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__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Solaris 2.x CDE sdtcm_convert Vulnerability
February 24, 1997 19:00 GMT Number H-36
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A vulnerability exists in the sdtcm_convert utility.
PLATFORM: All platforms with Solaris 2.x Common Desktop Environment (CDE)
DAMAGE: This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root
privileges.
SOLUTION: Until patches are available, take the steps outlined in Section
3 as soon as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made
ASSESSMENT: publicly available.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start AUSCERT Advisory ]
===========================================================================
AA-97.08 AUSCERT Advisory
Solaris 2.x CDE sdtcm_convert vulnerability
24 February 1997
Last Revised: --
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in the
Solaris 2.x Common Desktop Environment (CDE) sdtcm_convert utility.
This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly
available.
AUSCERT recommends that sites take the steps outlined in section 3 as soon
as possible.
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Description
sdtcm_convert(1) is a calendar data conversion utility which converts
between version 3 and version 4 calendar data formats.
During the execution of sdtcm_convert, files are modified with root
privileges in an insecure manner. By manipulating the files that
sdtcm_convert is accessing, local users may change the ownership of
arbitrary files on the system. This may be leveraged to gain
root privileges.
sdtcm_convert is part of the Solaris 2.x Common Desktop Environment
(CDE) Applications package, SUNWdtdst. Sites can determine whether
the SUNWdtdst package is installed with the command:
% pkginfo -l SUNWdtdst
The long listing (-l) from pkginfo will also give the version of the
CDE package installed.
The default location for sdtcm_convert is /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert.
2. Impact
Local users may be able to change the ownership of arbitrary files
on the system. This may be leveraged to gain root privileges.
3. Workarounds/Solution
Official vendor patches have been released by Sun Microsystems which
address this vulnerability (Section 3.1).
Until the patches recommended by Sun Microsystems can be applied,
AUSCERT recommends that sites limit the possible exploitation of this
vulnerability by immediately removing the setuid permissions as stated
in Section 3.2.
3.1 Install vendor patches
Sun Microsystems has released security patches which address the
vulnerability described in this advisory. AUSCERT recommends that
sites apply these patches as soon as possible.
Patches have been released for:
CDE version Patch MD5
~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1.0.1 sparc 103671-02.tar.Z abb42a75b89c16e085d0f8811eeede10
1.0.2 sparc 103670-02.tar.Z e9f8f34deaaf215ff5f5b632bf0d45ea
1.0.1 x86 103718-02.tar.Z cebb82a95592392359f5206fe2a63ed1
1.0.2 x86 103717-02.tar.Z 18fe28c03abdf118b647fd347261089e
Sites with SunService Contracts may obtain these patches through
their local SunSolve Online server.
For sites without a SunService Contract, the above security patches
may be retrieved from:
ftp://sunsolve1.sun.com.au/pub/outgoing/
Note that this site is currently the only public area where these patches
are available.
3.2 Remove setuid permissions
To prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability described in this
advisory, AUSCERT recommends that the setuid permissions be removed
from sdtcm_convert immediately. As the sdtcm_convert program will no
longer work for non-root users, it is recommended that the execute
permissions also be removed.
For example:
# ls -l /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert
-r-sr-sr-x 1 root daemon 285700 Feb 24 12:20 /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert
# chmod 500 /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert
-r-x------ 1 root daemon 285700 Feb 24 12:20 /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert
4. Additional measures
Most Unix systems ship numerous programs which have setuid or setgid
privileges. Often the functionality supplied by these privileged
programs is not required by many sites. The large number of privileged
programs that are shipped by default are to cater for all possible
uses of the system.
AUSCERT encourages sites to examine all the setuid/setgid programs
and determine the necessity of each program. If a program does not
absolutely require the setuid/setgid privileges to operate (for
example, it is only run by the root user), the setuid/setgid
privileges should be removed. Furthermore, if a program is not
required at your site, then all execute permissions should be removed.
A sample command to find all setuid/setgid programs is (run as root):
# find / \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -type f -exec ls -l {} \;
It is AUSCERT's experience that many vulnerabilities are being
discovered in setuid/setgid programs which are not necessary for the
correct operation of most systems. Sites can increase their security
by removing unnecessary setuid/setgid programs.
For example, the functionality provided by the sdtcm_convert program
is not needed by many sites. If sites had previously disabled
sdtcm_convert, they would not have been vulnerable to this latest
exploit.
[ End AUSCERT Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of AUSCERT, Marko Laakso
(University of Oulu), CERT/CC, DFN-CER and Sun Microsystems for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 510-422-8193
FAX: +1 510-423-8002
STU-III: +1 510-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/
Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53)
Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)
CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles;
3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.
Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called ListProcessor, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
CIAC-BULLETIN, CIAC-NOTES, SPI-ANNOUNCE or SPI-NOTES for list-name and
valid information for LastName FirstName and PhoneNumber when sending
E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name LastName, FirstName PhoneNumber
e.g., subscribe ciac-notes OHara, Scarlett W. 404-555-1212 x36
You will receive an acknowledgment containing address, initial PIN,
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subscription, or get help.
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
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