TUCoPS :: SunOS/Solaris :: ciach109.txt

Solaris Dce Afs Login Vulnerability

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             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

               Solaris DCE and AFS Integrated login Vulnerability

September 30, 1997 17:00 GMT                                      Number H-109
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       A vulnerability exists on systems running Transarc's Solaris
               DCE integrated login program (login.dce in place of /bin/login)
               which have AFS installed but no AFS klog binary in any of the
               standard locations.
PLATFORM:      Solaris 2.4 and Solaris 2.5 running Transarc DCE 1.1 in
               conjunction with any version of AFS.
DAMAGE:        Users without accounts on the system may gain unauthorized
               access to local resources.
SOLUTION:      Apply patches or workaround listed below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  Transarc urges you to act on this information as soon as
ASSESSMENT:    possible.
______________________________________________________________________________

[  Start CERT Advisory  ]

=============================================================================
CERT* Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-97.08
September 25, 1997

Topic:  Solaris DCE Integrated login bug if AFS klog not installed
Source: Transarc Corp.

To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT
Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from Transarc
Corporation. Transarc urges you to act on this information as soon as
possible. Transarc contact information is included in the forwarded text
below; please contact them if you have any questions or need further
information.


=======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================

Problem: Vulnerability in Transarc DCE Integrated login for sites running
         both AFS and DCE.

I. Description

On systems running Transarc's Solaris DCE integrated login program
(login.dce in place of /bin/login) which have AFS installed but no
AFS klog binary in any of the standard locations, unauthorized users
may gain access to local system resources as any valid user by supplying
a valid username for login, with any arbitrary string as a password.

The vulnerability stems from an incorrect interpretation of the
situation which occurs when an AFS klog binary is not found by
login.dce.

If there is a klog binary in ANY of the following standard locations,
the vulnerability will NOT occur:

        /opt/dcelocal/bin/klog
        /usr/afsws/bin/klog
        /usr/vice/etc/klog

Vulnerable products include Transarc DCE 1.1 for Solaris 2.4 and
Solaris 2.5 in conjunction with any version of AFS.  Systems not
running AFS are not vulnerable to this issue.


II. Impact

Users without accounts on the system may gain unauthorized access to
local resources.  Access to resources controlled by AFS/DCE/DFS is
unaffected, as no network credentials are granted unless a valid
password is supplied.


III. Solution

The following patches are available from Transarc:
        DCE 1.1 for Solaris 2.4:        patch 40 and higher
        DCE 1.1 for Solaris 2.5:        patch 25 and higher

A workaround is possible as well: simply install any program which
produces output on stdout in one of the standard klog locations.
(A "hello, world" program or shell script is sufficient; as long as
it puts something on stdout, it's good enough.  Optimally, install
the actual AFS klog program in one of the above locations.)

Contact Transarc customer support by telephone at 412-281-5852 or
via email (dce-help@transarc.com) for additional information or
questions.


IV.  Other Platform Impact

This vulnerability affects only Transarc products on the Solaris platform.


========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE=============================

[  End CERT Advisory  ]

______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT & Transarc Corp. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________


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