__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Center
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Sun BIND Vulnerabilities
[Sun Bulletin #00204]
July 31, 2001 13:00 GMT Number L-127
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Four vulnerabilities existed in Sun's version of the Berkeley
Internet Name Domain (BIND): Two buffer overflows, an input
validation error, and disclosure of environment variables.
PLATFORM: Those running Solaris(tm) 8, 7, 2.6, 2.5.1, 2.5, and 2.4
(SunOS(tm) 5.8, 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, and 5.4).
DAMAGE: The buffer overflows and input validation error could allow a
malicious attacker to execute code with superuser privileges.
The disclosure of environment variables occurs because the
remote attacker has access to the program stack.
SOLUTION: Apply the patches as indicated in the bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. Superuser privileges could be exploited by a
ASSESSMENT: remote attacker.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/l-127.shtml
______________________________________________________________________________
[***** Start Sun Bulletin #00204 *****]
______________________________________________________________________________
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin
Bulletin Number: #00204
Date: June 26, 2001
Cross-Ref: CERT Advisory CA-2001-02
Title: BIND
______________________________________________________________________________
The information contained in this Security Bulletin is provided "AS IS."
Sun makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information
contained in this Security Bulletin. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS,
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE
HEREBY DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW.
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ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN
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If any of the above provisions are held to be in violation of applicable law,
void, or unenforceable in any jurisdiction, then such provisions are waived
to the extent necessary for this disclaimer to be otherwise enforceable in
such jurisdiction.
______________________________________________________________________________
1. Bulletins Topics
Sun announces the release of patches for Solaris(tm) 8, 7, 2.6,
2.5.1, 2.5, and 2.4 (SunOS(tm) 5.8, 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, and
5.4) which relate to several vulnerabilities reported in CERT
CA-2001-02.
Sun recommends that you install the patches listed in section 4
immediately on systems running SunOS 5.8, 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5,
and 5.4 with Sun's implementation of BIND.
2. Who is Affected
Vulnerable: Systems running Sun's implementation of BIND
(in.named) on SunOS 5.8, 5.8_x86, 5.7,
5.7_x86, 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86,
5.5, 5.5_x86, 5.4, and 5.4_x86
3. Understanding the Vulnerability
The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) is an implementation of the
Domain Name System (DNS) protocols.
CERT Advisory CA-2001-02 describes four vulnerabilities in certain
versions of BIND. The four vulnerabilities are listed below along with
the affected versions of Solaris and the version of BIND shipped with
each version of Solaris.
VU#196945 - ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow in transaction
signature (TSIG) handling code
Solaris 8 04/01* (BIND 8.2.2-p5)
Solaris 8 Maintenance Update 4* (BIND 8.2.2-p5)
VU#572183 - ISC BIND 4 contains buffer overflow in nslookupComplain()
Solaris 2.6 (BIND 4.9.4-P1)
Solaris 2.5.1** (BIND 4.9.3)
VU#868916 - ISC BIND 4 contains input validation error in
nslookupComplain()
Solaris 2.6 (BIND 4.9.4-P1)
Solaris 2.5.1** (BIND 4.9.3)
VU#325431 - Queries to ISC BIND servers may disclose environment variables
Solaris 2.4, 2.5 (BIND 4.8.3)
Solaris 2.5.1** (BIND 4.9.3 and BIND 4.8.3)
Solaris 2.6 (BIND 4.9.4-P1)
Solaris 7 and 8 (BIND 8.1.2)
* To determine if one is running Solaris 8 04/01 or Solaris 8 Maintenance
Update 4, check the contents of the /etc/release file.
** Solaris 2.5.1 ships with BIND 4.8.3 but patch 103663-01 for SPARC and
103664-01 for x86 upgrades BIND to 4.9.3, current revision for each
patch is -17.
CERT Advisory CA-2001-02 is available at:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html
4. List of Patches
The following patches are available in relation to the above problems.
OS Version Patch ID
__________ _________
SunOS 5.8 109326-04
SunOS 5.8_x86 109327-04
SunOS 5.7 107018-03
SunOS 5.7_x86 107019-03
SunOS 5.6 105755-10
SunOS 5.6_x86 105756-10
SunOS 5.5.1 103663-16
SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103664-16
SunOS 5.5 103667-12
SunOS 5.5_x86 103668-12
SunOS 5.4 102479-14
SunOS 5.4_x86 102480-12
_____________________________________________________________________________
APPENDICES
A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/securitypatch
B. Checksums for the patches listed in this bulletin are available at:
ftp://sunsolve.sun.com/pub/patches/CHECKSUMS
C. Sun security bulletins are available at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/security
D. Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key is available at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pgpkey.txt
E. To report or inquire about a security problem with Sun software, contact
one or more of the following:
- Your local Sun answer centers
- Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT
- Sun Security Coordination Team. Send email to:
security-alert@sun.com
F. To receive information or subscribe to our CWS (Customer Warning System)
mailing list, send email to:
security-alert@sun.com
with a subject line (not body) containing one of the following commands:
Command Information Returned/Action Taken
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Note that your-email-address should be substituted
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______________________________________________________________________________
Copyright 2000 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. Sun,
Sun Microsystems, Solaris and SunOS are trademarks or registered trademarks
of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other countries. This
Security Bulletin may be reproduced and distributed, provided that this
Security Bulletin is not modified in any way and is attributed to
Sun Microsystems, Inc. and provided that such reproduction and distribution
is performed for non-commercial purposes.
[***** End Sun Bulletin #00204 *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems, Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
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global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
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PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
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Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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