__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Center
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
Sun Heap Overflow in Cachefs Daemon (cachefsd)
[CERT Advisory CA-2002-11]
May 7, 2002 17:00 GMT Number M-078
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A remotely exploitable heap overflow exists in the cachefsd
program.
PLATFORM: The cachefsd program shipped and installed by default with Sun
Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, and 8 (SPARC and Intel Architectures)
DAMAGE: A remote attacker can send a crafted RPC request to the
cachefsd program to execute arbitrary code with the privileges
of the cachefsd, typically root.
SOLUTION: Apply a patch from your vendor. If a patch is not available,
disable cachefsd in inetd.conf until a patch can be applied. If
disabling the cachefsd is not an option, follow the suggested
workaround in the Sun Alert Notification.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. A remote attacker may be able to execute code
ASSESSMENT: with the privileges of root.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/m-078.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-11.html
______________________________________________________________________________
[***** Start CERT Advisory CA-2002-11 *****]
CERT Advisory CA-2002-11 Heap Overflow in Cachefs Daemon (cachefsd)
Original release date: May 06, 2002
Last revised:
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
* Sun Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, and 8 (SPARC and Intel Architectures)
Overview
Sun's NFS/RPC file system cachefs daemon (cachefsd) is shipped and
installed by default with Sun Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, and 8 (SPARC and
Intel architectures). A remotely exploitable vulnerability exists in
cachefsd that could permit a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code
with the privileges of the cachefsd, typically root. The CERT/CC has
received credible reports of scanning and exploitation of Solaris
systems running cachefsd.
I. Description
A remotely exploitable heap overflow exists in the cachefsd program
shipped and installed by default with Sun Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, and 8
(SPARC and Intel architectures). Cachefsd caches requests for
operations on remote file systems mounted via the use of NFS protocol.
A remote attacker can send a crafted RPC request to the cachefsd
program to exploit the vulnerability.
Logs of exploitation attempts may resemble the following:
May 16 22:46:08 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Segmentation Fault - core dumped
May 16 22:46:21 victim-host last message repeated 7 times
May 16 22:46:22 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Bus Error- core dumped
May 16 22:46:24 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Segmentation Fault - core dumped
May 16 22:46:56 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Bus Error - core dumped
May 16 22:46:59 victim-host last message repeated 1 time
May 16 22:47:02 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Segmentation Fault - core dumped
May 16 22:47:07 victim-host last message repeated 3 times
May 16 22:47:09 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Hangup
May 16 22:47:11 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Segmentation Fault - core dumped
According a Sun Alert Notification, failed attempts to exploit this
vulnerability may leave a core dump file in the root directory. The
presence of the core file does not preclude the success of subsequent
attacks. Additionally, if the file /etc/cachefstab exists, it may
contain unusual entries.
This issue is also being referenced as CAN-2002-0085:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0085
The Australian Computer Emergency Response Team has also issued an
advisory related to incident activity exploiting cachefsd:
http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/Advisories/advisory/AA-2002.01.txt
II. Impact
A remote attacker may be able to execute code with the privileges of
the cachefsd process, typically root.
III. Solution
Apply a patch from your vendor
Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
If a patch is not available, disable cachefsd in inetd.conf until a
patch can be applied.
If disabling the cachefsd is not an option, follow the suggested
workaround in the Sun Alert Notification.
Appendix A. - Vendor Information
This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below, please check the Vulnerability
Note (VU#635811) or contact your vendor directly.
IBM
IBM's AIX operating system, all versions, is not vulnerable.
SGI
SGI does not ship with SUN cachefsd, so IRIX is not vulnerable.
Sun
See the Sun Alert Notification available at
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F44309.
_________________________________________________________________
The CERT/CC acknowledges the eSecurity Online Team for discovering and
reporting on this vulnerability and thanks Sun Microsystems for their
technical assistance.
_________________________________________________________________
Feedback can be directed to the authors:
Jason A. Rafail and Jeffrey S. Havrilla
______________________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-11.html
______________________________________________________________________
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
Our public PGP key is available from
http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
information.
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available from
our web site
http://www.cert.org/
To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your
message
subscribe cert-advisory
* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.
______________________________________________________________________
NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
_________________________________________________________________
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University.
Revision History
May 06, 2002: Initial release
[***** End CERT Advisory CA-2002-11 *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24)
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@ciac.org
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)
M-069: Microsoft SQL Server Unchecked Buffer Vulnerabilities
CIACTech02-003: Protecting Office for Mac X Antipiracy Server Ports
M-070: Apache HTTP Server on Win32 Vulnerability
M-071: Oracle9i User Privileges Vulnerability
M-072: FreeBSD stdio File Descriptors Vulnerability
M-073: Microsoft Outlook E-mail Editor Vulnerability
M-074: SGI IRIX cpr Vulnerability
M-075: HP Security Vulnerability in MPE/iX FTPSRVR
M-076: SGI IRIX nsd symlink Vulnerability
M-077: SGI IRIX Xlib Vulnerability
TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2025 AOH
