__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstic AdminSuite Daemon sadmind
December 30, 1999 20:00 GMT Number K-013
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A buffer overflow vulnerability has been identified in the
AdminSuite Daemon sadmind.
PLATFORM: SunOS 5.7, 5.7_x86, 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5,
5.5_x86, and 5.4, 5.4_x86, and 5.3 with AdminSuite installed.
DAMAGE: A buffer overflow could allow an intruder access to root.
SOLUTION: Disable sadmind or apply newly released patches. See Sun's
Advisory below for patch information.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Risk is high. This vulnerability has been discussed on public
ASSESSMENT: security forums and is being actively exploited.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ The CERT Advisory is followed by the update on December 29, 1999 from
Sun Microsystems ]
[ Start CERT's Advisory ]
CERT Advisory CA-99-16 Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstice AdminSuite Daemon
sadmind
Original release date: December 14, 1999
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
* Systems that have sadmind installed
I. Description
The sadmind program is installed by default in Solaris 2.5, 2.6, and
7. In Solaris 2.3 and 2.4, sadmind may be installed if the Sun
Solstice Adminsuite packages are installed. The sadmind program is
installed in /usr/sbin. It can be used to coordinate distributed
system administration operations remotely. The sadmind daemon is
started automatically by the inetd daemon whenever a request to
perform a system administration operation is received.
All versions of sadmind are vulnerable to a buffer overflow that can
overwrite the stack pointer within a running sadmind process. Since
sadmind is installed as root, it is possible to execute arbitrary
code with root privileges on a remote machine.
This vulnerability has been discussed in public security forums and is
actively being exploited by intruders.
II. Impact
A remote user may be able to execute arbitrary code with root
privileges on systems running vulnerable versions of sadmind.
III. Solution
Disable sadmind
Remove (or comment) the following line in /etc/inetd.conf:
100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind
Even though it will not defend against the attack discussed in this
advisory, it is a good practice to set the security option used to
authenticate requests to a STRONG level, for example:
100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind -S 2
If you must use sadmind to perform system administration tasks, we
urge you to use this setting.
Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
We will update the appendix as we receive or develop more information.
If you do not see your vendor's name in Appendix A, the CERT/CC did
not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly.
Appendix A. Vendor Information
Sun Microsystems
Sun Microsystems is currently working on patches to address the issue
discussed in this advisory and recommends disabling sadmind.
_________________________________________________________________
The CERT Coordination Center thanks Sun Microsystems for its help in
providing information for this advisory.
______________________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-16-sadmind.html
______________________________________________________________________
[ Start Sun's Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin
Bulletin Number: #00191
Date: December 29, 1999
Cross-Ref: CERT CA-99-16
Title: sadmind
______________________________________________________________________________
The information contained in this Security Bulletin is provided "AS IS."
Sun makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information
contained in this Security Bulletin. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS,
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE
HEREBY DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW.
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PROFIT OR DATA, OR FOR DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL
OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY
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If any of the above provisions are held to be in violation of applicable law,
void, or unenforceable in any jurisdiction, then such provisions are waived
to the extent necessary for this disclaimer to be otherwise enforceable in
such jurisdiction.
______________________________________________________________________________
1. Bulletins Topics
Sun announces the release of patches for Solaris(tm) 7, 2.6, 2.5.1,
2.5, 2.4, and 2.3 (SunOS(tm) 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, 5.4 and 5.3), which
relate to a vulnerability with sadmind.
Sun recommends that you install the patches listed in section 4
immediately on systems running SunOS 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1, and 5.5 and
on systems with Solstice AdminSuite (AdminSuite) installed. If you have
installed a version of AdminSuite prior to version 2.3, please upgrade
to AdminSuite 2.3 before installing the AdminSuite patches listed in
section 4.
Sun also recommends that you:
- disable sadmind if you do not use it by commenting the
following line in /etc/inetd.conf:
100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind
- set the security level used to authenticate requests to STRONG
as follows, if you use sadmind:
100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind -S 2
The above changes to /etc/inetd.conf will take effect after inetd
receives a hang-up signal.
2. Who is Affected
Vulnerable: SunOS 5.7, 5.7_x86, 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86,
5.5, 5.5_x86, and
5.4, 5.4_x86, and 5.3 with AdminSuite installed
Not vulnerable: All other supported versions of SunOS.
3. Understanding the Vulnerability
The sadmind program is installed by default on SunOS 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1,
and 5.5. In SunOS 5.4 and 5.3, sadmind may be installed if the
Solstice AdminSuite packages are installed. The sadmind program
is installed in /usr/sbin. The program can be used to perform
distributed system administration operations remotely. A buffer overflow
vulnerability has been discovered in sadmind which may be exploited by
a remote attacker to execute arbitrary instructions and gain root access.
4. List of Patches
The following patches are available in relation to the above problem.
OS Version Patch ID
__________ _________
SunOS 5.7 108662-01
SunOS 5.7_x86 108663-01
SunOS 5.6 108660-01
SunOS 5.6_x86 108661-01
SunOS 5.5.1 108658-01
SunOS 5.5.1_x86 108659-01
SunOS 5.5 108656-01
SunOS 5.5_x86 108657-01
AdminSuite Version Patch ID
__________________ ________
2.3 104468-18 (see Note)
2.3_x86 104469-18 (see Note)
Note: Install patch if AdminSuite is installed. AdminSuite may be
installed on SunOS 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, 5.4 or 5.3.
______________________________________________________________________________
Sun acknowledges, with thanks, Stanford University and the CERT Coordination
Center for their assistance in this matter.
______________________________________________________________________________
APPENDICES
A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-
license&nav=pub-patches
B. Checksums for the patches listed in this bulletin are available at:
ftp://sunsolve.sun.com/pub/patches/CHECKSUMS
C. Sun security bulletins are available at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/secBulletin.pl
D. Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key is available at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pgpkey.txt
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______________________________________________________________________________
Copyright 1999 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. Sun,
Sun Microsystems, Solaris and SunOS are trademarks or registered trademarks
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[ End Advisories ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT and Sun Microsystems for
the information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
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