script to the end of your /etc/rc.local file.
        


_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the CERT Coordination
Center for information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________


CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of
Energy. CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
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